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Abstract 
 
The elucidation of the biological bases of a complex trait like human language proceeds 
from identification of precise behavioral phenotypes to investigation of the underlying genes.  
The human behavioral parts of this dissertation focus on understanding the reasons for 
children’s overuse of definite article ‘the’, to refer to one of several objects in a context set, as 
opposed to the unique established referent. Competing theories argue the deficit is either in 
children’s semantic computational knowledge (of uniqueness/maximality), or in their 
pragmatic/social awareness/theory-of-mind development. Experiments in this dissertation 
focused on children’s comprehension and interpretation of the indefinite and definite determiners, 
as well as ‘that’, anaphors ‘another’ and ‘same’, and free relative clauses.  
The results in this thesis suggest that in typically developing (TD) children the late 
acquisition of determiner ‘the’ is due to the late maturation of the semantic principle of 
maximality. Children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and with Williams syndrome (WS) 
either manifested an adult-like competence, an absence of manifestation of knowledge, or a 
pattern found in TD younger children (where ‘that’ is understood better than ‘the’ as referring to 
the salient unique referent) – indicating delay of development of the language faculty, but no 
deviance. This suggests that the observed deficits in ASD and WS pattern with those in TD, and 
hence are also semantic in nature. 
The mouse neurogenetic part of this dissertation investigates whether the GTF2I family of 
genes, causal to WS behavioral phenotype, also contributes to WS cortical development. By 
overexpression of Gtf2i and Gtf2ird1 in the mouse neocortex via in utero electroporation, their 
effects on laminar patterning and cell morphogenesis during brain development are characterized.  
The present results suggest that these genes can synergistically contribute to the abnormal 
neocortical development in WS, and thereby could contribute to language deficits in WS. 
Beyond posing an explanatory challenge to linguistic theories, the research comparing 
typical and atypical development sheds light on the mechanisms of language development and 
impairment, and provides endophenotypic descriptions of ASD and WS, which are crucial for 
elucidating not only genetics of neurodevelopmental disorders, but also the genetic basis of the 
human language faculty. 
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 1. Introduction  
 
When it comes to development of definite determiners in children, what is it that is 
responsible for driving the developmental trajectory, what is it that makes children use ‘the’ 
instead of ‘a’ for a salient referent in the context set? Across multiple theories explaining the 
phenomenon, two camps are evident. The more predominant camp argues it is a problem of the 
correct use of the ‘the’, i.e. children have adult semantic knowledge, however children do not yet 
have correct pragmatic interpretations, which primarily have to do with distinguishing between 
speaker/listener knowledge. There is certainly evidence that pragmatics, e.g. correct 
interpretation of personal pronouns (Chien, Wexler, 1985), and of scalar implicatures (e.g. 
Guasti, Chierchia, Crain, Foppolo, Gualmini, Meroni (2005)) are delayed in children. The smaller 
camp argues it is a problem in children’s knowledge of the semantic principles that guide the 
correct use of ‘the’, specifically that of Maximality/Uniqueness (Wexler 2003), i.e. it is just 
another stage that maturation of linguistic principles goes through, on par with e.g. development 
of A-chains (phases) (Hirsch, Wexler 2006; Wexler 2004; Borer and Wexler 1987). 
This thesis takes on the challenge of answering this question and suggesting that specific 
deficiency in ‘the’ in children is a manifestation of a specific semantic deficit. Supporting 
evidence comes not only from determiner comprehension experiments from hundreds of typically 
developing children, but also from children and adolescents with neurodevelopmental disorders 
and language impairments: autism spectrum disorders and Williams syndrome. 
The next question posed herein is, what is the underlying genetic basis of human language 
faculty, and to what extent can investigating functions of genes in animal models shed light on 
the biology of human language. Current work by Chomsky and colleagues (Hauser, Chomsky, 
Fitch 2002 and Fitch, Hauser, Chomsky 2005) formulates hypotheses for investigations. The 
human language faculty certainly involves sensory-motor (perception of and reaction to external 
environment) and conceptual-intentional (planning, attention, control of behavior) systems which 
we share with other species. The question is whether recursion (ability to splice together lexical 
items and phrases to generate sentences) is uniquely human, unique to language, unique to 
language in humans, or a specific organization of otherwise existing capacities. 
This thesis investigates the influence of two Williams syndrome genes on brain 
development using mouse models. Brain morphology in Williams syndrome is known to be 
abnormal, with altered white and grey matter volumes, which some have argued to stem from 
deficits in laminar patterning. This thesis is the first to directly investigate synergistic effects of 
Williams syndrome genes on brain development. It is presently impossible to make a direct and 
transparent connection between language deficits (not only in Williams syndrome but in other 
disorders as well) and abnormalities in laminar patterning, but it is certain that such abnormalities 
can underlie linguistic and cognitive deficits. 
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 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 discusses semantic and pragmatic properties of determiners, goes over logical 
predictions based on those properties, then reviews some of the child language acquisition studies 
of determiners, and discusses the theoretical explanations for children’s deficits. 
Chapter 3 presents acquisition data on comprehension of determiners and anaphors in 
typically developing children. 
Chapter 4 presents lack of correlation between acquisition of determiners and 
development of theory of mind, and presents further evidence for delayed development of 
Maximality in domains outside of definite determiners: in free relative clauses. 
Chapter 5 presents acquisition data on comprehension of determiners in children and 
adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorders in comparison to typically developing children. 
Chapter 6 in part one presents acquisition data on comprehension of determiners in 
children and adolescents with Williams syndrome in comparison to those with Autism Spectrum 
Disorders and to typically developing children. 
Chapter 6 in part two presents data on the effects of two Williams syndrome genes on 
embryonic brain development - on laminar patterning and neurite morphology - in mice. 
Chapter 7 concludes. 
 
Publications 
The work presented in section 3.2 was previously published in conference proceedings of 
GALANA2 - Generative Approaches to Language Acquisition - North America in 2006. The 
results in 4.2 were previously published in the Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Boston University 
Conference on Language Development in 2008. The results in chapter 5 was presented in posters 
at the 28th Annual Symposium on Research in Child Language Disorders at University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, and also at the 2nd Annual Autism Consortium Retreat, Broad Institute of 
MIT and Harvard, both in 2007. 
Chapters 2-3, and sections 4.1, 5, 6.1, and 6.2 are in process of submission as individual 
journal articles.  
 
Advising/Collaborations 
Work in chapters 2-6.1 ensued under guidance from Ken Wexler. Experimental details in 
4.1 were worked out with Charlotte Giessman. The idea for 4.2 was suggested by Tania Ionin and 
was elaborated with significant help from Irene Heim. The participants in 5 and 6.1 were 
recruited in collaboration with Alexandra Perovic. Collection of all human behavioral data was 
performed by the author in collaboration with over 40 undergraduate research assistants. 
Collection of data from participants with autism spectrum disorders was especially made possible 
by assistance from Lee Mavros. 
Work in chapter 6.2 ensued under extensive guidance from Damon Page. 
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2. Background on Semantics and Pragmatics and their Development 
 
We first discuss semantic and pragmatic properties of determiners, go over logical 
predictions based on those properties, then review some of the child language acquisition studies 
of determiners, and discuss the theoretical explanations for children’s deficits that have been 
proposed. 
2.1. Semantics and Pragmatics of Determiners 
We start with semantic definitions – namely those of ‘the’ and ‘a’, following Heim (1991). 
The formal semantic definition of the definite article ‘the’ (1) contains a uniqueness 
presupposition – that there is exactly one referent in a given context set (for example one where 
there are several identical Xs that may be distinguished by various means, in order to make one X 
unique/salient). In plural cases, uniqueness generalizes to maximality, where ‘the objects’ must 
refer to the entire, maximum set of objects in the context and not a subset. Maximality is 
uniqueness, in a sense: a singleton set is the maximal element in a set of atoms – a unique set of 
atoms. 
The formal definition for the indefinite article ‘a’ (2) only suggests presence of at least 
one referent, without a context set, and may in fact be used in the absence of a referent.  
To differentiate between uses of ‘a’ and uses of ‘the’, Maximize Presupposition 
Implicature forces use of ‘the’ instead of ‘a’ in case of singleton set. This is what makes it 
incorrect to say “a biological mother of mine…”.  
 
(1) Adult’s lexical entry for ‘the’ (based on Heim 1991): 
Regardless of the utterance context (i), [the x] P expresses that proposition that is: 
true at an index i, if there is exactly one x at i, and it is P at i 
false at an index i, if there is exactly one x at i, and it is not P at i 
truth-valueless at an index i, if there isn’t exactly one x at i. 
 
(2) Adult’s lexical entry of ‘a’ (based on Heim 1991):  
A sentence of the form [a x] P expresses that proposition which is true if there is at least 
one individual which is both x and P, and false otherwise. 
 
It turns out that the English language has a word that presents an excellent minimal 
contrast, at least intuitively, to the definite determiner ‘the’ - the demonstrative determiner ‘that’. 
Consider three examples to illustrate the differences between ‘a’ (3), ‘the’ (4), and ‘that’ (5).  
 
(3) A guy in my class is a genius  Implies there is a smart male person in the set ‘my class’. 
(4) The guy in my class is a genius  Implies there is a unique male in the context set ‘my 
class’, i.e. there is only one male person in ‘my class’, and is infelicitous if there are several or no 
males in ‘my class’. 
(5) That guy in my class is a genius  Implies that the listener knows about a particular male 
person from previous discussions with the speaker. There is not necessarily a unique male in the 
physical world, but there is unique, familiar referent in shared world-knowledge (from prior 
conversations) between speaker and listener. 
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Thus the use of ‘that’ not only implicates uniqueness of the referent (just like ‘the’) but 
also requires the speaker to be aware of the listener’s state of mind when it comes the identity of 
the referent of ‘that’. A number of theories have been proposed to account for demonstratives and 
definites, their similarities and their differences.  
Maclaran (1982) discusses the differences between ‘the’ and ‘that’, the key one being that 
while it is enough that the referent of the definite article is inferred, the referent referred to by 
‘that’ must be given in the (extra)-linguistic context, it is not enough for it to be inferred. It seems 
that such nondemonstrative use of ‘that’ carries a number of presuppositions on the referent, 
which are minimally different from the definite article. ‘That’, according to Maclaran, carries a 
familiarity presupposition, such that both the speaker and the listener must be familiar with the 
referent, presumably from previous conversations. This familiarity is what makes the referent 
especially salient. ‘That’ also has a uniqueness presupposition, although effective not in the 
physical world, but in the metalinguistic knowledge space (context) shared by the speaker and the 
listener. Thus, while ‘the’ does not necessitate one to rely on awareness of other minds, but only 
on their knowledge of uniqueness and of how uniqueness applies to the context set of the 
utterance, ‘that’ necessitates knowledge of uniqueness and requires awareness of the context set 
knowledge shared by the speaker and the listener. 
More recent accounts try to deal with the definite-demonstrative difference more 
concretely. Thus King (2001) suggests that demonstratives have an extra argument which is 
saturated with a speaker intention to refer. Roberts (2002) suggests that demonstratives come 
with an additional presupposition, namely that of accompanying speaker demonstration.  
Wolter (2006 a,b) suggests reuniting semantics of definites and demonstratives, and 
pushing the differences into the land of domain restriction - the interpretation of nominal 
predicates relative to a situation (actual or possible world situation). Wolter assumes the 
situation-based domain restriction, where each nominal predicate enters compositional semantics 
with an extra argument position which is satisfied by the value of the situation variable for a 
particular possible world interpretation. 1  Both ‘the’ and ‘that’ have uniqueness presupposition 
on the referent. Wolter argues that the condition of familiarity in itself is not necessary. The 
difference lies in the relative domain of interpretation that the listener must take to identify the 
referent – a pragmatic distinction. Wolter argues ‘the’ (definite descriptions) is interpreted 
relative to default situations, i.e. those associated with main predicates and corresponding to the 
world of discourse context, while ‘that’ (demonstrative descriptions) are interpreted relative to 
other salient situations, which correspond to a speaker demonstration of other salient eventuality 
and/or situation, or a state of experiencing the knowledge or emotion shared by discourse 
participants, but not necessarily identical to the discourse context (formalized in 6). Thus 
demonstrative, unlike definite, restricts the “value of the situation argument of their nominal 
complement” (Wolter 2006a:62). Wolter argues that definite ‘the’ is less marked, in the sense 
that it only has a uniqueness presupposition, whereas demonstrative ‘that’ is more marked – it has 
uniqueness plus triggers non-default situation interpretation. Thus ‘the’ tends to be preferred, 
unless ‘that’ is required to enhance interpretation.  
                                                 
1 This is situation-based approach. The effects of domain restriction are tied to the modal 
parameter of the nominal predicate. Different predicates in one clause may be interpreted relative 
to different worlds. So each predicate enters the compositional semantics with its own modal 
parameter which determines which possible world the predicate is interpreted at. Predicate – has 
extra argument position saturated with a situation variable. Each predicate has its own situation 
index. Possible world = maximal situation. 
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(6) (reproduced from Wolter 2006a:74) 
[then ]]: lambda P.P(sn) is a singleton set. If defined, denotes iota x.P(x)(sn ) 
[thatn ]]: lambda P.P(sn) is a singleton set and sn is non-default. If defined, denotes iota  
x.P(x)(sn) 
Given a sentence A, a situation variable s is a default situation just in case it is bound in A. 
Otherwise s is a non-default situation 
 
Both definite and demonstrative can be used anaphorically – referring to linguistic 
antecedent (established by e.g. an indefinite description), also known as bridging. It is relevant to 
review here Avrutin (1999) and Heim’s (1982) File Change Semantics: “as a model of the 
discourse representation of NPs. An indefinite NP in this theory is represented in the discourse 
with a new file card, while a definite NP does not introduce a new file card (normally) but is 
incorporated into an existing one”. Avrutin (1999:37) suggests that “Indeed, the smaller the file 
(that is, the fewer cards it contains), the easier it is to maintain it (that is, keep record). It is 
plausible, therefore, that the economy (information-processing) considerations result in the 
following constraint on file change:  Avoid introduction of new file cards, unless it is required by 
syntax and/or discourse.” It follows that definite NPs always have an antecedent. The use of 
definite NP without a previouly linguistically established antecedent is ony natural in cases where 
the uniqueness of the referent is common knowledge. “Interestingly, this use depends on some 
shared knowledge, or at least on the assumption that some relevant knowledge is shared both by 
the speaker, and the listener.” Avrutin (1999:51) further argues that “speakers cannot felicitously 
use [such] definite NPs without making certain inferences about other speakers' knowledge.” 2 In 
summary, incorporation of a definite NP into discourse happens via explicit bridging or 
accomodation (inferential bridging), i.e. via bridging definite NP file card with some existing 
card. Notably, children as young as 4 years old (in Dutch, English, Russian) have adult-like 
interpretation of inferential bridging (argued to be implicit domain restriction) (Avrutin & 
Coopmans (2000)).  
 
Consider the following examples. 
 
(7) A cari stopped in front of a housej. The door *i/j was open. 
(8) (on a busy street) A cari stopped at the red light. ?That/The cari then took a left turn. 
(9) (on a busy street) A car came to a screeching stop. ?The/That car came so close to running 
the red light! 
 
In inferential bridging (associative anaphora (7)), ‘the door’ is taken to refer to that of the 
house, since a car as at least two doors, and hence has no unique door. In explicit bridging via an 
anaphoric definite (relational anaphora (8)), ‘a car’ is used to establish a unique referent, with 
                                                 
2 AVRUTIN (1999:45) Rules of NP Representation in Discourse 
1. Instantiate the variable index of an Indefinite NP with a number of a new file card. 
2. Instantiate the variable index of a definite NP with a number of an old file card. 
3. Instantiate two identical variable indices with the same number, and two different indices 
with different numbers. 
4. Instantiate the variable index of a definite NP with a number of a new file card only if this 
card can be bridged to another one. 
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‘the car’ referring back to the unique referent. Anaphoric demonstratives (9) (as Wolter argues, 
2006a:74) “can be understood as zooming in on a salient subpart of the discourse context”, hence 
the necessity of emotive or contrastive use. “Anaphoric demonstratives can also refer to an 
individual who has been previously mentioned or encountered by the interlocutors but who might 
have been subsequently forgotten”, and (2006a:75) “anaphoric demonstrative description can be 
understood as referring uniquely relative to a salient situation that does not correspond to the 
entire unadjusted discourse context. … anaphoric definite descriptions are relativized only to the 
situation corresponding to the entire discourse context. Definite descriptions may not zoom out 
on the discourse context to include potentially forgotten individuals.” 
 
It is also necessary to discuss referential elements which are intrinsically anaphoric – 
elements whose interpretation is intrinsically dependent on a linguistic antecedent. These include 
personal and reflexive pronouns (not the topic of current investigations), and anaphors ‘another’ 
and ‘same’. Referents of ‘another’ and ‘same’, just like anaphoric definite and demonstrative 
referents, crucially depend on existence of a unique salient referent in the discourse situation. 
‘Same’ refers to that unique referent, essentially is an equal sign to the existing file card. 
‘Another’ refers to a referent that is NOT the unique salient referent – something that is like that 
salient referent in property/kind, but is not that unique referent, but is any other one. Both of 
these are best used when there is a set of several similar referents, and one feature distinguishes 
the salient referent from non salient referents. Thus both ‘same’ and ‘another’, in a sense, can 
serve the role of definite and demonstrative descriptions – both require interpretation relative to 
the salient entity in the discourse set.  
 
(10) Another guy in my class is a genius somewhat weird without antecedent. A logical 
interpretation – there was one smart annoying person, and now there is a second one. 
(11) The same guy in my class is a genius somewhat weird without an antecedent. A logical 
interpretation – at some point in time there was a male genius, and now, contrary to expectations, 
that same male person continues to be a genius. 
 
A similar anaphoric notion is demonstrated by this example from Russian military 
folklore. The speaker of the sentence is clearly a utility pole. 
 
(12) Soldiers! You must march from me to the next utility pole! 
2.2. Predictions for Acquisition 
At this point, a good exercise would be to consider what it could mean to have difficulty 
with interpreting indefinites, definites, demonstratives, or anaphors, before looking at the 
acquisition data. It is possible to not have yet acquired the semantic definitions of all those 
determiners. Thus if children do not know that uniqueness is part of definition of ‘the’ or ‘that’ – 
we expect trouble. If children do not know that there must be a salient referent in the discourse 
set – we expect trouble. If children assume ‘a’ means something more than it does – we expect 
trouble. 
Another alternative is that it is possible to not have yet realized the precise interaction of 
determiners with context, and thus difficulty with setting the appropriate situation for an 
interpretation, which could be due to domain restriction deficits or deficits in realizing that shared 
speaker/hearer knowledge is relevant to interpretation. If children do not know that ‘that’ triggers 
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interpretation relative to a non-default situation, or do not know about the possibility of 
interpretation relative to a non-default situation, children may not differentiate ‘the’ from ‘that’. 
It is also possible that if children do not know about uniqueness, but are more sensitive to 
non-default situations of interpretations, that pragmatic knowledge may help children interpret 
‘that’ even if they lack semantic uniqueness.  
Note, that if Maximize presupposition implicature (i.e. there is a scale where The>A) is 
similar to other implicatures (e.g. ‘some’ implies ‘not all’, with a scale where All>Some), then 
we can expect, given studies of children’s difficulties with implicatures (Guasti, Chierchia, Crain, 
Foppolo, Gualmini, Meroni (2005) who show that from age 7 kids can do scalar implicatures, i.e. 
pragmatic inferencing (as opposed to logical)), that children will have problems with using ‘a’ 
correctly, and that children will think that, in some sense, ‘a’ means ‘the’.  
Thus deficits in determiner interpretation could be in semantics, or pragmatics, or both.  
Another good exercise is to think about what it means to have a ‘pragmatic’ deficit, or 
rather a ‘pragmatic processing’ deficit (as opposed to a semantic computational one). One of the 
few articulated proposals is that based on Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993), and it certainly can 
work in accounting for children’s deficits in scalar implicatures – which people have argued is a 
pragmatic phenomenon. In scalar implicatures, and perhaps in referential descriptions, a 
reference set computation is necessary, which requires temporarily holding two or more 
alternative interpretations / derivations in working memory at once. Children with 
underdeveloped linguistic working memory may fail to hold two interpretations at once, and 
guess. Reinhart (to appear:10) argues that intra-subject 50% (chance) performance (as seen on 
apparent delay of principle B errors in children) is indication of such working memory 
difficulties.3 In other words, difficulty in pragmatics in children may simply be the issue of 
finding the right match between the context set and the right proposition. In other words, 
children’s pragmatic difficulties in scalar implicatures have nothing to do with children’s lack of 
awareness of their listener’s states of minds, but have everything to do with children’s own 
underdeveloped capacity for finding the right interpretation for a given context. Note that all (as 
far as I know) scalar implicature experiments test children’s comprehension and children’s 
preferred interpretations. Why do people not study production of scalar implicatures? Because in 
production it is hard to distinguish between the two possibilities of pragmatic deficits – those due 
to limited working memory / referential set comparisons, and those due to limited 
awareness/calculation of listener knowledge of the discourse. It is only by turning the child into a 
listener and focusing the child’s attention on their own interpretations that it becomes possible to 
distinguish the two. If pragmatic difficulties are due to lack of knowledge of listener’s state of 
mind – those should only be present in production. If pragmatic difficulties are due to having to 
juggle multiple interpretations at once – those will affect comprehension, and may as well affect 
production.  
For such working memory issues, children may prefer to be economical, and may limit 
the number of cards in the discourse (according to Avrutin’s interpretations of File Card 
Semantics). It is more economical to have the same referent, rather than add a new one – 
otherwise it is necessary to hold multiple cards in mind. This view would expect for children to 
pick salient referents in context sets across the board, e.g. picking reflexive referent and not 
pronoun referent, and doing so also for ‘a’ and ‘another’ (which would lead to incorrect 
                                                 
3 Footnote on scalar implicatures: If marking on a predicate encodes neutral information that 
the predicate is underspecified… Build a set of alternatives, conjunct sentence with negation of 
alternatives that entail the sentence. AND>OR. ALL>some.  
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interpretations), and also for ‘the’ and ‘that’ (which would lead to correct interpretations) – but 
this is not what we see in acquisition (chapter 2.3). Wexler (2003) argues that this view of 
‘pragmatic’ deficits as working memory limitations does not seem to make correct predictions in 
the acquisition of determiners – children should make mistakes with ‘a’ and not with ‘the’ – 
which is not the case in acquisition. 
 
A very relevant question, which so far was not addressed, concerns the psychological 
reality of determiners, not just their linguistic reality. When we are discussing non/default 
situations, uniqueness, saliency, familiarity, the obvious question (Heim, p.c.) is “who are the 
relevant minds to whom the entities in these contexts are supposed to be salient or familiar. The 
speaker? The listener? Both? This question is crucial for an assessment of whether the production 
or comprehension of 'the' and 'that' involves reasoning about another mind, and if so, what kind 
of reasoning.” 
Many authors assume that the burden of communication lies on the speaker, and not the 
listener. The listeners are merely attentive processors. Thus in English, which bins article space 
by definiteness (speaker and listener knowledge) and indefiniteness (no listener knowledge) (as 
opposed to binning article space by specificity (speaker knowledge)), producing an indefinite 
implies no listener knowledge of referent (in naming or introducing referents), and a producing 
definite implies listener knowledge of referent (of already-established salient referent, physical 
contextual information, or it implies that listener can infer the referent given their knowledge). 
Listener’s interpretation should be guided solely by their own attentional state. Thus while 
producing determiners can be a complicated task – one always has to worry about one’s listener’s 
point of view of the context and their knowledge of salient and unsalient referents, 
comprehension of determiners should be more straightforward, that is if one has good knowledge 
of semantic presuppositions of determiners. If you know that ‘the’ means ‘unique referent’, but 
you don’t know about your listener’s state of mind or you don’t know that you have to be aware 
of your listeners’ state of mind, you’ll be making mistakes in producing utterances that point out 
salient-to-you but unsalient-to-the-listener referents. In comprehension however, you’ll know 
automatically as soon as ‘the’ is uttered – that’s the salient referent in the context set – no second 
thoughts. I.e. it seems that difficulties with understanding other minds should not cause errors in 
comprehension. But if you don’t know semantic presuppositions of determiners, or have some 
non-adult form of such presuppositions, you will clearly show this lack in comprehension, unless 
you have some canny strategy of interpretation. Similarly in production, you may show the non-
adult semantics by referring to referents in a non-adult way, whether or not you are or are not 
aware of necessity to be aware of other minds, unless you have some canny strategies. 
If, on the other hand, the listener is not passive and only follows their own attentional 
state, but is actively monitoring the speaker and their shared conversational history, then, as in, 
e.g. Relevance theory (Wilson and Sperber 20024), listeners are actively interpreting and guessing 
                                                 
4 An utterance (U) is relevant if and only if it carries enough cognitive effects to balance the 
processing effort. (Cognitive effects occur when new information combines with existing 
assumptions to produce new conclusions, or to strengthen or weaken and eliminate existing 
assumptions). 
It follows from the Communicative Principle that every U carries an expectation of 
optimal relevance, that is U will create enough cognitive effects to offset the processing effort 
required of H (Hearer) to process it, and that S (Speaker) will produce U which best reflects S’s 
abilities and preferences. This presumption of optimal relevance has two important 
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at what the speaker meant. The listeners are active interpreters. The listener would reason out 
(unconsciously of course), that since the speaker said ‘a’, they meant a new or any referent, 
because if they were referring to an old or a unique referent, they would have said ‘the’. Active 
listeners thus are applying just as much semantic and pragmatic and other-mind knowledge to 
comprehension of determiners as are speakers in producing them. Active listener’s working 
memory may also be continually taxed with reasoning out the possible interpretations of the 
speaker’s utterance. Again, if listeners are deficient in either semantic or pragmatic aspects of 
determiner interpretation, they may incorrectly infer the speaker’s intentions. If listeners have 
non-adult semantics, they may assume their speaker also has non-adult semantics, and happily 
follow their own (mis)interpretations. If listeners lack in awareness of other minds, they may 
not even think about communicational relevancy of the speaker’s utterance, ignore it 
altogether, or just go with what they as a listener would mean if they had produced such an 
utterance – from their own point of view, which may be drastically different from the 
intended point of view. If listeners have working memory issues, they may go with the first 
interpretation that comes to mind, which may or may not be the right one. The question is, do 
such active listeners, when they take on the role of speakers, take on the burden of producing the 
more relevant utterance or would they be sloppy since they know that the other person would 
figure it out if they cared to? For Economy principles, and that is what Relevance theory argues 
in a way, it is shameful to waste resources needlessly, unless it necessary to make a point. It is 
not economical for speakers to be sloppy since listeners would be expanding extra resources 
needlessly. It is not economical for speakers to take on all the communicational burden since 
listeners would be spending energy making sense of things any way. Is it possible that people 
speak in a way that makes sense for them (a result of interaction between their world knowledge 
and the semantics and pragmatic rules of their language) and as a result they are understood by 
listeners (as long as they have the same world knowledge and the same semantic and pragmatic 
rules of the same language as the speaker)? 
The catch in all this theorizing, is that I don’t know of a way to test whether listeners are 
just attentive processors or active interpreters.  
 
The main point is that if one has deficient semantic knowledge, one should make 
comprehension mistakes (unless one’s pragmatic knowledge (and awareness of speaker’s 
intentions, mediated e.g. in ‘that’ by interpretation relative to non-default situations) helps to 
overcome those deficits). The other main point is, if one has deficient pragmatic/other mind 
knowledge only, one should make production mistakes and speak as if from one’s own point of 
view, but no comprehension mistakes. If one is deficient in pragmatics/working memory (but not 
in semantic/pragmatic definitions), and if indeed referential set computations are involved in 
determiners as they are involved in scalar implicatures, one should make comprehension mistakes 
and show chance performance.  
 
                                                 
consequences: H can assume that S has not forced H into spending gratuitous effort and that 
every extra bit of effort will be balanced by extra cognitive effects; the second is that the first 
interpretation that H is satisfied with will be the only one H will come up with because H will 
assume that whatever change in H’s cognitive environment was intended by S to occur as a result 
of U will occur with least effort possible. (Modyanova 2002, unpublished term paper on 
Relevance-Theoretic interpretation of Tautologies). 
17
Can we distinguish then working memory deficit from semantic knowledge deficit in 
comprehension? I would like to argue that yes, it is possible. Just like in apparent delay of 
principle B effect, children misinterpret personal pronouns when the utterance can have two 
interpretations, but children perform perfectly when only one interpretation is possible – namely 
when there is a quantifier present. This result shows that children do know principle B, but for 
pragmatic reasons (working memory (Reinhart, to appear) or principle P (Chien, Wexler, 1990) 
are being confused when having to chose one of TWO possible interpretations.  
Similarly, I would like to argue, that when it comes to determiners and descriptions of 
unique entities, working memory/pragmatic and semantic deficits can be disambiguated. 
Consider two determiners – ‘same’ and ‘the’. Both refer to the salient entity in the context set, 
and hence may require reference set computation to figure out which is the salient entity in the 
context set.  Semantically, ‘same’ is an equal sign to the already-established salient referent, 
‘same’ is anaphoric to the salient antecedent. Semantically ‘the’ is not an equal sign, it 
presupposes uniqueness and existence of the referent in discourse set, but the referent may be 
inferred, and ‘the’ can be used anaphorically. If children are missing uniqueness (Wexler 2003), 
semantically ‘child-the’ indicates existence of a referent in discourse set, but the referent now no 
longer has to refer to the unique salient one. Just one of the salient referents will be good enough. 
Continuing this logic, if children’s difficulties are with working memory/pragmatic 
interpretations (but not semantics) – children will have problem with comprehending both ‘same’ 
and ‘the’ (since both involve reference set computations, and paying attention to the salient 
referent in the context set) in a similar way. If children’s difficulties are specifically with 
semantics of ‘the’ (but not with working memory/pragmatics), children will do fine on ‘same’, 
but will continue to have problems with ‘the’ until that time when their semantic knowledge 
becomes adult-like.  
Let’s consider another contrast – between ‘the’ and ‘that’. Both determiners involve 
uniqueness semantically and both require reference set computations (maybe). The difference is 
that, according to Wolter (2006a,b), ‘that’ has an extra feature which calls for interpretation 
relative to non-default discourse situation. If children are missing uniqueness, but are sensitive to 
non-default interpretations (for example shared speaker/hearer knowledge), those children may 
do better on ‘that’ than on ‘the’. If children are not missing uniqueness, but have working 
memory issues, will they do better on ‘that’ than on ‘the’ since ‘that’ is more marked and draws 
attention to the salient subpart of the context? Well, maybe, but maybe not, since still, children 
would have to figure out which is the salient subpart of the context – it’s almost an extra step in 
computation according to Wolter (2006a,b) – figuring out which is the relevant subpart of the 
context. If anything, is it possible to predict that children who know uniqueness but have working 
memory issues will perform better on ‘the’ than on ‘that’? Answer to this question is beyond the 
score of the present work, but may be answered by investigating comprehension of determiners 
in children with Dyslexia who are argued to have working memory deficits (e.g. in Fiorin 2009). 
Another question beyond the scope of present work - Do children learn and apply more marked 
things better than less marked things?  
2.3. Acquisition studies of definite determiners and evolutions of theoretical explanations 
Children’s acquisition of determiners has been addressed in many studies. A 
comprehensive review is beyond the scope of the present section, but a few notable studies that 
illustrate acquisition are reviewed (see also Hickman 2003 for extensive reviews and alternative 
arguments). While children produce determiners in spontaneous speech by 3 years, adult-like 
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competence and performance does not come in until later – as measured by production and 
comprehension tasks.  
2.3.1. Spontaneous production studies 
Brown’s natural production data (1973:355) suggests that “children somewhere between 
the ages of 32 and 41 months, roughly three years, do control the specific/non-specific distinction 
as coded by the articles”. However, as Karmiloff-Smith writes  “Brown nonetheless adds the 
proviso that this early productive control of the article contrast does not yet cover instances where 
the child is obliged to take into account his listener’s knowledge” (Karmiloff-Smith 1977:378).  
Analysis by Gundel and colleagues of Brown’s corpus similarly suggests that 3 year old 
children use all possible determiners, and assuming that speakers take on the entire burden of 
communicative relevance, Gundel argue that any successful production of determiners is clear 
evidence toward children’s full semantic and pragmatic competence and full awareness of other’s 
minds. (Gundel 2009). A key assumption made by this work is that full competence is necessary 
for production, and that spontaneous production is evidence for full competence – that may not 
be the case.  
 Abu-Akel & Bailey (2000) analyze spontaneous speech of 17 children ages 1.5-4.8 from 
the Bristol corpus on CHILDES, by classifying determiners into exophoric (identifiable from 
situation, extralinguistic grounds, but not prior discourse) and endophoric (identifiable from 
linguistic discourse, anaphoric) uses, into definite and indefinite, and into specific vs nonspecific. 
In other words, Abu-Akel and Bailey make an effort to explicitly investigate the contexts in 
which children produce determiners – something that e.g. Gundel did not do so explicitly (as far 
as I know). 50-60% of produced DPs were exophoric, i.e. identifiable from immediate context. 
Over time, Abu-Akel and Bailey found increase in definite-exophoric DPs and a decrease in 
indefinite-endophoric (i.e. pragmatically inappropriate) DPs. The reverse pattern remained 
constant.  
Thus while children may spontaneously PRODUCE determiners early on, they may not 
produce them in correct contexts. It is not enough to investigate spontaneous production – it is 
necessary to perform experiments where contexts of utterances can be explicitly and 
unambiguously investigated and controlled for. 
2.3.2. Elicited production studies 
The logic of elicited production studies is to set up a context where the children have 
opportunity to refer to either unsalient referents (one that are just being introduced into discourse 
set, ‘a’ use expected) or salient referents (already established referents or unique salient entities, 
‘the’ use expected). This can be done with stories or pictures, or various physical sets of identical 
or merely similar items (e.g. toys) which form “item contexts”. The goal seems to be testing 
children’s awareness of their listener’s knowledge of un/established referents. The assumption in 
many of these studies is that children’s semantics is adult-like. 
Nearly all studies find that children use ‘a’ for naming objects consistently, and as early 
as can be tested.  For example Karmiloff-Smith (1979, experiment 2) found that when children 
were shown a bag of toys and asked “What’s in the bag?” (a situation where there is no 
presupposed existence of anything, no context set), children (3-12 years) always used ‘a’ 
correctly, at least >80% (the remaining <20% were omissions and only in 5s and younger). 
Similar results were found in Bresson et al (1970), Warden (1976, 1981), Schafer and de Villiers 
(2000). 
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When it comes to children’s using ‘a’ for introducing referents (i.e. mentioning entities 
that listener knows nothing about, or entities that have not yet been mentioned in the discourse), 
there is some variability across studies.  
Some studies show early acquisition of ‘a’ and show that children do not overuse ‘the’ for 
first-mention nonsalient referents. For example 3-4 year olds produced ‘a’ 70-80% of the time (in 
Emslie and Stevenson (1981) when describing pictures to same-age children sitting behind a 
screen (2s were at 50% (and only 10-15% ‘the’)); in Maratsos (1974) when describing item 
contexts; in Zehler & Brewer (1982) in sentence completion within narratives by 2-3 year olds; in 
Schaeffer and Matthewson (2005) by 2-3 year olds at 75% in contexts believed by speaker only 
and at 100% in context believed by nobody). I.e. children in some studies successfully use ‘a’ to 
refer to unestablished referents, and do not overuse ‘the’. 
Other studies show a later acquisition of ‘a’, and in fact show overuse of ‘the’ in first-
mention contexts. It was found that 3-8 year old children use ‘the’ (incorrectly) for referring to a 
nonsalient entity in a salient context about 40-70% of the time. For example 4 and 5 year olds in 
Bresson et al 1970 in response to question ‘who left’ in item context; 3 year olds in Garton 
(1983) in describing item context to a seeing/blindfolded observer; 3-8 year olds in Warden 
1976,1981 in describing stories to other children behind a screen, or in another room; the ‘low’ 
half of 4 year olds in Maratsos 1974 when describing item contexts who produced 42% ‘a’ (58% 
‘the’); 3-7 year olds in Karmiloff-Smith 1979 exp 1 & 5 when referring to one of several 
identical objects, in exp 6 when referring to unestablished referents in a verbal story; 3-5 year 
olds in Schafer and de Villiers. I.e. children in some studies fail to use ‘a’ to refer to 
unestablished referents, and overuse ‘the’ in those cases. 
Is there a coherent difference between those studies that show lack of ‘the’ overuse for 
unestablished referents and those that show ‘the’ overuse? One logical (semantic) possibility is 
that children in the former studies are assuming the listener has no context set – in which case ‘a’ 
is possible, but ‘the’ is not (since children’s knowledge includes the fact that referent of ‘the’ is in 
the context set, while referent of ‘a’ does not require a context set). In the latter studies, children 
could be assuming that the listener has a context set, which enables them to overuse ‘the’ (if they 
do not know uniqueness/Maximality in ‘the’). Unfortunately it is hard to disambiguate 
participants’ estimations of listeners’ knowledge regarding the presence or absence of context set 
– this is something that multiple studies addressed explicitly through social manipulations 
(below), but the results of such manipulations were not consistent. 
One point of contrast across the elicited production studies is the method of elicited 
production. In some, various item contexts are set up (e.g. a group of identical objects, a group of 
similar objects (differing by color, some unique objects) and the experimenter points to various 
items or acts out scenarios with puppets which the children have to comment on (a more artificial 
set up) (Bresson et al 1970, Garton 1983, Karmiloff-Smith 1979). In others, children are given 
series of pictures forming a story and they have to retell the story (a more naturalistic set up) 
(Warden 1976, 1981, Emslie & Stevenson 1981). In both manipulations, social contexts can vary 
– the listener is either absent (Warden 1981), or is the experimenter (an all-knowing listener 
(Maratsos 1974,1976)), or is a blindfolded person (Garton 1983, Warden 1976), or is another 
child (naïve listener) who is sitting across the table behind a screen or in another room altogether 
(Warden 1976, 1981; Emslie and Stevenson 1981). 
However these social manipulations did not consistently affect the quality of determiners. 
In Garton (1983), blindfolding the observer reduced the omission of determiners (from 50% for 
seeing to 22% for blindfolded observer) but did not affect the patterns of production. Explaining 
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to the child why the screen was between them and their listener and motivating them to be 
understood helped participants in Emslie and Stevenson, relative to Warden 1976 (exp. 3) who 
simply put up the screen. However in an explicit set–up, telling a story by themselves vs to a 
visible or invisible audience did not make any difference in children’s performance (Warden 
1976, 1981). 
When it comes to children’s using ‘the’ for referring to singleton referents (unique objects 
in context set) or salient referents (e.g. second mention referents known to both listener and 
speaker), there is also variation, but children are consistent in using primarily ‘the’ in these 
contexts from about 4 years of age. (Gardon (1983) finds 3s use ‘the’ 29% and ‘this’ and ‘that’ 
over 60%; Emslie and Stevenson find 3-4 year olds use definite descriptions perfectly (‘the’ and 
pronouns) (the 2 year olds were at 60% ‘the’); Warden (1976) finds 3 and 5 year olds at 90% 
‘the’; Maratsos (1974) finds 3 year olds at 55% and 4s at over 90% on ‘the’; Zehler & Brewer 
1982 find only their 3s (and not 2s) close to 80% on ‘the’; Karmiloff-Smith (1979) finds 80-90% 
‘the’ for singletons in 3-9 year olds in item contexts, and 90% ‘the’ by age 5 in verbal story 
contexts; Schafer and de Villiers find 50-70% ‘the’ for children 3-5 (with 20-30% omission and 
10-30% ‘a’); Schaeffer and Matthewson (2005) find 2-3 year olds at perfect performance). 
In Summary, if children do make mistakes in using determiners, it is an “athe” 
response, where children overuse ‘the’ in context where they ought to be using ‘a’ – for an 
unestablished referent among a set of several similar or identical referents. It not a random 
response – children know to use ‘the’ for a singleton or a second-mention salient referent; 
children know to use ‘a’ when there is no context set. I.e. children make the mistake of using 
‘the’ for an unestablished referent within a context of several potential referents, but children do 
not make the mistake of using ‘the’ in a naming task.  
2.3.3. Explanations for patterns in production studies 
The most favorite explanation of overuse of ‘the’ has been ‘pragmatic’, since semantically 
children seem to know the difference between ‘a’ and ‘the’, but seem to fail to take into account 
listener knowledge.  
Bresson et al (1970) link difficulties with ‘a' in the use of the non-specific referent to the 
child’s ongoing cognitive problems in class and relation concepts (Piaget and Inhelder 1959). 
Maratsos (1974) explicitly links those difficulties to Piaget’s (1951, 1955) stage of 
Egocentrism, even though only a subset of children in his data support this theory (the Low 4s) – 
most children show very good knowledge. When egocentric, children fail to estimate their 
listeners’ referential knowledge – their listener’s point of view, thus the saliency of referents is 
evaluated from the child’s point of view and not relative to that of the speaker. Children establish 
a salient referent for themselves and stop there, without introducing the referent to the speaker 
with an indefinite. Children fail to tell their conversation partner explicitly about their chosen 
referent, i.e. they fail to realize that the salience of the referent is not shared by their interlocutor5. 
                                                 
5 (Maratsos 1974:477): “Piaget (1955) had children tell fairy tales and myths to other children, 
and explain to other children the workings of a tap or a syringe. Piaget noted: "The explainer 
always gave us the impression of talking to himself, without bothering about the other child. 
Very rarely did he succeed in placing himself at the latter's point of view" (Piaget 1955, p. 115). 
On logical grounds this ability might be expected to develop after the primary referential 
competence, since it seems unlikely one could estimate referential knowledge in others without 
21
However it has been noted that the stories in Maratsos experiments were difficult, and children 
could choose to concentrate on the task and not on the needs of the listener (who is also the 
experimenter). 
Warden (1976) similarly, based on children’s apparent difficulties with ‘a’ (underuse of 
‘a’ in first-mention nonsalient nonunique contexts), argues that children younger than 9 years old 
do not take into account the social context of their referring expressions, i.e. they fail to take into 
account their audience’s lack of knowledge of referent. Children are either confused about the use 
of determiners, or are only capable of their own egocentric point of view. Warden (1981) argues 
that since children never use ‘a’ for a salient referent, they know its meaning. The only possibility 
is that children fail to implement their knowledge and that Warden’s context manipulations 
“failed to simplify the context sufficiently to enable children to surmount their egocentricity.” 
(Warden 1981:98).6 
 More recent studies argue along the similar lines, but reinterpret egocentrism as pragmatic 
or theory of mind difficulties.  E.g. Schafer and de Villiers (2000) suggest that use of ‘a’ vs ‘the’ 
entails (via a scalar implicature) that the speaker implied ‘a’, and not the stronger ‘the’. Given 
that computing this implicature involves other people’s beliefs, they argue that it requires Theory 
of Mind – a modern reinterpretation of egocentrism. Schaeffer and Matthewson (2005) argue that 
children, when they are trying to figure out whether their language works by definiteness or 
specificity, “initially lack a pragmatic concept requiring them to distinguish systematically 
between their own beliefs and the belief state of their interlocutor” (2005:53), it is the “Concept 
                                                 
having developed the required distinctions in one's own usage first. Proper use of the two articles 
‘a’ and ‘the’ clearly demands a high degree of semantic and conceptual competence.” 
6 (Warden 1976:110-111): “They [children] fail to recognize the need for an indefinite 
expression when introducing a referent for the first time in a discourse; consequently, they also 
fail to recognize the constraints on the use of the definite article, namely that its use indicates an 
already-identified referent. The most obvious explanation for a child’s failure to identify referents 
is that he is unable to adopt his audience’s point of view. From his own egocentric viewpoint, a 
referent is specified as soon as he (the speaker) is familiar with it; he fails to realize that his 
audience will only become familiar with his referent after he has identified it for them verbally… 
however … why did nearly every child from four year upwards produce at least some identifying 
expressions? Were they only partially egocentric? Furthermore, why did the children who used 
context-bound referring expressions in expt. II only do so in appropriate contexts, namely, when 
their audience could see the referents. It may be argued that five-year-old children can be non-
egocentric in their use of referring expressions, for example, when using demonstratives [!!!!]; 
but that they are still grappling with the implications of non-egocentricity for the use of the 
articles. It seems likely that children’s difficulty with the articles stems from the dual function of 
the indefinite article, namely, to indicate either an indefinite referent or a specific, but previously 
unidentified, referent [!!!!]. In the former case, a speaker need only consult his own knowledge of 
a referent, whereas in the latter case he must take account of his listener’s knowledge. Children 
may be forced to rely on the definite article until they have mastered the identifying function of 
the indefinite article; and this mastery will depend on an awareness of their audience’s point of 
view.”(Warden 1976:110-111) [emphasis added]. Note here the observation that children can use 
demonstrative determiners better than other determiners, and that children’s apparent deficit with 
‘a’ (which is really overuse of ‘the’), as described by Warden, occurs in context sets where there 
are several potential referents. For our purposes (and anticipating Chapter 3) these observations 
are notable. 
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of Non-Shared Assumptions... Speaker and hearer assumptions are always independent” 
(2005:69). They suggest that this idea is reminiscent of Theory of Mind7. They argue that this 
accounts for children’s overuse of ‘the’ for first-mention referents (believed only by the speaker).  
 The parallel between Egocentrism and Theory of Mind is evident to modern cognitive 
scientists. Theory of Mind is a capacity to attribute and to interpret behavior in terms of mental 
states of conspecifics (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, Cohen, 1993 & 2000; Astington, 
Harris, Olson, 1988). Theory of Mind is a more recent proposal along the same cognitive 
conceptual development lines as Egocentrism that concerns a module of human mind that is 
responsible for one’s awareness of mental states of other people. Studies show that various 
aspects of TOM are acquired at different ages, from infant to kindergarten. Children younger than 
about 4;0 display behavior that has been taken to show that they do not understand that another 
person will have a false belief if the child him/herself knows the true state of affairs. That is, the 
child takes another’s understanding of the situation to be the same as his/her own, even though 
the child has good reason (in the experiment) to understand that the other person should have a 
different belief. Approximately 50% of 4-year-old children already have this so-called first order 
theory of mind, as measured by a number of false belief tasks (e.g. Perner, Leekam, Wimmer, 
1987; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Call & Tomasello 1999). When children are about 5-7 years old 
(depending on the study and the relative complexity of the task), they acquire the ‘second order’ 
theory of mind, where they are now able to represent one person’s beliefs about another person’s 
beliefs (e.g. Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg (1994); Muris et al (1999); Astington, Pelletier, 
& Homer (2003)). For example, in a story used by Sulliavan et al 1994, a little boy is led to 
believe by his mother that he would not be getting a puppy for his birthday only to find one in the 
basement. The child listening to this story must understand that the mother, since she still 
believes her son to be oblivious to the true nature of the present, believes that her son does not 
think he is getting a puppy, which is false given the state of the world in the story, yet true given 
the mother’s beliefs.  
It is possible to argue that theory of mind is required for use and comprehension of 
definite determiners. Note however, that any proposal attributing the misuse of ‘the’ to children’s 
cognitive immaturity must assume that children know the adult semantic definition of ‘the’, but 
children do not use ‘the’ in the adult way. In short, the Egocentrism/Theory of Mind account for 
children’s misuse of ‘the’ suggests that children’s mistakes are not linguistic, but are due to 
underdeveloped cognition or pragmatics.  
One must however keep in mind that it has been shown that children’s linguistic abilities 
do influence their awareness of other minds. Harris, de Rosnay and Pons (2005) in their review 
discuss that children with advanced language skills are better at the understanding of mental 
states, and children with deficient language abilities, such as deaf children born into non-signing 
families, lag in TOM, leading the researchers to conclude that TOM abilities are enhanced by 
children’s conversations involving multiple perspectives on a given topic and references to 
                                                 
7 Schaeffer and Matthewson (2005), footnote: “This concept might remind the reader of 
‘Theory of Mind’. Although we do not exclude the possibility that the phenomenon described 
and analysed in the present study is related to some of Theory of Mind, we choose not to explain 
it in terms of Theory of Mind for several reasons: (a) from the literature on Theory of Mind it is 
not clear what the exact age of the acquisition of Theory of Mind is (for example, some scholars 
mention the age of 3;0, others 4;0, and again others 4;6); (b) there is no one precise definition of 
what Theory of Mind is, for example, whether it includes ‘Point of view’, whether it involves the 
attribution of just false beliefs to others or also other beliefs, etc.” 
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other’s mental states. In other words, Harris et al argue that it is the children’s pragmatic 
enrichment that enhances their theory of mind. However work by de Villiers and de Villiers 
(2003) suggests that children’s ability to embed propositions structurally, i.e. children’s syntactic 
knowledge, is a precursor for TOM. Indeed, Hale & Tager-Flusberg (2003) demonstrate that 
training children on sentential complements, sentences of the kind “John said that Mary….”, 
enhances TOM. 60 preschoolers, who failed a 1st order false belief and a sentential complement 
pretest, were randomly assigned to three groups, where over the course of two weeks they were 
trained on one of the following tasks: false belief, sentential complements, noun-describing 
relative clauses (e.g. “the dish that is broken”). Upon post tests, the group trained on relative 
clauses only improved on their knowledge of relative clauses, and not on TOM or complements. 
The group that was trained on TOM only improved on tests of TOM, but the group trained on 
sentential complements, in a sense a task of embedding and recursion, acquired the linguistic 
knowledge and significantly increased scores on a number of tasks of theory of mind.  
Thus it would not be entirely correct to say that theory of mind is independent from one’s 
linguistic abilities, however there may exist children that may do well on measures of language, 
yet do poorly on measures of TOM, e.g. some children on the autism spectrum disorder. 
 
Only a few elicited production studies argue against some version of Egocentrism / Pragmatic 
/ Theory of Mind deficits. 
 Emslie and Stevenson (1981), who replicated Warden’s experiments with different results 
(and seem to show very good knowledge of determiners in children when the lack of context 
awareness in the listener is made very explicit for the children), argued against egocentrism. They 
predicted that if egocentric responses are inherent in children’s referential expressions, then 
children should make mistakes with ‘a’ on second-mention referents too (early in their 
development), then children should turn to making mistakes on first mention referent, i.e. 
developmentally children should show the following patterns: first a/a (‘a’ for first mention and 
‘a’ for second mention), then the/the, then a/the. So if children know ‘a’, they would use a/the, 
but if children know ‘a’ only for naming things, they would use a/a. This is the logic that Emsli 
and Stevenson seem to argue for. That children in their experiments were mostly showing a/the 
pattern as early as 2 years argues against egocentrism. They further argue that egocentric 
performance in Warden (1976) is likely due to cognitive task demands. 
Zehler & Brewer (1982) also argue against egocentrism, and as far as I can tell, they were 
the first to suggest that something is wrong with children’s knowledge of ‘the’ per se. They find 
2-3 year old children overused ‘the’ in nonspecific contexts (only 30% of the time, but these 
authors finally paid attention the fact that children did use ‘the’ in nonspecific contexts), and 
sometimes underused ‘the’ in specific contexts. Therefore children must be overgeneralizing 
some principle that guides the usage of ‘the’, e.g. ‘quasi-known’, or ‘one of a few like-items’, 
where specification of the referent is not crucial for discourse cohesion.  
 
In summary, children’s overuse of ‘the’ in production, in contexts where there are several 
potential but unestablished referents, may be due to several factors – either their deficient 
knowledge of semantic principles (the less favorite explanation), or due to their deficient ability 
to estimate their listener’s knowledge of the context set (the more favorite explanation). 
Simplifying the task by making the lack of listener knowledge explicit did not consistently 
contribute to improvement in children’s performance across studies, which suggests that children 
are deficient in something more than or other than listener knowledge estimation. Comprehension 
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experiments may provide a way to solve this issue, since the child is now placed in the role of the 
listener, and the child ought to know his/her own point of view of the context set and should not 
be able to go wrong with it. After all, a key assumption of the egocentric/pragmatic deficit 
hypothesis is that children’s semantic knowledge is intact – it is the application of this knowledge 
that is deficient. If children are now listening to utterances containing determiners, they ought to 
get the right interpretation – they are the listener, and they know what they see, and they know 
semantic principles – they should understand ‘the’ and ‘a’ well. 
2.3.4. Comprehension studies 
One repeated criticism of comprehension studies is due to Brown (1973), who argues that 
comprehension experiments “place a somewhat unusual communication burden’” on the 
indefinite article, and definite article too. Karmiloff-Smith (1979) argues that such ‘afunctional 
contexts and unnatural uses tell us relatively little about the way in which children decode the 
articles”. It is much more natural to say not ‘a X’ when implying another referent, but to say 
‘another X’ or ‘another one’; similarly it is more natural to say ‘the same X’, not ‘the X’ when 
implying the same referent.  
Nonetheless, we believe that putting such burden on determiners can clearly tell us 
whether children are certain of their semantic knowledge, since the burden of pragmatic 
awareness is minimized in comprehension tasks – the child is the listener! In comprehension 
tasks, the child does not have to worry about the mental state of the person they are telling a story 
to. They are the ones listening to the story / instructions. If the communicative burden lies on the 
speaker, i.e. it is up to the speaker to make sure that the listener can correctly interpret their 
utterance – as all production studies of determiners assume – then children should not pause and 
wonder – why was I told this and that – they should perfectly rely on the speaker and let their 
actions be guided by their semantic knowledge. It can be argued that children are still forced to 
rely on their pragmatic knowledge of implicatures and non/default situations. This could really be 
problematic in use of ‘a’ – if the speaker said ‘a’, the implication is that the referent is not 
necessarily the salient item in context set. Children however may still go for the salient item in 
context set with ‘a’ if they fail to apply this implicature. But then the role of the child listener can 
be argued to be an active one, not a passive one.  
In Maratsos (1976) comprehension experiments 3-4 year old children had to act out 
stories involving un/salient referents, and children correctly switched to a new referent when 
hearing ‘a’ X 76% of the time, and only 6% of the time when hearing ‘the’ X – these are similar 
stories to the ones used in his production experiments, with children now acting them out. The 
dichotomy between less successful production and more successful comprehension was taken by 
Maratsos to support the Egocentrism explanation – it predicts problems only with production, and 
has nothing to say about comprehension, since whatever state of mind a speaker aims to produce 
in a child listener would (should, given the assumption that speakers carry the communicative 
burden) match the child’s state of mind exactly. It is notable that this dichotomy between 
production and comprehension is exactly what is predicted by egocentrism. However it possible 
to argue that successful comprehension found by Maratsos was accidental – there were relatively 
few subjects, and those subjects came primarily from Harvard University area. It is an interesting 
question to explore whether children’s socioeconomic backgrounds (which are known be highly 
predictive of verbal (vocabulary) ability have any impact on knowledge of determiners.  
 In Karmiloff-Smith (1979) contexts of singletons and several identical items were set up 
for the children – exactly the same set up as in many production studies, except that now children 
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had to act-out the experimenter’s utterances. In experiment 12, children as young as 3 years when 
hearing ‘the’ went for the context which contained the singleton item >85%, and children went 
for the context which had several identical items <15% of the time. When hearing ‘a’, 3 year olds 
picked one of several items, but 4-7 year olds did so only half of the time – picking the salient 
singleton a lot. Only 9 year olds were above 80% correct.  
In experiment 15, children themselves established a salient referent (by acting on one of 
the available referents, following instructions in the first clause), and then had to pick that same 
salient referent (upon hearing ‘the’ in a second clause) or pick another, nonsalient referent (upon 
hearing ‘a’ in the second clause). On average, children performed twice as many actions on 
two different x’s than singular x (65% vs 35%) – this is across ‘the’ and ‘a’. Children only 
took ‘the’ to reliably indicate the unique/salient referent at age 9, whereas 7s and 8s were 
essentially at chance on ‘the’, 6s were exceptionally good, and 4s and 5s overwhelmingly 
preferred to pick different objects for ‘the’. For ‘a’, children were more likely to pick two 
different objects from earliest ages. 
Next, it is necessary to review acquisition (comprehension) studies of anaphors ‘same’ 
and ‘another’ – performed by Karmiloff-Smith (1979 experiment 16, and 1977). Recall (from 
section 2.1 above) that anaphors are elements whose interpretation is intrinsically dependent on a 
linguistic antecedent, thus referents of ‘same’ and ‘another’ are dependent on the salient 
established referent, and if children cannot identify which referent is salient, they will have 
problems with ‘same’ and ‘another’. The set up here was similar to Karmiloff-Smith’s exp. 15 
(1979) where children created their own salient referents: upon hearing ‘a’ X they chose one of 
several referents (thus establishing a unique salient referent), and then upon hearing ‘another’ X 
or ‘same’ X children had the option of choosing a different referent or the same referent. In 
understanding ‘same’ 3 and 4 year olds picked the same KIND of item as the salient referent, but 
NOT the salient referent. By 5 years, children picked the salient referent.  In understanding 
‘another’, only 3 year olds showed deficits where 40% of the time children refused to pick 
‘another’ object when all items were identical, suggesting that 3 year old children thought 
‘another’ meant another KIND, not another referent. From 4 years onwards, children pick two 
distinct referents with ‘another’. Karmiloff-Smith also tested these same young children on 
comprehension of the anaphoric use of ‘the’, i.e. using ‘the’ anaphorically to refer to the salient, 
second mention referent – children were around chance level (in a set up similar to her 
experiment 15).  
 Comprehension of ‘this’ and ‘that’ was also investigated (e.g. Webb and Abrahamson  
(1976)) although from a spatial perspective. Children either sat next to the experimenter (and had 
the same perspective on near/far objects) or across from the experimenter (and had a different 
perspective – what was far for the experimenter was near for the child).  4 year olds were correct 
on same perspective on ‘this’ 82% but only 52% on ‘that’, and on different perspective they 
performed at 34% on ‘this’ and 82% on ‘that’ (i.e picked the one closer to them most of the 
time); 7 year olds were at 80% for same perspective ‘this’ and ‘that’, but on different perspective 
were at 62% on ‘this’ and performed at 74% on ‘that’. Children learned first the spatial contrast 
(‘this’ vs ‘that’ implies near vs far), and then learned to apply the contrast from speaker’s point of 
view (when those are different). This is taken to support Piagetian stages (by 4;6 – polarity for 
own perspective in left vs right, but not for others; by 5;8 polarity for both perspectives, but 
egocentric; by 7;9 – polarity for both perspectives, non-egocentric – both own and others). This 
study is important in the present discussion because it establishes that children (from their own 
point of view) can understand demonstratives. 
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2.3.5. Explanations for patterns in Comprehension studies  
It seems that children in Karmiloff-Smith’s exp 12 and exp 15 are doing different things. 
In one case (exp 12) they seem to know ‘the’ refers to unique referent (and not one of several 
referents), in another (exp 15) they think ‘the’ refers to either a unique or a non-unique referent. 
In exp 12 they seem to be confused by ‘a’, in exp 15 they understand ‘a’ to refer to nonsalient 
objects. The point is that no children are doing what the adults would do until age 8-9. The key 
difference between experiments is the context set. In exp 15, children are establishing a salient 
referent for themselves in the first clause, and they know with certainty that ‘a’ in a second clause 
cannot refer to a salient referent again, indicating that they are keeping track of which referent is 
the salient one, but they seem to be ok with ‘the’ referring to a non-salient referent. In exp 12, the 
salient unique (singleton) and the non-unique referents are already set up for the children, and 
children have to infer that ‘a’ must refer to a nonsalient, nonsingleton entity, but ‘a’ really means 
‘any one’ and could be also used for singleton item. What does it mean that children seemed to 
know ‘the’ in exp 12, but not in exp 15? If children are missing the knowledge of Maximality, 
they should be performing on ‘the’ just like they are performing on ‘a’ – sometimes going for the 
singleton and sometimes going for one of the several items, but in experiment 12 they primarily 
go for the singleton referent. One possible explanation is that, in cases where there is a 
presupposition that a context set exits (e.g. when ‘the’ is used), children have a preference for a 
context set which dictates the action, where they don’t have to make a choice – there is only one 
possible action. In case of the singleton – there is only one referent to pick, otherwise the choice 
(if it matters to the children) is having to pick one of three. In other words, good performance in 
exp 12 on ‘the’ may indicate children’s sensitivity of semantics of ‘the’ which call for a context 
set and the semantics of ‘a’ which do not. When ‘a’ is used, there is no context set, so children 
pick either response. ‘The’, such that it involves a context set, may indicate to children to narrow 
the context of interpretation and help them identify the singleton referents. Thus it seems possible 
to argue that in exp 12 children may interpret ‘the’ correctly without knowledge of 
uniqueness/Maximality. It will take further investigation to determiner whether this explanation 
might be correct. One question is why the same explanation does not apply to exp 15 and to our 
experiment in Chapter 3. 
There is variation in children’s competence and performance in elicited production and in 
comprehension studies, but notably there is consensus! Production results suggested children’s 
deficits are mostly in underuse of ‘a’ for nonsalient referents (i.e. overuse of ‘the’ for non-unique 
nonsalient referents). Comprehension data suggested that children’s deficits are sometimes with 
‘the’ (overuse of ‘the’ to refer to nonsalient referents) and sometimes with ‘a’ (using ‘a’ to refer 
to salient singletons, although technically this is consistent with semantics of ‘a’). In other 
words, whenever studies find deficits, they are deficits, both in production and in 
comprehension, with overuse of ‘the’ to refer to nonsalient nonunique referents. Depending on 
the study, those deficits continue until children are 9 years old (or 4 years old if the children 
come from Harvard University area, in case of Maratsos8).  
One thing that we would like to argue is certain, is that poor comprehension data is 
unexplainable by pragmatic/egocentric deficits on the part of the child. Recall that Maratsos 
argued that dichotomy between poor production and good comprehension is evidence for 
                                                 
8 The issue of environmental effects on development of determiners, i.e. the possibility of better 
educated, more verbal parents inducing knowledge of determiners earlier in their children is 
being investigated (Modyanova, Hirsch, Perovic, Wexler, in preparation). 
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Egocentrism. What about poor comprehension? Children seem to ‘forget’ which is the salient 
referent between clause one and clause two of instructions (e.g in Karmiloff-Smith exp 15), 
something that is implausible. Can children really switch their attention that quickly between 
clauses, and have issues with maintaining referents and focus of attention? Most production and 
comprehension studies above assume that in a conversation it is only the speaker who is 
primarily charged with representing the mind of their interlocutor, and not the hearer, who 
implicitly trusts the speaker to guide their attention to the salient entities in the discourse set. If 
the speaker is successful in directing the hearer’s attention to the salient entities in the discourse 
set, this is not because the hearer recognizes the speaker’s intention to do so. Rather, it is possible 
that there are innate mechanisms of joint attention at work. (Heim, p.c.).  
If however the listener is not passive, but is active (something that none of the studies 
reviewed so far seem to assume), Egocentric/pragmatic deficits may result in the listener is 
misconstruing the salient set as relative to a context. I.e. children may make up their own salient 
referents which would differ from the intended salient referents. This however seems not to be 
the case, at least in children who understand ‘same’ and ‘another’ correctly (in Karmiloff-Smith 
1977) earlier than they understand ‘the’ correctly. Taking File Change Semantics, as an example, 
the Egocentric/Pragmatic deficit in comprehension will result in children making up (imagining) 
their own referential file cards that are not mentioned in the discourse, i.e. an ungrounded index 
card. This ungrounded index card creation is very uneconomical. Thus the only way to interpret 
the Egocentrism’s hypothesis for children’s miscomprehension of ‘the’, is to say that children are 
active listeners and are really bad at paying attention to the context of interpretation of the 
utterance or are really bad at matching the context of the utterance with the salient context of 
interpretation. This however was shown not to be the case with ‘same’ and ‘another’ above. 
Could Zehler & Brewer (1982) be right in arguing that children must be overgeneralizing 
some principle that guides the usage of ‘the’? Although in explaining the comprehension results, 
Karmiloff-Smith argued that the unnatural uses and afunctional contexts prevented younger 
children from showing their knowledge, she also suggests that only older 8-9 children “can make 
a more ‘abstract’ analysis of the utterance, no longer requiring functional clues… It may 
therefore be reasonable to hypothesize that something very important takes place in linguistic 
development from 8 to 9 years, i.e. that children are then capable of a more abstract analysis of an 
utterance, and no longer require stress on intralinguistic functional clues or extralinguistic 
situational clues.” [emphasis added] Inadvertently, Karmiloff-Smith in the previous sentence 
makes a very important observation – a linguistic change, a change in knowledge, may after all 
be the better explanation for children’s deficits, rather than changes in awareness of other’s 
minds. 
The drastic contrast between comprehension of ‘same’ and ‘another’ on one hand, and ‘a’ 
and ‘the’ on the other, is also deeply troubling for pragmatic and Piagetian theories, as Karmiloff-
Smith notes. “This led to a critical evaluation of Piaget’s implicit contention that young children 
are using determiners anaphorically”, and that “language is not only the tool of intelligence for 
representing ongoing cognitive development, but that it is also a problem area for children within 
its own right. It is suggested that the importance of young children’s processing procedures in the 
linguistic environment has hitherto been underestimated in Piaget’s interactive epistemology” 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1977:377). She asks “is there something essentially linguistic at work?” 
(1977:386). 
 One frequent observation in comprehension studies is that children seem to prefer to pick 
two distinct referents rather than one unique referent. A study by Foley et al (2000) illustrates a 
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similar point. The participants were presented with three characters, e.g. Elmo, Kermit, and 
Snowman, each of which had his own sandwich, and instructed to make “Elmo touches a/the/his 
sandwich and Snowman does too”.  In ellipsis, two interpretations are possible. The Bound 
(sloppy) interpretation would have subjects making each character touch their own sandwich, i.e. 
one to one mapping of characters and sandwiches. The Referential (strict) interpretation would 
have subjects picking only one sandwich, namely, in the above example, Elmo’s. i.e. there’s a 
two to one mapping of characters to sandwiches. Thornton and Wexler (1999) show that children 
know sloppy and strict readings for pronouns. Further, given addition of ‘too’ in stimuli, we 
expect action on the same object – since ‘too’ implies parallel action.  Children ages 4-7 prefer 
the one to one (bound/sloppy, action on two objects) interpretation where each character gets 
their own sandwich, regardless of whether the sentences used indefinite (40-55% ‘action on 
different objects’) or definite (50-60%) articles or pronouns (70%). Other interpretations (action 
by two characters on same object, action by all three characters on all three objects) take up 10-
20% of children’s answers. Adults on the other hand, take the referential/strict/two-to-one 
reading for indefinite and definite referents, but only slightly prefer the bound reading for 
pronouns. The relevant point for us from this study is that children below age 8 do not have 
adult’s interpretations, and are often treating ‘the’ as ‘a’, and preferring to act on two different 
objects regardless of whether they are hearing a pronoun, a definite or an indefinite determiner. 
2.3.6. Summary 
It was noted that the indefinite article is correctly produced by children in the absence of a 
context set, and the definite article is correctly used in presence of a single salient referent. 
However many of studies show that children incorrectly produce (and understand) the definite 
article to refer to a nonsalient, not-previously-identified referent from a group of several identical 
entities (i.e. a partitive context), regardless of whether they are visible objects or imagined 
characters from a verbally presented story. On the other hand, some studies show that children’s 
overuse of the definite article in production is to some extent an artifact of the experimental 
design (e.g. Emslie & Stevenson 1981). Children also seem to know that ‘the’, unlike ‘a’, needs a 
context set, but children seem to think ‘the’ can refer to one of the nonsalient referents. At the 
same time, children understand ‘same’ and ‘another’ well. While egocentric/pragmatic 
explanations work for most elicited production studies, comprehension errors with ‘the’ (and 
relatively much less comprehension errors with ‘same’) are unexpected, since 
egocentric/pragmatic view makes the assumption that children’s semantic knowledge is intact 
and pragmatics is not really involved in comprehension as it is in production. Perhaps the right 
explanation is not in children’s deficits with pragmatics, but in children’s deficits in semantics.  
2.4. Maximality hypothesis: semantic deficits in children’s ‘the’ 
The key issue for the pragmatic class of theories is children’s mistakes in comprehension. 
While production of determiners necessitates awareness of the state of the listener’s knowledge 
about the ongoing information exchange, and consequently a lack of such awareness may well 
inhibit correct use of determiners, no such things goes on during comprehension. The child is the 
listener, the child is evaluating own knowledge about the information in a conversational 
exchange. NO! Let me rephrase that. The child does not need to evaluate own knowledge. The 
child simply knows! The child simply knows the salient referents in the context set, because the 
child is the one who defines the salient referents. So why then does the majority of children under 
the age of 7-8 make comprehension mistakes? 
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One possibility is that children are not passive listeners, they are active listeners, they are 
applying their own semantic knowledge, and that semantic knowledge may be deficient.  
Wexler (2003) argues that children’s overuse of the definite article is a deficit in 
children’s computational system of language, arising specifically due to the lack of a component 
of the semantic definition of ‘the’ – Maximality (Uniqueness). This proposal is based on Heim’s 
(1991) semantic definitions of articles and her observation that Egocentrism cannot explain all 
the patterns of children’s use of ‘the’ without further stipulations. It cannot explain children’s 
overuse of ‘the’ in contexts such as the ‘one of the children is laughing’ Making Noise story (e.g. 
Karmiloff-Smith 1979). There, children are told about ‘lots of boys and girls’ but there is no 
information on the referents beyond that – they are not shown, they are not enumerated. Thus 
there are no unique referents for children to focus on and make salient for themselves, short of 
inventing such referent out of thin air. Egocentrism also cannot explain children’s lack of overuse 
of ‘a’ with singletons (unique referents), which is guided by the maximize presupposition 
implicature, which children are supposed to lack if children have pragmatic problems.  
Now suppose children are missing the Uniqueness presupposition from their definition of 
‘the’: for them, the definite article simply means that there exists a referent in a context 
(formalized in 13). Essentially, children’s ‘the’ means ‘one of’ the things in a context set, instead 
of ‘the unique’ thing. In plural cases, ‘the things’, according to children, may refer to a plural 
subset of the entities in question, rather than the entire set. However even in lacking 
uniqueness/maximality, children are still able to differentiate between the definite and the 
indefinite article, as the definition of ‘a’ has no context set, but ‘the’ does. Observe also that 
children may be inconsistent with their use of the definite article, which would stem from what 
children chose the context set to be. Children may decide that the salient referent is the entire 
context set, as there is no reason, semantically, to rule out the bigger set. Children may also pick 
the restricted, smaller set that only contains the salient referent. Furthermore, children’s 
pragmatic implicature of maximize presupposition is intact. Given the results of many acquisition 
studies, it does look as if this is what children are using in producing and comprehending the 
definite and the indefinite articles. They only produce ‘a’ in the absence of a context set, and 
produce ‘the’ in contexts containing a singular referent, contexts requiring reference to one of a 
set of objects. Children understand ‘the’ to refer to one of a set of equally salient things 
(incorrectly). This can also apply to plural sets. Plural ‘the’ picks out a maximal whole set of 
items, and not a subset. Children lacking Maximality may interpret ‘the’ to pick out a plural but 
not necessarily the maximal set. This is what they do. In Karmiloff-Smith’s (1979) experiment 
14, children were presented with toy parking lots containing a variety of cars and trucks and were 
instructed to e.g. “put the closed cars into the garage”. The four and five year olds’ responses 
showed violations of maximality with children only picking the entire set of referents on average 
12% and 55%, respectively. Children 6 years of age and older showed performance above 80%. 
 
(13) Children’s lexical entry for ‘the’ (Wexler 2003) 
Regardless of the utterance context (i), [the* x] P expresses that proposition that is: 
true at an index i, if there is an x at i, and it is P at i 
false at an index i, if (i) there is an x at i, and there is no x such that x is P at i 
truth-valueless at an index i, if there is no x at i 
 
Thus, if children lack the uniqueness/maximality presupposition from the definite article, 
but have intact pragmatics (at least as much as is relevant for interpretation of determiners), the 
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main pattern in acquisition, the overuse of ‘the’ instead of ‘a’, seems to be fully accounted for, 
and key predictions are made. Definite determiners and definite plural DPs are not the only 
aspects of language that involve Maximality/uniqueness. So do questions, and free relatives, and 
demonstratives.  
Herein, we investigate the Maximality hypothesis by investigating comprehension of 
anaphoric use of ‘the’ and ‘that’, ‘a’, ‘another’ and ‘same’.  
We predict that if children’s deficit is semantic (and not pragmatic/theory of mind) in 
nature, we expect a difference in acquisition between ‘same’ and ‘the’ – children will do better on 
‘same’ that does not involve Maximality. We expect difference between ‘the’ and ‘that’ – 
children may do better on ‘that’ if they are aware of its pragmatic restriction to interpretation in 
non-default contexts. We expect that children can figure out the relevant salient context set early 
on, and will show good knowledge for determiners that do not involve Maximality, but do 
involve knowledge of the salient context  - ‘same’ and ‘another’, i.e. we aim to replicate the 
findings of Karmiloff-Smith of ‘same’ and ‘another’ in English.  
If children’s deficits are not semantic, and children do know Maximality as well as 
definitions of other determiners, but are deficient in speaker/hearer knowledge distinctions, we 
expect children to do very well across the board if children are passive listeners letting the 
speaker direct their attention. If children are active listeners on the other hand, and they are 
deficient in pragmatics, they may have problems with those items that rely more on the 
speaker/hearer knowledge on their interpretation, e.g. in ‘that’ (according to theory of ‘that’ by 
Wolter 2006a,b). Except that we will not see that in children’s performance – semantic 
knowledge, knowledge of uniqueness should be enough in choosing the salient referent for 
anaphoric use of ‘the’ and ‘that’. Thus if children’s deficit is not semantic, there should be no 
difference in performance between ‘same’, ‘the’, and ‘that’. Children, as active interpreters, could 
still have difficulty establishing the salient context set, and that may cause problems with all 
determiners, including ‘another’ where we should see lots of incorrect actions on salient referent. 
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3. Comprehension of Determiners in Typically Developing Children 
 
To elucidate the situation in the development of referential abilities, we study children’s 
comprehension of articles, allowing children to demonstrate their preference for the interpretation 
of the anaphoric use of definite and indefinite and demonstrative determiners.  
 
3.1. Abstract 
 
Is children’s overuse of ‘the’ due to their deficient knowledge of semantics or due to their 
deficient use of such knowledge due to pragmatic or egocentric factors? We tested 203 children 
ages 3 to 9 years on comprehension of the indefinite determiner ‘a’, anaphor ‘another’, and 
definite determiners ‘the’ and ‘that’. Of these children, 74 were also tested on comprehension of 
anaphor ‘same’ and verb ‘share’. Children at three years of age were able to pick the correct 
referent for ‘same’ 65% of the time, and 83% of the time at age four, indicating their knowledge 
of the salient referent. Children were also able to pick the correct referent for ‘another’ at all ages, 
again indicating their knowledge of the salient referent in the context set by picking not that 
referent. At the same time, only 40% of 4-5 year olds consistently showed correct interpretation 
of ‘the’. The majority of children (70%) consistently picked the salient referent for ‘the’ only 
from the age of seven years. Additionally, between 5% to 40% of children across ages were able 
to pick the correct referent of ‘that’ better than they were able to pick the correct referent of ‘the’, 
with this pattern peaking around 5 years. The opposite pattern was only observed in two six-year 
olds. These results are taken to support the Maximality hypothesis, that children are deficient in 
their knowledge of uniqueness/Maximality in the definite article, and is taken to argue against 
theories where children’s knowledge is intact, but performance suffers from pragmatic/cognitive 
limitations.  
3.2. Experiment 1. “Puppets” 
3.2.1. Method 
 
Figure 3.2.1. Act-out task set up 
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An act-out paradigm was used, closely following Karmiloff-Smith’s (1979) experiment 
15. This particular paradigm was chosen because here children can establish a salient referent for 
themselves as part of the task, and do not have to infer the saliency of a referent from the context 
of singleton vs several identical nonsalient items. This kind of set up worked well for Karmiloff-
Smith when investigating ‘same’ and ‘another’, and we aim to use a consistent paradigm for the 
new investigation of anaphoric use of ‘that’. 
Children’s comprehension of different articles, as illustrated by children’s actions is 
studied. Several objects are laid out in front of a child, here six fences, three balloons, three 
spoons, and three logs. The significance of three vs six context sets will be explained later. A 
child is given two puppet actors, here Kanga and Froggy, and asked to follow the investigator’s 
instructions: “Kanga, push a balloon” [break to allow for action] “and then Froggy, push 
a/the/that balloon.” The first clause always contains the indefinite article, and is used to establish 
a salient referent out of a group of identical objects. The second clause asks subjects to act on the 
same object that was acted on in the first clause if ‘the’ and ‘that’ are used and interpreted in 
adult manner, or to act on any object if ‘a’ is used and interpreted in adult manner. Children were 
presented with exemplars of each condition 4 times in a randomized order. Two verbs were used 
for the act-out task: push and kiss.  
It may be argued that the instruction phrase is not exactly a natural set up, since adults are 
more likely to say ‘the same X’, rather than simply ‘the X’. However, our goal is investigate 
children’s knowledge of ‘the’, ‘that’, and ‘a’ in a ‘pure’ setting – without additional 
disambiguating terms. 
The dependent variable is the number of actions by children on the same object in both 
clauses. Observe that children are placed in the position of the listener, thus they have to evaluate 
their own knowledge about the context and the referents, and what the speaker’s words are meant 
to imply.  
3.2.1.1. Context size variable 
The idea for investigating the possible effects of the size of the context set arose 
following a closer examination of Karmiloff-Smith’s (1979) data from her experiment 15. 43 
French children aged 4-9 years were tested on two conditions with ‘a’ or ’the’ in the second 
clause. There was only one presentation of each condition, but additional items were added ad 
hoc. The context set consisted of four objects.  
Briefly going over her results (Table 3.2.2, where percentage of actions on the same 
object are shown), the indefinite article is mostly correctly interpreted to mean ‘any’ or ‘a 
different one’ depending on the age of the subjects. The definite article is differentiated from the 
indefinite article by all ages except 4, 5 and 7 year olds. Perfect knowledge of ‘the’, which would 
consist of 100% actions on the same object is not attained by any subjects, but is approximated 
by 6 and 9 year olds. Children are clearly presenting a deficit in comprehension and correct 
interpretation of the definite article. 
  4;0-4;11 5;0-5;11 6;0-6;11 7;0-7;11 8;0-8;11 9;0-9;11 
A 19% 10% 14% 42% 0% 0% 
The 26% 30% 72% 42% 47% 81% 
Table 3.2.2. Percentage ‘same’ responses by French children from Karmiloff-Smith, exp 15 
 
If we consider the probabilities for children’s performance given a context size of 4 
objects and a single presentation of each condition, it becomes evident that younger children are 
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performing at chance levels. Once one of 4 objects is made salient, there is a 75% chance of 
picking one of the other three nonsalient objects, if the child picks a randomly – i.e. as if ignoring 
the determiner altogether. The chance for picking the same, salient object randomly is only 25%. 
It is important to note that these chance levels are only applicable in case there is only one 
presentation of each condition. Well, this is indeed the performance that French 4 and 5 year-olds 
are giving. They are picking about 80% different objects for ‘a’, and about 70% different object 
for ‘the’. 
Thus our goal was to pick two context sizes such that chance levels would be sufficiently 
different, yet the experimental set-up would still be manageable. There are two items for every 
determiner condition that have 3 elements of a set of objects, and two other items for every 
conditions that have 6 elements of a set of objects, giving us 33% vs 16% chance levels, 
respectively. Note that average chance levels over both determiner context conditions is 25%. 
Additionally, we can argue that there are two ways to define a salient set. For children who are 
missing uniqueness it could be that the salient set of referents is the entire context set in front of 
them, or it could be the unique salient referent. Thus a smaller context size of 3 items may be 
easier for children to apprehend at once, but a larger set of 6 items may be too much to take in, 
leading the child to select the unique salient referent. On the other hand, we may see evidence of 
random model in children’s performance – children, by chance, may choose the salient referent 
more often in the 3-item context than in the 6-item context. Using two different context set sizes, 
we can reliably investigate whether children are responding uniformly or randomly.  
3.2.2. Participants 
Group Mean Age N Minimum Age Maximum Age 
3s 3;7 12 3;2 3;11 
4s 4;6 18 4;0 4;11 
5s 5;5 13 5;0 5;10 
6s 6;6 12 6;2 6;11 
7s 7;8 12 7;1 7;11 
8s 8;4 11 8;0 8;9 
9s 9;6 11 9;1 9;11 
10s 10;4 4 10;0 10;10 
Adult 19 2 19 19 
Total 6;10 95 3;2 19;0 
Table 3.2.3. Participants in ‘Puppets’ Task 
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3.2.3. Results 
 
Figure and Table 3.2.4. Percentage ‘same’ responses by English-speaking children 
(error bars represent +-1 standard error) 
 
Age 3s 4s 5s 6s 7s 8s 9s 10s Adults 
A% 21% 33% 23% 33% 42% 34% 34% 37% 62% 
The% 39% 47% 46% 67% 54% 64% 75% 75% 100% 
That% 42% 57% 67% 60% 60% 70% 95% 94% 100% 
 
Our results, summarized in Figure 3.2.4, replicate those found previously for ‘a’ and ‘the’. 
The indefinite article is correctly interpreted as ‘any’ by all age groups, remaining around 30% - 
very close to the average 25% chance levels. The definite article is differentiated from the 
indefinite article, but proficiency is not yet fully attained even by the 10 year-old group. Our new 
result is that the determiner ‘that’ is differentiated from the definite article, with more children 
picking more same objects upon hearing ‘that’, at almost all ages. Proficiency with ‘that’ is 
attained by 9 year olds – earlier than with ‘the’. Adults are excluded from further analyses.  
A mixed repeated measures ANOVA was performed (Determiner (3 levels) by Context (2 
levels) as repeated measures by Age group (8 levels) as between subject measure). Mauchly’s test 
of Sphericity for within subjects effects of determiner (χ2(2) = 10.05, p = .007) and the 
interaction between determiner and context (χ2(2) = 7.03, p = .03) come out significant, hence we 
must accept the hypothesis that the variances of the differences between the levels of variables 
are significantly different, and the assumption of sphericity has been violated. Therefore, degrees 
of freedom were corrected using the Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = .993 for determiner 
and ε = 1 for the interaction). For main effect of context, the assumption of sphericity is met. 
Results revealed a significant effect for determiner (F(1.98, 168.73) = 47.72, p<.0001) and 
context (F(1,85) = 11.52, p = .001). The effect of age group was significant (F(7,85)=2.5, 
p=.023). The age by determiner type is the only interaction that remotely approached significance 
(F(13.89, 168.73) = 1.47, p = .128). 
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 Post-Hoc pairwise comparisons (adjusted for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni 
correction) revealed significant difference between the 3 year old and the 9 year old group 
(p=.018) (no other comparisons of age groups were significant), significant difference between 
all determiners (‘a’ vs ‘the’ (p<.001), ‘a’ vs ‘that’ (p<.001), ‘the’ vs ‘that’ (p=.006)), and 
significant difference between 3-item and 6-item contexts (p=.001). 
It can be noted that all children (age groups) differentiate between the indefinite and the 
definite articles. This in itself however cannot be taken as evidence for knowledge of Uniqueness, 
as the in/definite articles can be distinguished by existence of context. The indefinite implies no 
context consideration. The definite determiners imply consideration of the context, and in case of 
“child’s the” there are two context possibilities: the entire set of objects can be considered, or 
alternatively only the object that was previously made salient can be taken as the context set.  
Thus the results so far strongly suggest that English-speaking children in an act-out task 
are able to interpret ‘that’ to refer to an established salient referent better than they can interpret 
‘the’. This difference in interpretation is not predicted by Egocentrism (pragmatic/cognitive 
deficit), but is predicted by Uniqueness (computational system of language deficit).  
3.2.3.1. Random model in children’s performance 
Figures 3.2.6-3.2.8 summarize the proportion of subjects performing in particular ways on 
determiners, i.e. picking the ‘same’ reference 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 times, out of the 4 possible 
presentations. A random model of responses is derived by considering probabilities1 given a 
context size and number of presentations (Figure 3.2.5). Given that children are presented with 
each conditions 4 times (2 times with 3-item context and 2 times with 6-item context), it is 
possible to derive the proportion of subjects that will produce from 0 to 4 out of 4 possible ‘same’ 
responses. Thus by pure chance, more subjects will show 0 and 1 ‘same’ responses. If such a 
pattern of responses is seen in the data, then subjects are guessing.  
Individual subject’s performance on ‘a’ shows that the older participants are eerily 
reminiscent of the random response model, which is in fact the correct interpretation for ‘a’. The 
younger participants show a preference for acting on two different objects. Perhaps this is 
evidence of an interpretation strategy. Individual subject’s performance on ‘the’ shows that the 
younger participants display a random model pattern of responses. The older participants show 
less random model and more knowledge of ‘the’, however performance is not perfect.  Individual 
subjects’ performance on ‘that’ shows that a lot of younger children are now moving away from 
the random model and showing some knowledge of ‘that’. Older participants show firm 
knowledge – there is no room for random model. Observe, that all proportions generally fit a 
unimodal distribution, suggesting children to be on a continuum of knowledge. If we saw 
bimodal distributions, it would suggest distinct populations within subjects, such that some 
children knew exactly what was going on, and the rest failing the task. 
 
                                                        
1 Average of 3-item and 6-item contexts: e.g. P(same=4) = (1/4)^4; e.g. P(same=0) = (3/4)^4.  
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Figure 3.2.5. Proportion of children giving 0, 1, 
2, 3, or 4 ‘same’ responses – chance model 
 
Figure 3.2.7. Proportion of children giving 0, 1, 
2, 3, or 4 ‘same’ responses for ‘a’ 
 
Figure 3.2.6. Proportion of children giving 0, 
1, 2, 3, or 4 ‘same’ responses for ‘the’ 
 
Figure 3.2.8. Proportion of children giving 0, 
1, 2, 3, or 4 ‘same’ responses for ‘that’ 
 
3.2.3.2. Analysis of children performing ‘well’ 
 We will define children as “performing well” on ‘the’ and ‘that’ when they perform the 
action by the two actors on the ‘same’ element of a set of objects 3 or 4 times per condition (i.e. 
at least 75% ‘same’ performance).  Participants were subdivided by their pattern of performance 
between ‘the’ and ‘that’, with “A” pattern denoting good performance on both ‘the’ and ‘that’, 
“B” pattern denoting bad performance on ‘the’ with a relatively better performance on ‘that’, “C” 
pattern denoting a bad performance on ‘that’ with a relatively better performance on ‘the’, and 
finally “D” pattern denoting a bad performance in both ‘the’ and ‘that’. Figure and Table 3.2.9 
shows for each age the proportion of children showing a given pattern on ‘the’ and ‘that’. The 
children who are performing well on both ‘the’ and ‘that’ tend to be older, while children 
performing poorly on both tend to be younger. It should be noted that children performing well 
on ‘that’ only (B pattern) are well distributed throughout the age ranges, while only 5 children 
perform better on ‘the’ (C pattern). 
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Figure and Table 3.2.9. Proportion of children performing well by age 
 3(12) 4(18) 5(13) 6(12) 7(12) 8(11) 9(11) 10(4) 
D (poor performance) 0.58 0.44 0.54 0.33 0.42 0.36 0.00 0.00 
C the>that 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
B the<that 0.08 0.17 0.15 0.08 0.17 0.18 0.27 0.25 
A (good performance) 0.25 0.33 0.31 0.42 0.33 0.45 0.73 0.75 
 
3.2.3.3. Effect of context size on interpretation of articles 
Recall that children were presented with either 3 or 6 elements of a set of identical 
objects. The ANOVA (above) showed a significant main effect of context, therefore a closer look 
is warranted. The first clause of instructions established a salient referent, and the second clause 
asked the child to act on either the same or a different referent. Thus the definite determiner 
phrases here are endophoric, i.e. the referent is identifiable from immediate linguistic context: if 
the first clause had ‘a balloon’, and second clause had ‘the balloon’, an adult does not need to 
consider a physical context set in order to interpret the referent. At the same time, the phrase may 
also be interpreted exophorically, meaning the salient context set and the salient unique referent 
is identifiable on extralinguistic grounds or from the specific physical situation of the utterance. 
Since children are guessing referents due to their inconsistent knowledge of ‘the’, children may 
show different performance depending on the context set. 
The Uniqueness account suggests that children will take either the endophoric unique 
discourse-determined context set of size one i.e. the established referent, in which case we may 
see the ‘same’ response. Alternatively, children may take the exophoric situation determined 
context set of size 3 or 6, depending on the trial, in which case they may respond according to a 
random model, with probabilities of responses determined by size of that set. Thus the 
uniqueness account predicts that more same responses will be given for a context size of 3 than 
context size 6 (Figure and Table 3.2.10).  
It is difficult to see what the Egocentrism account predicts. It seems that it does not 
predict a differential or random treatment of articles at all, so context size should not matter. Thus 
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we expect to see little random responses, as children will be focusing on one object, and 
producing the same performance in both contexts. If kids pick a unique element for themselves, 
then the context selected is unique, and children may produce more ‘same’ responses than 
uniqueness account predicts.  
We derive the random model of responses for each context size via probability 
performance levels (Figure and Table 3.2.10). Chance levels for action on the same object given 
two presentations for the 3 and for the 6 contexts are given. When looking at the ‘visible values’, 
i.e. one and two responses out of two, it follows that by pure chance, more children are likely to 
act on the same referent when there are 3 elements of a set in front of them, than when there are 6 
elements. 
 
‘SAME’ 3-ITEM 6-ITEM 
Zero 0.44 0.69 
One 0.44 0.28 
Two 0.11 0.03 
 
 Figure and Table 3.2.10. Probability 
‘same’ responses: random model for 3 vs 
6 object context, given two presentations 
 
 
Figure 3.2.11 shows the difference in percent ‘same’ responses between the 3-item and 
the 6 item context for each age and for each determiner.  As expected, context size significantly 
affects performance on the indefinite article for all age groups. The indefinite indeed means ‘any 
one’ for children, as it does for adults. While context size affects performance in younger 
children on ‘that’, indicating imperfect knowledge, there is no context influence in the older 
children, suggesting lack of doubt in referent choice guided by familiarity, and singular choice of 
context set. Context size significantly affects performance on the definite article ‘the’ for the 
younger children and overall, suggesting a choice of context set from two possibilities: the entire 
set of objects or the already-established referent. The above analyses show that children are 
sensitive to context set size, something that is not predicted by Egocentrism, but is expected on 
the Uniqueness account.  
The way such pattern can be predicted by egocentrism/pragmatic difficulties is if an 
assumption is added: the larger the context size, the more likely a child is to let his/her mind 
wonder, and to pick a different (own) salient referent from the true salient referent. This however 
does not really seem plausible to us.  
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Figure 3.2.11. Proportion difference ‘same’ responses between 3-item and 6-item context set 
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3.3. Experiment 2. “Felt” 
 
3.3.1. Method 
Another version of the above experiment was developed, eliminating any potential issues 
affecting children’s performance. One potential confound is memory and attention limitations of 
young children. There were many things a subject had to attend to in the experimental set-up, so 
it was possible that children forgot which object was affected in the first clause. There was 
extensive set up of stimuli between conditions, and at times it was possible for the participants to 
forget the salient referent – if for example the puppet that made the initial action was then 
returned to the starting position. Reliance on participants’ remembering of the initial salient 
referent may place unnecessary cognitive demands and may obscure participants’ knowledge, 
and may perhaps lead to the context-size effects observed. In the new task, the goal was to make 
the initial salient referent visually obvious so as to eliminate memory involvement.  
A second problem was small number of sentences per condition. Thus the new version 
has 6 sentences per condition. A condition is added to balance out ‘same’ versus ‘different’ 
actions - 'a/another'. This ‘another’ condition is also a test of anaphoric interpretations, as its 
correct interpretation means ‘a different entity from the salient one in the context set’, which 
requires one to be aware of the salient entity in the context set, but does not require knowledge of 
Maximality for correct interpretation. 
The experiment is in a form of a book made of felt cloth, with arrays of 3 or 6 identical 
objects permanently attached to the pages. Objects included apple, watermelon slice, car, carrot, 
Christmas tree, star, flower, ice-cream cone, baseball, heart, witch’s hat. Every page contains an 
array of target items and an array of distractor objects. Subjects are given two Velcro-backed 
‘actors’, Fishy and Turtle. Thus the characters can be physically stuck to the page by children 
who can see what they were/are doing.  
There were two ways of making sure the subjects are paying attention: whether they are 
affecting the right kind of object, and whether they are doing that with the correct actor (the order 
in which the actors affect the objects is randomized). 
Firstly, subjects are introduced to the two actors and different objects that will be used. A 
few practice trials follow where children become comfortable with using actors to touch either 
same or different objects. Subjects are told that in this ‘game’, they have to decide whether Fishy 
and Turtle go to same or different objects based on what the experimenter says. Article use is 
avoided during introduction to avoid biasing subjects’ responses.  
Comprehension of items is evaluated when the experimenter gives the child instructions 
on how to manipulate the actors given the context of the current page. The first clause of 
instructions always contains the indefinite article ‘a’ and serves to establish a unique, salient, 
visually distinct referent within the context set – the object that has Fishy or Turtle on it. The 
second clause contains one of the four articles – ‘a’, ‘another’, ‘the’, or ‘that’. Note that simple 
present tense is used in all sentences in experiment, unlike imperative which was used in 
‘Puppets’.  
Instructions go like this: “Fishy touches an apple, [pause to allow for action of Fishy 
touching one of the apples] and Turtle touches a/another/the/that apple.” An adult would respond 
like this: pick two different objects upon hearing ‘another’, pick any object upon hearing ‘a’, and 
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pick the same (salient) object upon hearing ‘the’ and ‘that’. The number of times the same object 
was subsequently acted upon served as the dependent variable. 
The modulation of the context size (three-item vs six item) was retained in this 
experiment, to confirm the effects observed previously. 
 
             
introductory page     test page, example of ‘another’ response 
 
Figure 3.3.1 Experimental set up of ‘Felt’ task 
 
Thus the comprehension experiment tests how children interpret ‘the’ versus ‘a’, 
specifically whether they know Uniqueness or whether they take account of the pragmatic 
conditions for establishing context sets – that both the speaker and listener must have means for 
determining the context sets. It also tests whether children use pragmatic properties (old 
information, known to listener) of ‘that’ to decide how to use the correct article. 
3.3.2. Participants 
Age group Mean age N Minimum Maximum 
3 3.47 19 3.00 3.96 
4 4.62 18 4.08 4.97 
5 5.45 21 5.00 5.91 
6 6.55 21 6.10 6.98 
7 7.54 21 7.02 7.96 
8 8.62 15 8.00 8.99 
9 9.42 14 9.00 9.92 
Total 6.36 129 3.00 9.92 
Table 3.3.2. Participants in ‘Felt’ task 
 
The participants included 129 children from Boston and Cambridge daycares and 
afterschool programs. The results of this study are more clear than those using ‘puppets’ version 
of the experiment, since children no longer have to rely on remembering the salient referent but 
they are able to clearly read it off the context. The clear-cut trends in the data were already 
evident with about ten children per age group, however more children were recruited to verify the 
patterns as well as for purposes of the ongoing autism study.  
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3.3.3. Results 
 
Figure and Table 3.3.3. Percentage ‘same’ responses by children 
(percent choice of salient entity in the context set (action on the same object by both actors)) 
(error bars represent +-1 standard error) 
Age 3;0-3;11 
(19) 
4;0-4;11 
(18) 
5;0-5;11 
(21) 
6;1-6;11 
(21) 
7;0-7;11 
(21) 
8;0-8;11 
(15) 
9;0-9;11 
(14) 
A% 2.7% 5.5% 15.0% 10.3% 13.5% 6.7% 13.2% 
Another% 0.8% 5.5% 7.2% 4.8% 1.7% 0.0% 1.2% 
The% 2.7% 44.5% 46.8% 54.0% 70.7% 74.5% 85.7% 
That% 8.8% 49.0% 62.7% 50.8% 81.0% 80.0% 97.7% 
 
A mixed repeated measures ANOVA was performed (Determiner (4 levels) by Context (2 
levels) as repeated measures by Age group (7 levels) as between subject measure). Mauchly’s test 
of Sphericity for within subjects effects of determiner (χ2(5) = 184.5, p < .001) and the 
interaction between determiner and context (χ2(5) = 11.1, p = .048) come out significant, hence 
we must accept the hypothesis that the variances of the differences between the levels of 
variables are significantly different, and the assumption of sphericity has been violated. 
Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geiser estimates of 
sphericity for determiner (ε = .508 for determiner) and Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity for 
the interaction (ε = 1 for the interaction). For main effect of context, the assumption of sphericity 
is met. Results revealed a significant effect for determiner (F(1.52, 185.8) = 232.9, p<.001), with 
determiner type by age interaction reaching high significance (F(9.13, 185.5) = 8.9, p < .001). 
Neither context, nor interaction between context and age reached significance. Interaction 
between determiner and context was significant (F(3,366)=5.4, p=.001). The three way 
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interaction (determiner by context by age) was not significant.  The effect of age group was 
significant (F(6,122)=10.3, p<.001). 
 Post-Hoc pairwise comparisons (adjusted for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni 
correction) revealed significant difference between the 3 year old group and all other age groups 
(all ps<=.001, except for 4 year olds (p=.012)), 4 year olds also differed from the 9 year olds 
(p=.02). No other age group comparisons showed significance. There was also significant 
difference among all determiners (all ps <.001, i.e. each determiner was significantly different 
from all other determiners for all ages). There was no difference between contexts.  
 
Comprehension of the indefinite article ‘a’ remained between 3% and 15% actions on the 
same object for all ages studied. This is lower that what would be expected for chance 
performance (25%) if children took ‘a’ to mean ‘any one’. 
Comprehension of ‘another’ was surprisingly good (i.e. practically no actions on the same 
object) for even the youngest participants and indicated a number of things. Firstly, ‘another’ is 
an anaphor, i.e. has a distinct mechanism of interpretation from the indefinite and definite 
articles. Secondly, interpretation of ‘another’ involves being aware of the salient entity in the 
context set, and picking not the salient one! In other words, as early as 4 years, when children 
begin to distinguish between indefinite and definite articles, the notion of ‘salient entity in the 
context set’ is known to children. Had this not been known by children, they would be 
performing around 25% actions2 on the same object, which, obviously, they are not. Children are 
differentiating ‘a’ from ‘another’ significantly (see post-hoc tests above). 
Comprehension of the definite determiner ‘the’ showed an S-shaped curve found in the 
development of many biological systems, with an initial plateau around 50% and lack of change 
in performance for 4, 5, and 6 year olds, with the following rapid increase between ages 6 and 8, 
with 8 year olds already reaching adult-like levels of performance.  
Comprehension of ‘that’ was better than comprehension of ‘the’ for all ages studied (see 
post-hoc tests above). Ignoring, for the moment, the dip in the 6 years, interpreting ‘that’ as 
referring to the salient entity in the context set gives children a whole two years worth of 
advantage over interpreting ‘the’. Using ‘that’ helps 5 year old children interpret 63% of 
utterances correctly, whereas on ‘the’ only 7 year olds reach the same level. 
Participants were subdivided by their pattern of performance between ‘the’ and ‘that’ 
(Figure and Table 3.3.4), with “A” pattern denoting good performance on both ‘the’ and ‘that’, 
“B” pattern denoting bad performance on ‘the’ with a relatively better performance on ‘that’, “C” 
pattern denoting a bad performance on ‘that’ with a relatively better performance on ‘the’, and 
finally “D” pattern denoting a bad performance in both ‘the’ and ‘that’. 3 
We find that no 3s show adult-like interpretation, only 45% of 4-6s show adult-like 
interpretation. This analysis makes more evident the steep increase between ages 6 and 8, with                                                         
2 Chance performance (see section on random model) suggests that children, by chance will 
produce many 1/6 or 2/6 responses, which would result in about 25% ‘same’ responses. 
3 Pattern the vs that: If the difference (absolute value of ‘the’-‘that’)<2, then (if the<4 assign “D”, 
else assign “A”); else (if ‘the’<’that’ then (if that<3, then “D”, else “B”), else (if the<3, then “D”, 
else “C”)). Random model of responses (section 7) shows that it is extremely unlikely to get 4/6 
or better by chance, hence for ‘the’ and ‘that’, 4-6/6 is ‘good’ performance. The difference 
between ‘the’ and ‘that’, to be significant, is decided to be at least 2. In case of such differential 
performance, it is necessary to show knowledge of at least 3/6 on ‘the’ or ‘that’. 
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80% of 8 year olds showing adult like interpretations. Apparent increase in knowledge of ‘that’ 
relative to ‘the’ in 5s and 7s is due to a subset of these children interpreting ‘that’ better than 
‘the’. The apparent dip in knowledge of ‘that’ in 6s is due to 2 children interpreting ‘the’ better 
than ‘that’.  
 
 
Figure and Table 3.3.4. Proportion of children performing well by age 
  3(19) 4(18) 5(21) 6(21) 7(21) 8(15) 9(14) 
D 0.95 0.56 0.33 0.43 0.19 0.20 0.00 
C, that<the 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
B, that>the 0.05 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.14 
A, the=that 0.00 0.44 0.43 0.48 0.67 0.80 0.86 
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3.4. Experiment 3. Replication of “Felt” with addition of ‘same’ 
and ‘share’ 
 
3.4.1. Method 
Additional control conditions were built into the “Felt” task to verify that children have 
the concept of ‘sameness’, know which is the salient referent in the context set independent of 
Maximality in ‘the’, and to assure that children do not slip into a strategy of simply picking two 
different objects These unambiguous sentences involved ‘same’ and share’, and replaced the 
second clauses of utterances: “Fishy touches an apple, and Turtle touches the same apple” OR 
“…and Turtle shares the apple with Fishy.”  
3.4.2. Participants 
Another group of participants, which included 104 children and teenagers from Boston, 
Cambridge, Wellesley, and Michigan, was tested on the version of ‘felt’ task which included the 
‘same’ and ‘share’ control conditions.  
 
Age Mean N Minimum Maximum 
3 3.59 15 2.92 3.98 
4 4.46 19 4.00 4.96 
5 5.43 7 5.09 5.97 
6 6.41 12 6.00 6.93 
7 7.34 9 7.06 7.71 
8 8.61 8 8.03 8.89 
9 9.46 4 9.06 9.93 
Total 5.76 74 2.92 9.93 
Table 3.4.1. Child participants 
 
Age Mean N Minimum Maximum 
“10” 11.44 19 10.00 13.14 
“20” 16.74 11 14.59 19.66 
Table 3.4.2. Adolescent and Adult 
participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.3. Results 
 
OLDER GROUP A ANO THE THAT SAME SHARE 
10;0-13;1 (19) 9.7% 0.0% 97.3% 98.2% 100.0% 100.0% 
14;6-19;8 (11) 10.7% 0.0% 94.0% 94.0% 97.8% 97.8% 
Table 3.4.3. Percent ‘same’ actions by adolescent and adult participants 
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Figure and Table 3.4.4. Percent of choice of salient entity in the context set (action on the 
same object by both actors) (Error bars represent +-1 standard deviation) 
Age 3;0-3;11 
(15) 
4;0-4;11 
(19) 
5;0-5;11 
(7) 
6;1-6;11 
(12) 
7;0-7;11 
(9) 
8;0-8;11 
(8) 
9;0-9;11 
(4) 
A% 8.8% 13.2% 21.5% 12.5% 0.0% 4.2% 4.2% 
Another% 2.2% 0.8% 2.3% 5.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
The% 38.8% 52.7% 40.5% 61.2% 68.5% 89.7% 100.0% 
That% 41.2% 67.5% 88.2% 83.3% 74.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Share% 73.3% 90.8% 96.5% 93.8% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Same% 65.0% 83.0% 96.5% 95.8% 97.3% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The trends in performance on the test conditions were the same in this sample as in the 
previous sample (3.3.). Participants in the younger ages showed a much better performance on 
‘same’ and ‘share’ than on the definite articles, indicating that they have concepts of sameness, 
and awareness of the salient entity in the context set. This additionally shows that their lack of 
adult-like performance on the definite determiners is not due to their lack knowledge of the fact 
that toy characters can appear in the same space (i.e. on a same apple) together.  
This time older children and teenagers also participated. This older group showed perfect 
knowledge of all determiners. They gave 10% actions on the same object for the indefinite 
determiner – a bit lower than expected by chance levels, but differing ‘a’ from ‘another’ which 
got 0% actions on the same object. We believe that a larger sample size as well as a clearer 
experimental set up showed the true state of adult knowledge, unlike the knowledge shown by 
only two adults tested on “Puppets” who showed unusually high actions on the same object for 
indefinite ‘a’. 
A mixed repeated measures ANOVA was performed (Determiner (6 levels) as repeated 
measures by Age group (7 levels) as between subject measure). Mauchly’s test of Sphericity for 
within subjects effects of determiner (χ2(14) = 117.4, p < .001) come out significant, hence we 
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must accept the hypothesis that the variances of the differences between the levels of variables 
are significantly different, and the assumption of sphericity has been violated. Therefore, degrees 
of freedom were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geiser estimates of sphericity for determiner (ε 
= .572 for determiner). Results revealed a significant effect for determiner (F(2.86, 191.8) = 
232.8, p<.001), with determiner type by age interaction reaching high significance (F(17.2, 
191.8) = 2.9, p < .001). The effect of age group was significant (F(6,67)=3.9, p=.002). 
 Post-Hoc pairwise comparisons (adjusted for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni 
correction) revealed significant difference between the 3 year old group and the 6 year olds 
(p=.034), the 3s and the 8s (p=.005), the 3s and the 9s (p=.042). There was also significant 
difference between all determiners (all ps <.001), except for ‘a’ vs ‘another’ (p=.001), for ‘that’ 
vs ‘share’ (p=.003), and for ‘that’ vs ‘same’ (p=.01). Only ‘share’ vs ‘same’ was not significant.  
 
 In dividing participants by their patterns of performance on ‘the’ and ‘that’ (Figure and 
Table 3.4.5), we find similar trends as in the previous sample. “A” pattern is only shown by 30-
40% of 4-6 year olds, but by close to 90% of 8 year olds. In this sample, we find a larger 
proportion of participants showing the “B” pattern, and not a single child showing the “C” 
pattern. We also find that 20% of 3 year olds show ‘A’ pattern unlike 0% of 3 year olds in the 
previous sample. This could be due to a sampling error. It could be because the saliency of the 
referents exemplified by additional control conditions (‘same’ and ‘share’) influenced children in 
their identification of the salient referent of ‘that’, but still was powerless to help children identify 
the salient referent of ‘the’. Why was this powerless to help children identify the salient referent 
of ‘the’? Because children are missing Maximality/uniqueness. 
 
 
Figure and Table 3.4.5. Proportion children performing well 
  3(15) 4(19) 5(7) 6(12) 7(9) 8(8) 9(4) 
D 0.60 0.42 0.14 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.00 
B, that>the 0.20 0.21 0.57 0.42 0.11 0.13 0.00 
A, the=that 0.20 0.37 0.29 0.42 0.67 0.88 1.00 
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3.5. Analysis. “Felt” – entire sample 
 
Participants in the analyses in this section included the combined sample of 203 
participants from both ‘Felt’ experiments. This combination is possible because, while there were 
some differences in the data between the two ‘Felt’ experiments, these are not significant. 
ANOVA (dependent variable  = the pattern of performance that each participant is showing; 
between subjects factor = experiment (Felt part 1 (experiment 2) vs Felt part 2 (experiment 3)) 
showed no significant effect of experiment (p=.444). When Age group was added as another 
between subjects factor, the effect of experiment approached but did not reach significance 
(F(1,188)=3.4, p=.066), the effect of age was highly significant (F(6,188)=10.7, p<.001), the 
interaction was not significant (p=.8). Thus we can take advantage of the 203 participant strong 
sample size and analyze the patterns of performance in fine detail. 
 
3.5.1. Fine-grained analysis by half-ages 
Given the large number of participants in the combined ‘Felt’ experiment, it is worthwhile 
to look at children’s development of determiners on a finer scale than a year. For this reason, 
children are divided into ‘half-age’ groups, i.e. 3-3.49, 3.5-3.9, 4-4.49, 4.5-4.9, etc. A special age 
of interest here is in the 6-7 year old range, since this is where children experience a change in 
their knowledge trends in ‘the’ and ‘that’ – that is where the inflection point seems to be in the 
maturation of uniqueness/Maximality. Children at 6 years show the ‘A’ pattern (good knowledge 
of ‘the’ and ‘that’) more like the 4 and 5 year olds, children 7 years show the ‘A’ pattern more 
like the older children. Can we map this inflection point precisely? 
Participants 
Group 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 Total 
Number 12 22 15 22 15 13 18 15 15 15 5 18 10 8 203 
Table 3.5.1 All participants in ‘Felt’ divided by half-ages 
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Results 
 
Figure 3.5.2. Actions on the ‘same’ objects for participants divided into ‘half-ages’ 
 
A mixed repeated measures ANOVA was performed (Determiner (4 levels) by Context (2 
levels) as repeated measures by half-age group (14 levels) as between subject measure). 
Mauchly’s test of Sphericity for within subjects effects of determiner (χ2(5) = 247.8, p < .001) 
and the interaction between determiner and context (χ2(5) = 41.1, p <.001) come out significant, 
hence we must accept the hypothesis that the variances of the differences between the levels of 
variables are significantly different, and the assumption of sphericity has been violated. 
Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geiser estimates of 
sphericity for determiner (ε = .544 for determiner) and Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity for 
the interaction (ε = .969 for the interaction). For main effect of context, the assumption of 
sphericity is met. Results revealed a significant effect for determiner (F(1.63, 308.3) = 371.7, 
p<.001), with determiner type by age interaction reaching high significance (F(21.2, 308.3) = 5.1, 
p < .001). Neither context, nor interaction between context and age reached significance. 
Interaction between determiner and context was significant (F(2.9,549.6)=9.2, p<.001). The three 
way interaction (determiner by context by age) was finally significant (F(37.8,549.6)=1.5, 
p=.025).  The effect of age group was significant (F(13,189)=5.7, p<.001). 
 Post-Hoc pairwise comparisons (adjusted for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni 
correction) revealed significant difference between the 3s and 4s (p=.039), 3s and 5s (p=.009), 
and 3s and 6s-9.5s (ps range from p=.036  to p<.001). 3.5s differ from 5s (p=.04), and from 6.5s-
9.5s (ps range from .04 to <.001), but not from 8s (likely because there are only 5 children in the 
8.0-8.49 age range). There was also significant difference between all determiners (all ps <.001).  
There was no difference between contexts.  
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 Analyzing the entire sample and binning the children by half-year groups, we can see the 
distinct jump in knowledge of ‘the’ in the six year olds. Younger 6s perform similarly to the 4 
and 5 year old children. Older 6s perform similarly to 7-8 year old children. This categorical 
jump in performance is significant. We borrow the logic from Hirsch and Wexler (2006)’s 
studies of development of syntactic phases via studies of nonactional passives. Question is what 
drives children’s performance. If it is internal, maturing knowledge, then we expect little variance 
in the age of attainment of the semantic principles. If it is language-external factors, such as 
paying attention to the speaker-hearer knowledge distinction, we would expect great variance 
with respect to the age when individual children acquire definite articles. Clearly, we see that the 
former is the case for ‘the’ – 40% of children 4-6 show adult-like knowledge, and almost 70% of 
6.5 year olds show that knowledge. For children younger than 6.5 the latter seems to be the case 
for ‘that’. Before knowledge of semantic principles is in place (before 6.5), a subset of children 
can use the pragmatics in ‘that’ better than lack of semantics in ‘the’ in choosing the salient 
referent. Once the semantic principle is in place (6.5 and beyond), the majority of children have 
no need of relying on pragmatics – hence performance on ‘the’ and ‘that’ tracks closely together. 
 
 
Figure and Table 3.5.3. Proportion children performing well, by half-ages 
 
3 
(12) 
3.5 
(22) 
4 
(15) 
4.5 
(22) 
5 
(15) 
5.5 
(13) 
6 
(18) 
6.5 
(15) 
7 
(15) 
7.5 
(15) 
8 
(5) 
8.5 
(18) 
9 
(10) 
9.5 
(8) 
D 0.83 0.77 0.40 0.55 0.20 0.38 0.44 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.00 
C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
B 0.00 0.18 0.20 0.05 0.40 0.23 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.20 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.13 
A 0.17 0.05 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.28 0.67 0.73 0.60 0.80 0.83 0.90 0.88 
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3.5.2. Random model in children’s performance? 
Next, we investigate patterns of performance relative to a random model of responses for 
each determiner. The random model here was calculated for 3 presentations of 3-item contexts 
and 3 presentations of 6-item contexts, i.e. we calculated the probability that children will give us 
0/6, 1/6, etc ‘same’ responses (Figure and Table 3.5.4). Such performance might be expected for 
‘a’ (which means ‘any one’), but not for ‘another’. If younger children’s knowledge of ‘the’ is 
deficient, we might see some random responses in ‘the’ too. If children are picking their referents 
by chance, we expect a great deal of 1/6 and 2/6 ‘same’ responses, some 0/6 and 3/6 responses, 
and practically no 4/6 or greater ‘same’ responses as those are unlikely by chance.  
We can see that with ‘Felt’ set-up, as opposed to ‘Puppets’ set-up, we observe practically 
no random patterns of responses in groups of subjects. (Figures 3.5.5-3.5.8).  
It follows from this data, that there are almost no ages when children show such random-
model profile of answers in any of the determiners in ‘Felt’ task.  
 
Number 
actions on the 
‘same’ object 
Random model 
estimate for 3*3 
and 6*3 
0 0.17147 
1 0.36008 
2 0.30350 
3 0.13083 
4 0.03035 
5 0.00360 
6 0.00017 
Figure and Table 3.5.4. probability of performance on random model. 
 
 
Figure 3.5.5.Proportion of children giving 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 ‘same’ responses for ‘another’ 
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Figure 3.5.6. Proportion of children giving 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 ‘same’ responses for ‘a’ 
 
 
Figure 3.5.7. Proportion of children giving 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 ‘same’ responses for ‘the’ 
 
56
  
Figure 3.5.8. Proportion of children giving 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 ‘same’ responses for ‘that’ 
 
Proportion of children who get ‘the’ (at 4/6 or better) plateaus from 4 to 6 years. 
Proportion of children who get ‘that’ varies within that same plateau. Once children are 6.5 years 
old or older, there is no wide variation between ‘the’ and ‘that’. This pattern suggets that before 
6.5, children who are getting ‘that’ are doing so via some interpretational strategy which some 
children get and some children don’t – hence the variation. Note that the same young fives that 
get almost as many correct referents with ‘a’, and ‘another’ as they do with ‘that’, only 40% of 
these same young fives get correct referent with ‘the’. If children do not know uniqueness in ‘the’ 
and ‘that’, they can think ‘the’ means ‘one of salient things in context set’, and they can think that 
‘that’ also means ‘one of salient things in the context set’. A reasonable strategy is that children 
take ‘that’ to indicate interpretation relative to non-default context, which for children may focus 
the interpretation on the true salient entity in the context. Once children know uniqueness (by 6.5 
years), that knowledge is sufficient for them to interpret the salient entity in the discourse set.  
 
  
4-6 year olds      6.5-9 year olds  
Figure 3.5.9.  Proportion of children giving 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 ‘same’ responses – summary 
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 Three year olds primarily show 0/6 responses for all determiners, although notably there 
are few ‘smart’ three-year olds who show 4/6 and better on ‘the’ and ‘that’, but those are very 
unique individuals. For ‘another’, 86% of younger children and 94% of older children show ‘0/6’ 
‘same’ responses, with other children showing some 1/6 and 2/6 responses. For ‘a’, 60% of 
children give 0/6, 25% give 1/6 responses, and about 20% of children give 2/6 and 3/6 responses 
– this pattern does not change with age. For ‘the’ and ‘that’ three year olds show primarily 0/6 
responses with some 1/6 responses. In all other ages, children give many more 6/6 responses for 
‘that’ than for ‘the’, almost twice as many (19% vs 38% in 4-6s, 51% vs 73% in 6.5-9s). At 
younger ages for ‘the’ about 10% of children show each of 1/6, 2/6, 3/6, 4/6, 29% show 0/6, and 
14% show 5/6. For the same younger ages using ‘that’ to indicate the referent pushes many these 
children toward 6/6 responses. At older ages, there are still some children showing poor 
performance on ‘the and ‘that’, but what is notable is that many more children are sure of the 
referent of ‘that’ than of ‘the’: older children show 6/6 by a third more for ‘that’ than ‘the’, and 
show 5/6 more for ‘the’ than for ‘that’ (26% vs 12%). 
In other words, children’s average ‘50%’ ‘same’ responses performance on ‘the’ at 
younger ages, is not that. There is almost bimodal distribution of participants. There are around 
half of participants who show adult-like knowledge (4/6 or higher). With the rest of participants 
showing poor performance (3/6 or lower), which is consistent with chance performance 
according to our model of random responses.   
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3.5.3. Gender effects? 
Participants 
Age Gender Mean N Minimum Maximum 
3 f 3.47 17 3.00 3.95 
  m 3.59 17 2.92 3.98 
4 f 4.57 18 4.08 4.97 
  m 4.51 19 4.00 4.87 
5 f 5.42 15 5.00 5.91 
  m 5.42 12 5.01 5.64 
6 f 6.60 22 6.10 6.98 
  m 6.27 12 6.00 6.58 
7 f 7.47 19 7.05 7.96 
  m 7.48 11 7.02 7.90 
8 f 8.67 13 8.10 8.94 
  m 8.55 10 8.00 8.99 
9 f 9.53 10 9.00 9.93 
  m 9.30 8 9.06 9.80 
Total F 5.89 114 3.00 9.93 
Total M 5.82 89 2.92 9.80 
Table 3.5.10. Participants in “Felt” divided by age and by gender 
Results 
A mixed repeated measures ANOVA was performed (Determiner (4 levels) by Context (2 
levels) as repeated measures by Age group (7 levels) and gender (2 levels) as between subject 
measures). Mauchly’s test of Sphericity for within subjects effects of determiner (χ2(5) = 250.1, p 
< .001) and the interaction between determiner and context (χ2(5) = 41.9, p < .001) come out 
significant, hence we must accept the hypothesis that the variances of the differences between the 
levels of variables are significantly different, and the assumption of sphericity has been violated. 
Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geiser estimates of 
sphericity for determiner (ε = .543 for determiner) and Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity for 
the interaction (ε = .97 for the interaction). For main effect of context, the assumption of 
sphericity is met. Results revealed a significant effect for determiner (F(1.63, 307.9) = 395.5, 
p<.001), with determiner type by age interaction reaching high significance (F(9.8, 307.9) = 9.9, 
p < .001). Neither determiner by gender interaction, nor the determiner by age by gender 
interaction, nor context, nor interaction between context and age, nor the interaction between 
context and gender, nor the interaction between context age and gender reached significance. 
Interaction between determiner and context was significant (F(2.9,550.7)=9.6, p<.001). The three 
way interaction between determiner, context and age approached significance 
(F(17.5,550.7)=1.6, p=.065). The three way interaction between determiner, context, and gender 
and the four way interaction were not significant.  The between subjects effect of age group was 
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between age and gender.  
 
Figure 3.5.11. % actions on the ‘same’object in females and males 
 
 
Figure 3.5.12. Proportion of females and males performing well 
 
While there is no significant effect of gender and no interactions between determiner and 
gender, there is noticeable difference in graphs in performance between females and males ‘the’ 
at ages 6 and 7. Females’ development takes off by 6 years and by 7 years over 70% of them 
show good performance. Males’ development lags behind, and takes off only by 7years and 
reaches good performance in majority of children only by 8 years. Furthermore, more males 
show “B” pattern at age 6 than females. Thus males are a year behind females in developing 
semantic knowledge.  
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3.5.4. Context effects? 
Participants 
Age Mean N Minimum Maximum 
3 3.53 34 2.92 3.98 
4 4.54 37 4.00 4.97 
5 5.42 27 5.00 5.91 
6 6.48 34 6.00 6.98 
7 7.48 30 7.02 7.96 
8 8.62 23 8.00 8.99 
9 9.43 18 9.00 9.93 
Table 3.5.13. Participants in “Felt” by age 
Results 
Below are Random models for potential probabilistic replies for picking the same entity 
zero, once, twice or three times, in a 3-item or a 6-item context given 3 presentations of each. As 
in the ‘puppets’ experiment, subjects should be more likely, by chance, to pick the same objects 
in the smaller sized context (see discussion above in the ‘effect of context size’ section of 
‘puppets’ experiment). In other words, chance performance in the 3-item context should be 33%, 
and chance performance in the 6-item context should be 16%. Thus the expected difference 
between 3-item and 6-item contexts should be around 16%. 
 
 
 Number 
‘same’ 
actions 
3-ITEM 
context 
6-ITEM 
context 
0 0.296 0.579 
1 0.444 0.347 
2 0.222 0.069 
3 0.037 0.005 
 
Figure and Table 3.5.14 Random 
model context 
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Figure 3.5.15. Differences between 3 and 6 contexts for all determiners 
 
While in the repeated measures ANOVA (above in half-age analysis) there was no 
significant effect of context, interaction between determiner and context was significant 
(F(2.9,549.6)=9.2, p<.001). The three way interaction (determiner by context by half-ages) was 
significant (F(37.8,549.6)=1.5, p=.025). 
This time around, participants have a tendency to perform slightly more actions on the 
same object as expected for 3-item rather than 6-item contexts only for ‘a’; for ‘the’, participants 
perform slightly more action on the same object for 6-item contexts rather than for 3-item 
contexts – contrary to random model effects. There are no context effects for ‘another’ and hardly 
any ‘that’ (Figure 3.5.15). 
Notably, the highest differences for ‘the-3’ vs ‘the-6’ occur in children of ages 4, 5, and 6 
(9%, 10%, and 13% respectively) – the time where they are at the developmental plateau. From 
age 7 onwards the effect of context almost disappears (less than 3% with the exception of 8 year 
olds (7%)). For ‘a-3’ and ‘a-6’ the largest differences are in the 4 and 5 year old children (12% 
and 9% respectively), appearing somewhat less in the 6 (4%), 7 (8%) and 9 (8%) year olds, and 
practically absent in 8 year olds. For ‘that-3’ and ‘that-6’ the differences are less than 3% for all 
ages except for 6 year olds (7%). For ‘another-3’ and ‘another-6’ the differences are less than 3% 
for all ages. 
So, as before, for children’s interpretation of ‘that’, there is no room for probabilities. For 
‘another’ we find no variation either. However for ‘the’ and ‘a’ context is playing a role. For the 
indefinite article ‘a’ the context effect is as predicted by the random model – since ‘a’ means ‘any 
one’, children show that they know this definition by picking slightly more ‘same’ objects when 
there are fewer referents in the context set. For the definite article ‘the’ the context effect is the 
opposite of what is predicted by the random model. What seems to be going on in the younger 
children is that the larger context set is forcing them to pay more attention to the salient referent. 
Perhaps while young children are able to hold three items in their attention at once, and thereby 
assigning them equal saliency, young children are not able to hold six items in their attention at 
once, and therefore focus on the truly salient referent.  
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3.5.5. Context effects vs patterns of performance 
 To explore the effect of context further, we divide participants into those who show 
differential performance in 3 vs 6 contexts (group 1) and those who do not (group 0), and 
evaluate their patterns of knowledge. Manipulation of the context size (3 items vs 6 items) 
showed that around 30% of children are sensitive to it. Recall that while in case of ‘a’ children 
show semi-random performance and chose the salient referent slightly more often in the 3-item 
context than in the 6-item context, in case ‘the’ children chose the salient referent more in the 6-
item context – contrary to random-effects models.  
 
Table 3.5.16. Proportion children (not) showing sensitivity to context size by age. 
 
 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  average 
 the a the a the a the a the a the a the a the a 
0 76% 82% 54% 68% 57% 71% 64% 67% 73% 73% 61% 74% 67% 67% 65% 72% 
1 24% 18% 46% 32% 43% 29% 36% 33% 27% 27% 39% 26% 33% 33% 34% 38% 
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For a3 vs a6: No difference participants 
 
 
Figure 3.5.17. % actions on the same object by context     Figure 3.5.18. Proportion children  
giving particular performances 
 
Table 3.5.19. Paired t-tests for those not differentiating between ‘a’ contexts 
a context = 0 t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
ANO3 - ANO6 -0.576 145 0.565 
THE3 - THE6 -4.168 145 5.26E-05 
THAT3 - THAT6 -0.686 145 0.494 
AA3 - THE3 -12.126 145 0 
AA6 - THE6 -13.933 145 0 
THE3 - THAT3 -6.22 145 0 
THE3 - THAT6 -6.324 145 0 
THE6 - THAT3 -2.746 145 0.006795 
THE6 - THAT6 -3.238 145 0.001491 
AA3 - ANO3 1.814 145 0.072 
AA3 - ANO6 1.351 145 0.179 
AA6 - ANO3 1.814 145 0.072 
AA6 - ANO6 1.351 145 0.179 
 
Those who do not differentiate ‘a’ contexts (72% of participants), show context 
differences on ‘the’. (reach 4/6 by 7 years of age).  These children seem more categorical in their 
reasoning, e.g. ‘a’ = another one (indeed ‘a’ performance tracks with ‘another’ closely). They 
also show context differences in ‘the’. It seems that their semantics does not provide a clear 
definition of a given determiner, they try to guess (use a strategy). Relative saliency of an item 
relative to its context seems to be what’s going on in ‘the’. It seems that what is going on is in 
The3 children can take in all three items, so technically, any of the three can be salient – look, 
they are right in front of the child, whether or not fishy/turtle is on them. But in The6 – there are 
too many items for children to take in at once, so ‘salient’ is more likely to be the on with 
fishy/turtle on it. 
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Figure 3.5.20. % actions on the same object by context     Figure 3.5.21. Proportion children  
giving particular performances 
 
Table 3.5.22. Paired t-tests for those differentiating between ‘a’ contexts 
a context =1 t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
AA6 - AA3 -3.711 56 0.0004767 
ANO3 - ANO6 1.694 56 0.096 
THE3 - THE6 -1.154 56 0.253 
THAT3 - THAT6 0.704 56 0.484 
AA3 - THE3 -4.596 56 0 
AA6 - THE6 -8.115 56 0 
THE3 - THAT3 -3.647 56 0.001 
THE3 - THAT6 -2.32 56 0.024 
THE6 - THAT3 -1.847 56 0.070 
THE6 - THAT6 -1.53 56 0.132 
AA3 - ANO3 8.204 56 0 
AA3 - ANO6 8.3 56 0 
AA6 - ANO3 3.188 56 0.002 
AA6 - ANO6 4.014 56 0 
 
Those who do differentiate ‘a’ contexts (28% of participants), show NO context 
differences on ‘the’. (reach 4/6 by 6 years of age).  These children seem more sensitive (sure of) 
to semantics, e.g. ‘a’ = “any one” (adult meaning), in fact in 4 year olds, A3 = The (!), and 
random model context effects are evident with this interpretation. These children are also 
somewhat more likely to show ‘adult’ interpretation of ‘the’ earlier.  
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Figure 3.5.23. % actions on the same object by context     Figure 3.5.24. Proportion children  
giving particular performances 
 
Table 3.5.25. Paired t-tests for those not differentiating between ‘the’ contexts 
the context =0 t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
AA6 - AA3 -1.377 130 0.171 
ANO3 - ANO6 2.023 130 0.045 
THAT3 - THAT6 0.294 130 0.769 
AA3 - THE3 -10.955 130 0 
AA6 - THE6 -11.248 130 0 
THE3 - THAT3 -3.486 130 0.001 
THE3 - THAT6 -3.077 130 0.003 
THE6 - THAT3 -3.486 130 0.001 
THE6 - THAT6 -3.077 130 0.003 
AA3 - ANO3 3.193 130 0.002 
AA3 - ANO6 3.707 130 0 
AA6 - ANO3 2.446 130 0.016 
AA6 - ANO6 3.239 130 0.002 
 
Those who do not differentiate ‘the’ contexts (65% of participants), also show no context 
differences on ‘a’. (reach 4/6 by 7 years of age). 
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For the3 vs the6: with difference participants 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5.26. % actions on the same object by context     Figure 3.5.27. Proportion children  
giving particular performances 
 
Table 3.5.28. Paired t-tests for those differentiating between ‘the’ contexts 
the context = 1 t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
AA6 - AA3 -3.753 71 0.0003541 
ANO3 - ANO6 -0.241 71 0.81 
THE3 - THE6 -4.349 71 4.49E-05 
THAT3 - THAT6 -0.478 71 0.634 
AA3 - THE3 -6.457 71 0 
AA6 - THE6 -12.804 71 0 
THE3 - THAT3 -7.577 71 0 
THE3 - THAT6 -6.775 71 0 
THE6 - THAT3 -1.276 71 0.206 
THE6 - THAT6 -1.905 71 0.061 
AA3 - ANO3 5.958 71 0 
AA3 - ANO6 4.916 71 0 
AA6 - ANO3 2.559 71 0.013 
AA6 - ANO6 2.218 71 0.03 
 
Those who do differentiate ‘the’ contexts (35% of participants), also show context 
differences on ‘a’. They also reach good performance only by 8 years. Note these participants are 
evenly distributed across the two ‘felt’ experiments. ‘Felt’ part one had 45 of 129. ‘Felt’ part two 
had 27 of 74. These participants show context effect on ‘a’ that goes in the direction predicted by 
the random model, so it is not the fact they are not subject to chance performance. However in 
case of ‘the’ something is going on. Performance on The6 tracks closely with performance on 
‘That’. Performance on ‘the3’ looks exactly like the random model of responses. At the same 
time, participants are differentiating ‘the3’ from ‘a3’. The fact that only 50% of children are 
showing adult-like knowledge till they are 8 years old suggests that their semantics does not 
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provide a clear definition of a given determiner, and that they try to guess (use a strategy). 
Relative saliency of an item relative to its context seems to be what’s going on in ‘the’. It seems 
that what is going on is in ‘The3’ children can take in all three items, so technically, any of the 
three can be salient – look, they are right in front of the child, whether or not Fishy/Turtle is on 
them. But in ‘The6’ – there are too many items for children to take in at once, so ‘salient’ is more 
likely to be the on with Fishy/Turtle on it. This is evidence supporting the idea that children who 
are lacking uniqueness are variable in their choice of the context of the utterance – which could 
be the whole context set or the unique salient referent.  
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Figure 3.5.29. Proportion of participants giving 0,1,2 or 3 ‘same’ answers 
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3.6. Discussion of TD Results 
 
We presented data on comprehension of determiners in children as tested on act-out tasks.  
The classical act-out task in which children physically pushed around actors and referents 
(“Puppets”) already showed the developmental trends in definite and indefinite determiners later 
replicated by the more constrained act-out task made of felt (“Felt”), which were in turn 
replicated in another sample of participants on ‘Felt’ with additional conditions, however the 
results from ‘Puppets’ were far noisier. The investigated effects of random models of 
performance as well as effects of differences in context size were very much pronounced in 
‘Puppets’, and following the data from ‘Felt’, it can be safely concluded that majority, but 
notably not all, of those effects were due to straying children’s attention due to experimental set-
up issues.  
MANOVA (dependent variables = percent ‘same’ responses for ‘a’, ‘the’ and ‘that’; 
independent variable = task (‘Felt’ or ‘Puppets’) did not show a significant difference between 
‘Felt’ and ‘Puppets’ for ‘the’ and ‘that’, but did show it for ‘a’ (F(1,290)=72.1, p<.001). When 
age group was added as another between subjects factor, the effect of task did not change, the 
effect of age was highly significant for ‘the’ (F(6,278)=8.5, p<.001) and ‘that’ (F(6,278)=10.2, 
p<.001), not significant for ‘a’. The interaction between age and task was not significant for any 
determiner. 
 
Figure 3.6.1. Development of Determiners on ‘Puppets’ and ‘Felt’ tasks 
 
One notable difference was in the 3 year old group on ‘the’ and ‘that’ who seemed to 
perform relatively better on ‘the’ and ‘that’ in ‘Puppets’ than on ‘Felt’ (about 20% difference). 
Are they are avoiding acting with Fishy and Turtle on the same object in ‘Felt’ – is it a strategy to 
always pick a different one? Perhaps it is. Perhaps, the difference here is in the memory demands 
of ‘Puppets’. If young children have trouble remembering in ‘Puppets’ what just happened, we 
expect to see random model (chance) performance on all determiners – which is close to what we 
observe. In ‘Felt’ however, there are no memory demands – the salient unique referent is clearly 
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visible, and children are less likely to show random model performance where by chance they 
may land on the salient referent some of the time. In this regard, ‘Felt’ is a clearer test than 
‘Puppets’ of children’s knowledge – children’s competence, since in ‘Felt’ performance issues 
(e.g. memory demands) are minimized. The same notable difference between ‘Puppets’ and 
‘Felt’, although going in the opposite direction, occurs in the 7-9 year old participants. It seems 
their semantic competence is obscured by the cognitive demands of ‘Puppets’. In the 4-6 year old 
children however, the nature of the task did not seem to influence their performance.  
Another notable difference, across all participants, is in ‘a’. In ‘Puppets’ participants 
picked the salient referent for ‘a’ around 30%, while it was around 10% in ‘Felt’. This could be 
explained by random model performance in ‘Puppets’, but a very mich reduced random model 
performance in ‘Felt’, which perhaps allowed participants to clearly invoke maximize 
presupposition (if ‘a’ is used and not ‘the’, that indicates a nonsalient referent).  
 
 
Figure 3.6.2. Differences between ‘Puppets’ and ‘Felt’ by age 
 
Overall, the data produced by testing children on ‘Felt’, a more constrained version of an 
act out task, produced clear results. Three year olds showed almost no knowledge of ‘the’ or 
‘that’ in comprehenesion, but were able to pick out the salient referent as refered to by ‘same’ or 
‘share’, and were able to pick out the unsalient referent as refered to by ‘another’. From age 4 till 
age 6 children plateaued in their knowledge. 40% of children showed adult-like knowledge of 
‘the’ and ‘that’, between 5% and 40% of these children understood ‘that’ to refer to the salient 
referent in the context set better than ‘the’. The opposite pattern was found only in two children 
of age six. A big jump in knowledge is observed in seven year olds – now 70% of them show 
adult-like knowledge, as do 80% of 8 year olds.  
About 30% of participants at all ages showed sensitivity to the size of the context set – by 
chance levels children should be more likely to pick the salient referent in a smaller context set 
size (3-item) than in a larger context set size (6-item). In ‘Puppets’, we found such effects of 
context set on ‘a’ and ‘the’, but not on ‘that’. In ‘Felt’, we confirmed these effects on 
interpretation of the indefinite article ‘a’ and a lack of these effects on interpretation of ‘that’. It 
seems when it comes to ‘that’ children are certain of their interpretation and are not susceptible to 
context effects. With ‘the’ we found something new in ‘Felt’. Children were going against chance 
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levels, and were picking more same objects when there were 6 items in the context set. The only 
logical explanation is that children are able to make all three objects in a context set salient, but 
they are unable to make all six objects in the context set salient, perhaps due to 
attentional/working memory issues, and hence focus their attention on the truly salient item in the 
context set – the referent of ‘the’.  
 Thus we show that children can identify the salient entity in the discourse set as early as 
3-4 years (they know ‘another’, and ‘same’, and sometimes ‘that’), but at the same time children 
do not know the salient entity with ‘the’. For the logic of pragmatic deficit theories – whether 
egocentrism or others – this is a paradox. For egocentric/pragmatic view to work in 
comprehension, children should be able to pick their own salient referents – ones that are 
different from the salient referents implied by the speaker. But children can and do pick correct 
salient referent with ‘same’. For the logic of semantic deficit theories – this is supportive 
evidence. If children are deficient in their knowledge of speaker-listener distinctions, and/or in 
their ability to pay attention to the truly salient entity in the context set, it should not make much 
difference which determiner is used to refer to the salient referent.  If children are deficient in 
their knowledge of the semantic principle of uniqueness / maximality, which article is used to 
refer to the salient referent makes all the difference: if children are forced to rely on uniqueness, 
as in case of ‘the’, when they lack uniqueness, which is at least through age 6, their interpretation 
breaks down; however if children realize they do not have to rely on uniqueness but instead can 
rely on pragmatic features of familiarity or the feature signifying non-default context 
interpretation, as in the case of ‘that’, they show more successful comprehension.  
In our future publications we will address the question – what factors can explain the 
presence or the absense of knowledge of ‘the’ and ‘that’ in children – and we will investigate 
children’s nonverbal reasoning, vocabulary levels, overall grammatical comprehension levels, as 
well as children’s syntactic knowledge of actional and psychological passives, and children’s 
syntactic and pragmatic interpretation of personal and reflexive pronouns (Modyanova, Perovic, 
Hirsch, Wexler, in preparation).  
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4. Further Investigations of Typical Acquisition 
 
In Chapter 3, we presented results suggesting that children’s deficits in ‘the’ are semantic 
(due to immature uniqueness/Maximality), and not pragmatic/egocentric in nature. To fully 
support such a view, it is necessary to further investigate children’s semantic and pragmatic 
(other mind awareness) development, in way that distinctly separates them.  
This chapter presents results from two experiments from the opposite ends of theoretical 
continuum. Experiment 4 investigated potential correlations between comprehension of 
determiners and development of theory of mind, as way to directly test children’s awareness of 
other’s points of view and whether that is involved in comprehension of determiners. Experiment 
5 investigated children’s comprehension of Free Relative clauses – constructions which 
unequivocally invoke Maximality in certain contexts, and which, we would like to argue, should 
not involve any pragmatic considerations in their interpretations and hence may present a 
challenge for egocentric/pragmatic accounts. Together, these experiments provide further 
evidence for the semantic deficits hypothesis. 
 
4.1. Experiment 4. Theory of Mind (Not) in Determiner 
Acquisition  
4.1.1. Abstract / Motivation 
The interconnection between development of theory of mind and development of 
language is a hotly debated topic. Some show that TOM depends on language development, 
especially sentential clauses, others show that’s not the case (reviewed below). But can theory of 
mind really be involved in definite article acquisition? This is an implicit assumption of many 
elicited production studies and pragmatic theories of acquisition of determiners where children’s 
deficit in ‘the’ is attributed to children’s inability to consider the point of view of their listener 
(reviewed in section 2.3). Theory of mind in determiners was explicitly considered by Gundel 
(2009) (where the fact that children use determiners early in spontaneous speech is suggestive of 
knowledge of TOM), Schaeffer and Matthewson (2005), and Shaefer and de Villiers (2000). To 
reiterate, many studies investigate whether language contributes to theory of mind, but those 
studies that investigate determiners suggest that theory of mind contributes to language 
development (at least in determiners) – the two fields have opposing points of view! 
For all the talk about egocentrism and theory of mind in determiners, nobody before us 
has actually investigated this in acquisition. 
Thus, an experiment developed in collaboration with Charlotte Giessman is testing in 
parallel the development of articles (using the ‘felt’ task) and a nonverbal theory of mind test 
(adapted from work by Baron-Cohen and Tomasello) which excludes any potential linguistic 
confounds. Preliminary results show similarity in patterns of acquisition on group levels, 
however there is no correlation on an individual level, thus some children are excellent at theory 
of mind, yet poor on articles, and the opposite pattern is also found. Thus it seems that the 
hypothesis of egocentrism/theory of mind for acquisition of articles, while plausible, does not 
stand up to the test.  
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4.1.2. Language in Theory of mind? 
 The topic of the role of language in theory of mind has been already raised in Chapter 2. 
An important question is whether language (grammar/syntax, vocabulary) or nonverbal 
intelligence affects Theory of Mind development (or vise versa), and to what extent can a test of 
TOM measure development of social reasoning independently of other factors. Harris, de 
Rosnay, Pons (2005) argue that children with advanced language skills (i.e. those who are 
exposed to lexical and syntactic enrichment through maternal conversations) are better at mental 
state understanding. Studies by de Villiers demonstrate that typical children need to have 
syntactic structure for sentential complements prior to successfully performing on false-belief 
tasks, suggesting that first order theory of mind inferencing builds on structural linguistic 
knowledge (e.g. De Villiers & Pyers 2002). Hale & Tager-Flusberg (2003) support this in a 
training study where typical children trained on TOM task improved only on the TOM task, but 
children trained on a task of sentential complements improved both on the syntactic structure 
comprehension and on a TOM task. A recent study however fails to show such exclusive 
dependence on syntax, instead suggesting a dependence of false-belief understanding on general 
language ability: both syntactic and semantic proficiencies, but not working memory (Slade & 
Ruffman 2005). Perner et al (2003) also show that in German, where complement structures are 
required in sentences not involving mental states, complement structure is in place before TOM: 
children ages 2;6-4;6 could understand ‘want that’ complement clauses before ‘say that’, ‘think 
that’, and false belief.  
 Perhaps a behavioral genetic study of TOM in over a thousand 5-year-old twin pairs can 
help elucidate what is going on (Hughes, Jaffee, Happe, Taylor, Caspi, Moffitt 2005). It was 
found that individual differences in theory of mind correlated with verbal ability (as measured by 
vocabulary knowledge), and that knowledge of TOM was primarily predicted by environmental 
and not genetic factors. This finding is in contrast to behavioral genetic studies of syntactic 
acquisition that find strong genetic factors. Behavioral genetic studies with TD twins show that 
development of syntactic constructions, such as passives and verbal inflections, has substantial 
heritability (genetics) but little shared environment effects, with higher correlations between 
abilities of monozygotic twins than dizygotic twins (Ganger et al 2005, Ganger 1998). 
Furthermore, development of syntactic verbal inflections has no correlation with children’s 
verbal levels and maternal education (Rice, Wexler, Hershberger 1998). But vocabulary levels 
are known to be driven by environmental effects in twins (e.g. Bishop et al 2005). Therefore, if 
there is a genetic component in syntactic development (and not much environment), but not much 
genetics and plenty of environment in theory of mind development, the development of the two 
correlates because it happens in parallel, but not because one influences the other. The fact that 
children in Hale & Tager-Flusberg (2003) performed better on theory of mind after being trained 
on sentential complements is a direct illustration of environmental influences on theory of mind 
development, as is the fact that deaf children, who lack ‘normal’ levels of input due to having 
hearing parents, are delayed in theory of mind, but not deaf children who are exposed to sign 
language from birth (Schick, de Villiers, de Villiers, Hoffmeister 2007). Thus it seems that 
whereas computational aspects of language (syntax) are driven by genetics, cognitive strategies – 
such as vocabulary levels and theory of mind – are driven by environmental contributions – as 
evidenced by the fact that richness of input to the children enhances theory of mind.  
 As far as we know, there were no behavioral genetic studies of semantic and/or pragmatic 
knowledge in twins. Given that Maximality is part of the semantic computational language 
faculty, we can predict that it can pattern alongside syntactic development. If on the other hand, 
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children’s deficits with determiners are due to theory of mind, we expect to see the majority of 
variance in performance being accounted for by environmental factors. A twin behavioral study 
of determiners would be the perfect answer to these questions, but given the absence of such a 
study, we can investigate acquisition of determiners in parallel to theory of mind. 
4.1.3. Determiners and Theory of Mind – independent of each other?! 
Let us try to incorporate theory of mind with semantics. Let us assume that the listeners 
DO actively try to figure out what the speaker means (although it is usually assumed that the 
burden of effective communication is on the speaker).  Determiners help listeners pick out 
referents, and may play key distinguishing roles in interpretations. The semantic definition of 
‘the’ tells a person to pick the uniquely salient referent in the context set. ‘That’ on the other hand 
tells a person that the familiar uniquely salient referent is in the context set located in the 
information space shared by both the speaker and the listener. Observe that while the definition 
of ‘that’ explicitly refers to minds other than the listener, ‘the’ only needs a context set –if the 
context set is not clear, the listener may think about the hearer’s intentions, but that is optional.  
Let us illustrate what we mean. Figure 4.1.1 shows the path of reasoning involved in 1st 
order vs 2nd order standard TOM tasks (reviewed in 2.2.3.). For the 1st order TOM, the Ignorant 
person refers to the one who leaves the room and does not witness the Hider moving the object of 
interest from one place to another. For the 2nd order TOM, the Informed person is one who 
believes that the Knowledgeable person is not aware of the object of interest, although the 
Knowledgeable person actually is. (e.g. Perner & Wimmer 1985) 
 
Figure 4.1.1. Schematic representation of reasoning involved in Theory of Mind 
 
Figure 4.1.2. Schematic representation of hypothesized reasoning in interpretation of 
determiners 
 
Ignorant person  Knowledgeable person Hider  child  Informed person 2nd order TOM 1st order TOM 
Fishy touches a box, and Turtle touches the/that box 
Child (listener) 
Speaker  That box That box  The box 
The box 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Figure 4.1.2 illustrates in the same manner the reasoning involved in interpretation of the 
definite determiners ‘the’ and ‘that’. It is evident that while understanding ‘that’ involves the 
speaker and the listener sharing a mental space representing the salient unique referent and 
interfacing with the context, understanding of ‘the’ depends on the context set. In other words, 
children do not need to know anything about theory of mind to interpret ‘the’ in comprehension – 
only their knowledge of the salient object in the context set and knowledge of maximality, no 
false belief is involved, and no necessary consideration of what the speaker has in mind. But 
children do need awareness of others’ minds for interpretation of ‘that’, because they have to 
consider the saliency of the referent relative to the shared knowledge between the speaker and the 
listener. Thus if children’s performance on determiners depended on theory of mind, then we 
would expect, if anything, children to do worse on ‘that’, that requires pragmatics. Yet results in 
sections 3.2-3.5 above make a clear case that just the reverse is true. 
4.1.4. Method 
The nonverbal theory of mind test was used because it excludes any potential linguistic 
confounds (adapted from work by Call & Tomasello 1999; Colle, Baron-Cohen & Hill 2007). 
This involved two experimenters – a hider and a communicator. The hider hid a reward (a poker 
chip which the kids traded for stickers at the end of the game) under one of two identical 
Styrofoam cups/plates, the action visible to the communicator only. The communicator tried to 
help the participant to locate the reward (by placing a brightly-colored ring on the location of 
reward from the communicator’s point of view), but occasionally left the room. During the 
absence of the communicator, the hider would sometimes either visibly displace the reward from 
one location to another (in control conditions), or switch the containers without revealing the 
location of the reward (in control and test). Thus, the communicator occasionally ended up with a 
false belief and eventually indicated an incorrect location for the reward, which the kids were 
supposed to pick up on. The only verbal stimuli was the question “Where is the chip?” uttered by 
the hider to communicator to initiate indication of communicator’s point of view, and to the 
participant to initiate the participant’s response. The participant had to point to the final location 
of the chip. 
Several conditions were devised (see appendix for complete descriptions). In the False 
Belief condition, the containers switched locations while communicator was away (thus 
Communicator had a false belief about the location of the reward). In the True Belief the 
communicator was present during the switching of the containers. In Control Belief, the 
communicator was away, but there was no container switch.  
Typically developing children successfully passed the nonverbal task in a similar way as 
the verbal task (Call & Tomasello 1999): children ages 4;5-5 were successful in passing both. 
Children with autism (verbal/language levels at 2 year old level) failed only the false belief 
conditions (less than 20% correct), but passed the control conditions (80% correct), whereas 
typically developing 4 year old participants got false belief (almost 60% correct). (Colle, Baron-
Cohen & Hill 2007).  
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Figure 4.1.3. Experimental set up for nonverbal theory of mind task 
Children were also tested on ‘Felt’ (as described in 3.3). The order of administration of TOM task 
and Felt task was randomized. 
4.1.5. Participants 
Participants included 51 children (3;1-11;4) tested on both the ‘felt’ version of determiner 
act-out task and the nonverbal theory of mind. The majority of these children came from prior 
samples ran on ‘Felt’. 8 children were excluded from the present analysis for failing control 
conditions on TOM task. Given the small number of subjects, for analysis data from three and 
four year olds was combined (17 children, mean age 4.2), data from five and six year olds was 
combined (13 children, mean age 5.9), data from seven-ten year olds was combined (13 children, 
mean age 9.0).  
Age (number of participants) 3(5) 4(12) 5(6) 6(7) 7(4) 8(1) 9(4) 10(4) 
Table 4.1.4. Participants in ‘TOM’ vs ‘Felt’ experiment 
4.1.6.  Results 
Firstly, following other studies of nonverbal theory of mind, we confirmed children’s 
ability to understand the nonverbal theory of mind method using Control and Belief control 
conditions (all groups perform well (66% or better, except 5-6s on control Belief condition)).  
 
  CONT-visible CONT-invisible CONT-ignore BELIEF-true BELIEF-cont 
3-4s(24) 92.00% 66.67% 66.67% 70.67% 66.67% 
5-6s(14) 82.00% 77.00% 89.67% 71.67% 51.33% 
7+s(13) 92.33% 82.00% 97.33% 74.33% 74.33% 
Table 4.1.5. Percent correct responses on control conditions on TOM task 
 
Children’s performance on ‘Felt’ was consistent with previous findings in Chapter 3. 
 
Looking next at performance on False Belief and on “Felt”, we find, intriguingly, that 
levels of false belief performance match those of determiner performance on group levels. 3-4 
year olds perform around 30-40% correct on False belief and ‘the’ and ‘that’; 5-6 year olds are 
around 60% on false belief, 60% on ‘the’ and 77% on ‘that’; and 7-10 year olds are around 70-
80% on all tasks. Note that at the same time, 3-4s were closer to 50-60% on anaphor ‘same’, and 
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5-6s were close to ceiling performance on these items – suggesting children know what is the 
salient referent in the context set and can pay attention very well to the tasks. 
 
 
Figure and Table 4.1.6. Percent correct responses (TOM) and percent actions on same 
object (FELT) 
  BELIEF-false The That Share Same 
3-4s(17) 43.00% 32.33% 34.33% 58.75% 54.50% 
5-6s(13) 61.67% 62.83% 77.00% 97.75% 95.50% 
7+s(13) 71.67% 84.67% 88.50%   
 
However there is no correlation between false belief and determiner performance within 
each of these groups. Correlations across ages simply reveal an overall development, rather than 
causation. If we were to measure height of children, that would also correlate with theory of mind 
and determiner knowledge – simply because children are growing beings. If we investigate 
children’s performances for a given False Belief Score – there is only correlation between scoring 
zero on FB and scoring 26% on ‘the’ and ‘that’. With other scores on False Belief there is no 
correlation with determiner knowledge. 
 
FB THE THAT AGE # Age Range 
0 25% 27% 4.5 10 3.5 6.92 
1 77% 73% 6.3 5 4.1 10.25 
2 68% 80% 7.1 15 3.5 11.33 
3 63% 69% 6.1 13 4.42 9.17 
Table 4.1.7. Determiner performance for a given False Belief score 
 
Next we characterized children’s performance as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’. ‘Good 
performance’ counts getting 2/3 or more correct on the TOM task, and getting 4/6 or more correct 
on the Felt task. This is similar analysis to what was done for ‘Felt’. In ‘Felt’ Participants were 
subdivided by their pattern of performance between ‘the’ and ‘that’, with “A” pattern denoting 
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good performance on both ‘the’ and ‘that’, “B” pattern denoting bad performance on ‘the’ with a 
relatively better performance on ‘that’, “C” pattern denoting a bad performance on ‘that’ with a 
relatively better performance on ‘the’, and finally “D” pattern denoting a bad performance in both 
‘the’ and ‘that’. The trend in this data was similar to what was found in the larger sample tested 
on ‘Felt’.  
In TOM, participants were subdivided by their pattern of performance between ‘the’ and 
‘false belief’, with “A” pattern denoting good performance on both ‘the’ (4/6 or better) and FB 
(2/3 or better), “B” pattern denoting bad performance on FB with a relatively better performance 
on ‘the’, “C” pattern denoting a bad performance on ‘the’ with a relatively better performance on 
FB, and finally “D” pattern denoting a bad performance in both ‘the’ and FB. 
On individual level, almost 50% of 3-4s were bad at both FB and ‘the’, 29% were doing 
better at FB than at ‘the’, with a minority doing well on both or doing better on ‘the’ than on FB. 
In 5-6 year olds, the majority of children (38%) showed better knowledge of FB than ‘the’, 31% 
showed good knowledge on both, and 23% showed better knowledge on ‘the’ than on FB. 
Comparison of False Belief relative to ‘that’ yielded similar results in this sample (data not 
shown). 
 
 
 
  
3-4s 
(17) 
5-6s 
(13) 
7-10s 
(13) 
D 0.47 0.08 0.00 
C the<tom 0.29 0.38 0.08 
B the>tom 0.06 0.23 0.15 
A 0.18 0.31 0.77 
 
Figure and Table 4.1.8. Proportions 
of children performing ‘well’ and 
otherwise on theory of mind 
relative to ‘the’. 
 
 
4.1.7. Discussion 
We investigated whether Theory of Mind may play a role in acquisition of determiners. 
We find that in 3-6 year old children, around 30-40% of participants know false belief better, but 
do not know ‘the’. In the 5-6 year olds, there were 23% of participants who knew ‘the’ better 
than false belief. These results suggest that development of false belief leads the development of 
‘the’ and ‘that’, however false belief is not sufficient for the development of ‘the’ and ‘that'. 
Based on the study of ‘the’ vs ‘that’ in chapter 3, and this study of theory of mind, there is a two 
year difference between attainment of semantic knowledge vs other mind/pragmatic/theory of 
mind knowledge: ‘the’ develops around age 7, whereas first order theory of mind is in place by 
age 5.  
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If theory of mind, specifically the ability to estimate other people’s knowledge of the 
(discourse) context, is causal to the development of determiner ‘the’, why do children spend two 
years digesting their ability to know other people minds before finally applying uniqueness 
correctly? 
Given this data, it is still possible to argue that theory of mind is necessary for determiner 
acquisition, but we clearly show that theory of mind is not sufficient for determiner acquisition, 
and it cannot be the sole cause of children’s deficits in ‘the’.  
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4.1.9. Appendix: Details of Procedure 
 
Task (adapted from Baron-Cohen et al. 2006 and Call & Tomasello 1999) 
Material 2 experimenters (Hider, Communicator) 
2 identical non-transparent Styrofoam plates/cups  
cardboard screen 
reward: poker chips later converted to stickers 
Instruction Kid is told that he/she has to find the chip in one of the two containers, and 
communicator would try to help the kid. Kid gets warned that the communicator 
is not always right 
 chip placement is quasi randomized, not in the same place for more than 2 
successive trails 
Pretest  To demonstrate the communicator’s intention to help and to introduce the 
method of indication (brightly-colored plastic ring) 
without screen 
1. Hider puts chip in one container visible to both, kid and communicator 
2. Hider asks communicator: “Where’s the chip?”, who points to the correct 
container 
3. Hider asks child: “Where’s the chip?” 
with screen 
1. Hider puts sticker in one container behind the barrier, only visible to 
communicator  
2. Barrier is removed. Hider asks communicator: “Where’s the sticker?” who 
indicates the correct container for 1-2 seconds 
3. Hider asks child: “Where’s the sticker?” 
 
 End when child points correctly on 4 successive trials 
Screening / 
Control test 
 3 times each (randomized) = 9 trials. Children must pass at least 2/3 of each 
of these controls 
Visible 
displacement 
Hider hides sticker behind barrier, communicator indicates the correct container 
and leaves. 
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Whilst communicator is absent, hider moves the chip to the other container, 
visible for child 
When communicator returns, Hider asks the child: “Where’s the chip?” 
Invisible 
displacement 
Hider hides sticker behind barrier, communicator indicates the correct container 
and leaves. 
Whilst communicator is absent, Hider switches the locations of containers 
When communicator comes back, hider asks child: ”Where’s the chip?” 
 Piaget’s object permanence  
Ignore 
communicator 
(hardest) 
Hider hides chip behind screen, visible only for the communicator, who then 
leaves. 
Hider shows containers to the child and moves chip to the other container 
When communicator returns, hider asks communicator: “Where’s the chip?”, 
who indicates the wrong container 
Hinder asks child: ”Where’s the chip?” 
Belief task Each given 3 times (randomized) = 9 trials 
False belief Hider hides chip behind barrier, communicator leaves 
Hider switches the containers, visible for kid 
Communicator returns and indicates wrong container 
Hider asks child: “Where’s the chip?” 
(child needs false belief reasoning to find correct container) 
True belief Hider hides chip behind barrier,  
Hider switches the containers, visible for kid and communicator 
Communicator indicates correct container 
Hider asks child: “Where’s the chip?” 
(to make sure, that child doesn’t believe the communicator to be always wrong) 
Control 
belief 
Hider hides chip behind barrier, communicator leaves 
No switching 
Communicator returns and indicates correct container 
Hider asks child: “Where’s the chip?” 
(to make sure kids won’t think the communicator is always wrong when s/he 
left the room) 
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4.2. Experiment 5. Comprehension of Maximality in Free 
Relative Clauses 
 
4.2.1. Abstract  
 The present section adds to the debate around ‘the’ by experimentally testing another 
linguistic phenomenon that involves maximality, namely Free Relatives (e.g. “[What is on the 
table] is red”). Unlike definite DPs, Free Relatives do not seem to exhibit salience effects, and 
thus are not salience-dependent, and therefore should not present comprehension difficulties for 
non-semantic reasons (Heim, p.c.). We found that children lack awareness of the maximal 
interpretation in free relatives at least until 6-8 years of age, the age at which it was shown (e.g. 
Karmiloff-Smith 1979, Modyanova & Wexler 2007, Chapter 3 herein) that children begin to 
reliably interpret the definite article in the adult way. These results are taken to support the 
Maximality hypothesis. 
 
4.2.2. Background on Free Relatives 
Semantics of Free Relatives 
A Free Relative (1) is a headless (or nonlexically headed) relative clause found in many 
languages, taking singular agreement on the matrix verb, and replaceable by a truth-conditionally 
equivalent definite plural DP (2) (e.g. Caponigro 2002, 2004). Narrow scope indefinite free 
relatives (not found in English) will not be addressed herein. Two presuppositions play a role in 
free relatives. The maximality presupposition (that the clause must refer to the maximal entity) 
and the homogeneity presupposition (that the predicate must be true of every subpart of the 
maximal entity, i.e. the maximal set must be internally homogenous with respect to the predicate 
(Lobner 1985, Gajewski 2005)). These presuppositions in free relatives become evident in 
consideration of several contexts: if there are one or more red things on the table, the sentence is 
true (a). If there are some blue things in addition to some red things (b), the sentence is neither 
true nor false, but constitutes a presupposition failure. The failure is of the presupposition of 
homogeneity - the maximal entity of things has some red and some blue elements, and thus does 
not constitute a homogenous set. As a result, the Maximality presupposition fails because the 
only way to prevent a failure of homogeneity is to select a nonmaximal subset. I.e. in a context 
like (b) the predicate ‘red’ is expected to hold true of the entire referent, denoted by the free 
relative, not a part of it (homogeneity presupposition), but then the clause cannot refer to the 
maximal entity (Maximality presupposition). The sentence fails in context (b). Similar judgments 
are observed in the case of plural DPs. In absence of a referent in context (c), DPs and free 
relatives seem to differ: an empty set seems unacceptable for DPs, but is sometimes possible for 
free relatives. 
 
(1) [FreeRel What is on the table] is red 
(2) [DP The things on the table] are red 
 
(3) contexts: 
a. Any number of red things 
b. *?Some red things, some blue things 
c. ?No things {null set is a plural entity} 
83
  
For the purposes of the current investigation, we are going to make the assumption that 
children know (have) the property of homogeneity (though this remains to be experimentally 
investigated). If adults are forced to make a judgment on a free relative referring to a subset, they 
cannot preserve homogeneity without violating Maximality – they would have to select the 
homogenous nonmaximal set, or a nonhomogenous maximal set – neither of which is an 
acceptable alternative. The sentence fails for adults. Children however, if they are missing 
Maximality in free relatives (but they have homogeneity), are happy to satisfy homogeneity by 
selecting the nonmaximal subset, something that adults cannot do.  
 
A notable point (Heim, p.c.) is that there seems to be a subtle but important difference 
between plural DPs and free relatives. Free relative clauses, unlike plural DPs, do not seem to 
show salience effects – they do not require the referent to be salient in the context set. Let us 
consider some examples that illustrate salience effects (all due to Heim, p.c., originating from 
McCawley). For definite description in (4), it is clear that ‘the dog’ is same dog as ‘my dog’ – it 
is the salient dog in the context set. The same holds true of plural definites (5). In free relative 
clauses (6), however, this notion of saliency fails to apply and the result is bizarre. There seems 
to be no way to separate out the set of things under the table that were just put there (the salient 
set) from the set of things under the table that were already there. Thus, the only possible 
interpretation of (6) is that the set of things under the table ends up sitting on itself, and even that 
does not make sense. This is in stark contrast to the salient dog(s) in (4) and (5) and the distinct 
nonsalient another dog. Free relatives do not do saliency. 
  
 (all examples due to Heim, p.c.) 
(4) I took my cat and my dog to the park.  There, the dog got into a fight with another  
(5) I took my cat and my two dogs to the park.  There, the dogs got into a fight with  
another dog. 
(6) I put some of my stuff under the bed and some under the table.  What was under the  
table sat on top of some other stuff already piled up there. 
 
Thus in (1) the free relative clause seems to refer to “the set of everything in the universe 
that is on the table”. In (2) the plural DP seems to refer to “the set of everything that is on the 
table and that is salient”. In other words the semantics of free relatives can be argued to be not 
saliency dependent, in the same way that the semantics of ‘the’ is saliency dependent. If this is 
true (and it certainly merits further study), then investigating comprehension of maximality in 
free relative clauses is a ‘pure’ test of semantics – the saliency of the context plays no role, hence 
no pragmatic deficits should influence comprehension of free relatives – only semantic deficits 
may do so.  
Sources of Maximality in Free Relatives 
An account of the semantics of free relatives must explain the source of the maximality 
presupposition. As illustrated above, free relatives may be substituted by truth-conditionally 
equivalent definite DPs (as long as salience effects are not invoked). And herein lies a potential 
problem. DPs are usually expressions of type e (denoting individuals, like ‘Bill’), but depending 
on the context may shift into type <e,t> (denoting characteristic functions of a set of individuals), 
or type <<e,t>,t> (the characteristic function of a set of properties, e.g. ‘every X’) (Partee & 
Rooth 1983). Wh-constituents, such as relative clauses, denote sets of individuals (Cooper 1983). 
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How can one make a relative clause ‘shift down’ to denote a single individual in case of the free 
relative? How to solve this type mismatch? 
Two recent proposals (Jacobson 1995; Caponigro 2002, 2004) find the answer in type-
shifting rules of Partee (1987). Notably, the Iota type shifting rule is a way for a property (type 
<e,t>) to map into its maximal individual (one that contains all other individuals of the set, and is 
of type e), and is only defined for properties that characterize one and only one individual. Thus a 
predicative expression, e.g. a wh-clause, may shift into an individual-denoting expression, a DP, 
but only when the set that the predicate characterizes is a single entity. 
Where the two accounts differ is in the source of maximality. Jacobson proposes 
maximality to be encoded in the wh-words, implying that wh-clauses always display maximality, 
regardless of context. Caponigro argues against that, since depending on the context, not all wh-
questions have to absolutely be answered in a completely exhaustive manner: there is room for 
the involvement of pragmatic, contextual restrictions on interpretation of wh-clauses. Caponigro, 
in unifying the account over both definite and indefinite free relatives (not found in English), 
claims that maximality results directly from the type mismatch itself, between the set denoted by 
the free relative (type <e,t>) and the fact that the rest of the sentence requires an individual (type 
e). Thus, unlike lexically headed relative clauses, which describe sets of objects, the free relative 
denotes a maximal plural entity, which explains the maximality presupposition.  
Prior Studies of Acquisition of Free Relatives 
Although children’s interpretation of free relatives was never previously investigated, 
their syntactic acquisition was. Flynn & Lust (1981) tested 96 children (aged 3;6-7;7) on elicited 
imitation and act-out comprehension tasks of several kinds of object relative clauses: lexically 
headed (with determinate (7) or non-determinate (8) heads) and nonlexically headed (free 
relatives(9)). 
 
(7) Big Bird pushes the balloon which bumps Ernie 
(8) Ernie pushes the thing which touches Big Bird 
(9) Cookie Monster hits what pushes Big Bird 
 
Free relatives were the easiest for children to imitate, and children spontaneously turned 
other forms of relative clauses into free relatives. The Determinate Head (7) was the best 
comprehended. In all conditions, children showed 75% correct performance only by age 6;6; 
younger children performed at or below 50%. (Flynn & Lust 1981). Since then, a similar pattern 
of acquisition, with free relatives emerging before or alongside headed relative clauses, was 
observed in first and second language acquisition crosslinguistically (Flynn & Foley 2004). It is 
argued that there is an easier semantic-syntactic mapping for free relatives than for lexically 
headed clauses.  
This study illustrates that free relatives clauses can be understood by children (from a 
syntactic point of view), therefore it is possible to investigate children’s comprehension of 
semantics in free relative clauses, without worrying too much about any syntactic confounds. 
4.2.3. Method 
Maximality in free relatives can be studied by presenting participants with contexts that 
do not contain a maximal plural entity uniquely described by the predicate and result in a truth-
valueless utterance and a presupposition failure. Investigating presupposition failures is known to 
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be a challenge, thus we wanted to set up a relatively simple but informative behavioral task. We 
investigated the interpretation of free relatives with a match/mistmatch (yes/no) task presented on 
a computer, and, in addition to participants’ responses, their reaction times were also recorded. 
Neither a ‘yes’ nor a ‘no’ response is an entirely correct answer in case of a presupposition 
failure, but we wanted to keep the experiment simple and therefore we did not provide a third 
answer option (‘neither true nor false’). Participants’ reaction times are expected to be 
informative as to any uncertainties in their answers – if participants experience a presupposition 
failure, it is reasonable to expect that will take them longer to process. If participants do not 
experience a presupposition failure, they will answer faster.  
Participants were presented with a single picture at a time on the computer screen, and 
were asked a yes/no question. Free relatives were formulated in form of a question because in 
pilot testing with declarative free relatives children pointed to the referent(s), instead of 
evaluating the truth-value of the utterance and replying with ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Figure 4.2.1 shows one 
of the illustrations. The elephant is hiding some apples under a blanket, and some other apples are 
lying around the elephant. All pictures involved colors and animals, and children were tested on 
their color words and animal names in the introduction to the task. 
 
 
Figure 4.2.1. Example of stimulus picture 
 
There were three conditions, each with eight items. In the “yes” control condition, a 
picture denoted a complete set of items, and was correctly described by the test sentence. Thus if 
all the apples under the blanket were red, the sentence here would be: “Is what is under the 
blanket red?”. In the “no” control condition, the test sentence failed to question the pictured set: 
e.g. all the apples under the blanket were green, but the test sentence would still be “Is what is 
under the blanket red?”. Here we made sure there was still a potential referent in the picture, e.g. 
a red apple, but not under the blanket, to ensure that children had an opportunity to say ‘yes’. The 
key test condition was ‘max’ (‘maximal’), which involved a set consisting of two kinds of 
objects, e.g. some green and some red apples under the blanket, but the test sentence only asked 
about a part of the set, “Is what is under the blanket red?”, which constituted a violation of the 
maximality presupposition. The right answer is ‘neither true nor false' (which we do not provide), 
and we expect those who know maximality to say ‘no’ (however it is also entirely possible for 
them to say ‘yes’), and to take longer to make their judgment relative to the control “no” and 
“yes” conditions. 
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Potential Phases in Free Relatives 
 When free relatives appear in copular sentences like above, there may be a concern that 
any children’s deficits in comprehension of free relatives may be not due to problems with 
maximality or domain restriction, but due to children’s universal phase requirement (UPR), 
which causes children to lack the ability to define defective phases and be unable to interpret 
passives, unaccusatives and raised constructions (Wexler 2004). Because of the structure of the 
investigated free relatives, this confound is unlikely. Copular sentences are distinguished in two 
ways (e.g. Higgins 1973). In predicational sentences, the referential DP comes before the copula 
with the predicate following it (10). In specificational sentences, the referential DP is post-verbal, 
and the predicative constituent is in the first position (11). The latter, but not the former, requires 
raising of the predicational constituent to specTP, necessitating crossing a phasal boundary. As 
predicted by UPR, children do have deficits with comprehension of inverse copulas, performing 
at 75% correct only by age 7, whereas non-inverted copulas are understood at near 100% rates as 
early as 3 years of age. (Hirsch & Wexler, 2007). Free relatives in the current study are 
predicational (12), not involving raising, and hence should not pose problems for subjects for 
syntactic reasons. 
 
(10) The pig is the animal who hugs  [non-inverted copula, predicational] 
(11) The animal who hugs is the pig  [inverse copula, specificational] 
(12) [RefDP What is under the blanket] is [AdjPred red]  
4.2.4. Predictions 
As stated earlier, for the purposes of the current investigation, we are going to make the 
assumption that children know (have) the property of homogeneity (though this remains to be 
experimentally investigated). If adults are forced to make a judgment on a free relative referring 
to a subset, they cannot preserve homogeneity without violating Maximality – they would have to 
select the homogenous nonmaximal set, or a nonhomogenous maximal set – neither of which is 
an acceptable alternative. The sentence fails for adults. Children however, if they are missing 
Maximality in free relatives (but they have homogeneity), are happy to satisfy homogeneity by 
selecting the nonmaximal subset, something that adults cannot do.  
If children do not know the maximality presupposition, we would see variable verbal 
answers to conditions violating maximality, and perhaps the reaction times would be the same 
across the test and the control conditions. If subjects do know Maximality (e.g. adult 
participants), we would see longer reaction times relative to control conditions, and these longer-
than-expected reaction times would illustrate subjects’ awareness of the Maximality 
presupposition, the failure of which they end up experiencing. 
The key prediction is if Maximality is involved in interpretations of free relatives, and if 
Maximality is involved in definite determiners (which we know is the case), then we should see 
similar patterns in acquisition of free relatives and the definite determiner if children are lacking 
Maximality. Thus we expect children younger than 6-7 years to not show us knowledge of 
Maximality within the Free Relative task. If on the other hand, Maximality is not what is causing 
children’s definites in ‘the’, then we expect children to perform similarly to adults very early on, 
on Free Relatives. 
Predictions of the pragmatic / Theory of Mind / Egocentric view are harder to formulate 
because, as argued in other chapters, it does not readily apply to comprehension without 
additional assumptions, and because children would need to be hypothesized to be unpredictably 
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selecting their own salient context sets which do not match the actual salient context sets, which 
to us does not seem plausible. It is feasible to imagine that children could focus on the subset 
described by the free relative, as opposed to the entire set, but that should clash with their adult-
like knowledge of maximality. Thus it would seem on this view that children may take a bit 
longer with the maximal condition early on, since they are expected to have adult-like 
competence. Furthermore, if children are focusing on a wrong subset, we would expect a great 
deal of ‘no’ responses. 
 Furthermore, it is worth it here to repeat a point made by Heim (p.c.) that free relative 
clauses do not involve saliency at all. Hence the potential reasoning that we hypothesize could be 
taken by the pragmatic/egocentric view in the above paragraph cannot hold. “Indeed, if the 
semantics of 'what's on the table' is simply 'the set of everything in the universe that is on the 
table', then … egocentrism cannot possibly be an explanation for non-adult-like comprehension. 
 If salience plays no role in determining reference in the first place, the child's comprehension 
can't depend on what's salient to them.” (Heim, p.c.). 
4.2.5. Participants 
Participants were recruited from Boston, Cambridge, and Wellesley, MA daycare and 
after school programs, and from higher education institutions. There were sixteen younger 
children (3;0-5;11, mean age 4;0), thirteen children aged 6;0-8;11 years (mean age 7;0) termed 
‘middle’ herein, nine older children (9;0-12;4, mean age 10;2), and twenty two college students 
(18-25 years old). An older group of eleven adults (aged 43-56) was also tested, but their results 
were not qualitatively different from the college students  (older adults take much longer to react) 
and are not included. 
4.2.6. Results 
We find (Table 4.2.2) that all children performed well on control conditions involving 
free relatives but containing no maximality violations. Everybody correctly said ‘yes’ to ‘yes’ 
conditions where the sentence matched the picture, and everybody correctly rejected ‘no’ 
conditions where there was a clear mismatch between the picture and the sentence. Most children 
said ‘yes’ (i.e. seemed to agree with) violations of maximality in the ‘max’ conditions. As 
expected, the adult group also showed similar acceptance of maximality violations as children 
(remember, the right answer there is neither ‘yes’ nor ‘no). Although the rates of performance on 
‘max’ condition do not differ across groups, individual subject analysis shows that all children 
younger than 6 years accepted Maximality violations, but four of the nine children in the old 
group did primarily reject them.   
 
 Young  (3-5) 
Middle  
(6-8) 
Old  
(9-12) 
College  
(18-24) 
MAX 17% 22% 33% 30% 
NO 83% 95% 97% 98% 
YES 95% 96% 96% 98% 
Table 4.2.2. % ‘Correct’ Responses 
 
The reaction time data elucidates what is going on (Figure 4.2.3). The younger children 
take an equal amount of time to reply to all conditions, indicating their lack of awareness of 
maximality. The older children and adults take longer to reply to the maximal condition, than to 
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the control conditions, indicating their awareness that something unusual is going on in sentences 
violating the maximality presupposition. This awareness begins to emerge as early as 6-8 years of 
age, with the middle group taking as much time to say ‘no’ correctly to the ‘no’ condition, as they 
did to say ‘yes’ to the ‘max’ condition. When children are 9 years old, their performance RTs 
mirror those of adults. 
 
Figure 4.2.3. Reaction Times for Free Relatives 
 
Younger children’s reaction times were not significantly different across conditions. The 
middle group’s (6-8 year olds) RTs for ‘yes’ vs ‘max’ conditions were approaching significance 
(t(12)=2.07, p=.061), and the older groups’ (9-12 year olds) differences for ‘yes’ vs ‘max’ 
conditions were significant (t(8)=2.5, p=.038). College students’ (18-24 year olds) RTs 
significantly differentiated between ‘no’ and ‘max’ (t(21)=3.1, p=.005) and ‘yes’ and ‘max’ 
conditions (t(21)=3.58, p=.002). Crucially, those few participants in the 9-12 year olds and the 
college groups, who rejected violations of maximality, took as much time as those who failed to 
reject the violations (with no significant differences). A difference plot graph (Figure 4.2.4) 
shows the same trends. 
 
 
Figure 4.2.4. Difference between ‘Max’ and ‘No’ and ‘Yes’ conditions by age group 
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4.2.7. Discussion 
The results of the first-ever study of children’s maximal interpretation in free relatives 
appear consistent with predictions made by the maximality hypothesis (Wexler 2003): very 
young children would show variable acceptance rates of conditions involving violations of the 
maximality presupposition, but they do not show any slower reaction times relative to control 
conditions. The age at which awareness of Maximality appears in Free relatives (6-8 years old) 
matches the age at which awareness of Maximality appears in the definite determiner ‘the’.  
The younger children, ages 3-5, took an equal amount of time to reply to all conditions, 
indicating that they had no particular doubts as to any of their responses across conditions. It is 
likely that younger children do not know the maximality presupposition, and thus do not think 
twice about their answers to the ‘max’ condition, but merely pick the subset described by the 
picture. The middle group, ages 6-8, began to be aware of the failure of the maximality 
presupposition, and took as much time to correctly reject the ‘no’ condition, as to accept the 
‘max’ conditions. The older children and the adults took much longer to react to the maximal 
condition, than on both the control conditions. The majority of these participants responded 
affirmatively, but a minority did reject the ‘max’ conditions. All, however, took about the same 
time to provide either response. That "no" answers take longer than "yes" answers is an extremely 
reliable and well-known result in psychological experimentation. Thus the fact that adults took 
longer giving "yes" answers for presupposition failures provides convincing evidence that they 
are not sure what to say, and that an answer in the ‘max’ condition is problematic for them.  
Our results can be explained if the older children and the adults do know maximality, but 
do not know how to react to a presupposition failure, given a constrained yes or no answer 
choice, and are likely to accept it, while taking a while to think about their answer. 
The results do not appear to be consistent with the pragmatic/egocentric hypotheses. 
Firstly, these would predict that children know Maximality and hence should show longer (adult-
like) reaction times to the maximality presupposition failure than we found, and would predict 
higher rates of rejection responses than we found. And Secondly, it is possible to argue that free 
relatives do not involve salience, and hence there is no way for their interpretation to be deficient 
for pragmatic/egocentric reasons.  
The present findings are also corroborated by Yatsushiro (2007), who investigated 
children’s knowledge of the anti-uniqueness presupposition of ‘every’. If children are missing or 
just beginning to develop uniqueness, they will also be missing antiuniqueness. ‘Every’ was 
argued to have a number of presuppositions: the existence (the argument of ‘every’ cannot be an 
empty set), the anti-duality (the argument of ‘every’ cannot be a two-membered set), and the anti-
uniqueness (the argument of ‘every’ cannot be a singleton set) (Sauerland 2007). Yatsushiro 
tested 120 monolingual German children ages 6-9 years using a presupposition judgment task, 
where the subject’s job was to say whether an observer of the situation depicted in a picture 
would say a particular sentence. For example, in one illustration there was a woman sitting, and a 
man and three children standing. Somebody with full knowledge of presuppositions of ‘every’ 
would reject sentences like (13) (violating anti-uniqueness) and like (14) (violating truth, and 
violating anti-duality). All participants showed near 100% knowledge of the existence 
presupposition, but the anti-uniqueness for ‘every’ was only achieved by adults (90%). The 6-9 
year old children progressed from 35% to 63% correct.  
(13) Every mother of mine is sitting on a chair 
(14) Every grandfather of mine is also sitting on a chair 
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Testing presupposition failure is known to be a challenge, and as our percent-correct 
response results show, even adult participants are likely to accept presupposition failures. 
However measuring participants’ reaction times clearly indicates the levels of (un)certainty of 
their replies, and can be successfully used to estimate the participants’ competence. Needless to 
say, further experiments are necessary, ones that perhaps provide participants with a third 
potential response, in addition to ‘yes’ and ‘no’.  
Our further studies will include testing comprehension of free relatives in parallel to 
plural DPs, and perhaps using a picture-matching and/or a presupposition judgment task (as in 
Yatsushiro) in addition to the current match/mismatch reaction-time task. We would also like to 
investigate the homogeneity presupposition, as well as the potential differences in interpretations 
of free relatives and plural DPs. 
That maximality (in determiners and free relatives) and anti-uniqueness (in ‘every’) 
problems seem to pattern in analogous ways adds further proof to the hypothesis that children’s 
semantic competence, like their syntactic knowledge, takes time to develop. Studies also show 
that children’s pragmatics takes time to mature too. Perhaps we should aim at investigating 
semantics independently of pragmatics, which will be difficult for they work hand in hand, but is 
certainly possible given the present results. 
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4.3. Discussion of Further Investigations into the Typical 
Development of Semantics and Pragmatics 
 
In this chapter, further investigation of semantic and pragmatic abilities in typically 
developing children provides support to the semantic deficit theory in determiner acquisition. 
We presented data on comprehension of determiners in children in parallel to their 
comprehension of false belief conditions. According to our interpretation of pragmatic deficit in 
determiners theories, children’s deficits with ‘the’ are due to inability to consider the difference 
between speaker/hearer knowledge, and hence false belief should track closely with development 
of ‘the’, and no children should show knowledge of ‘the’ ahead of knowledge of false belief. On 
semantic deficit account, there should be no such correlation.  
It was found here that while on group level, the knowledge of false belief tracks with the 
knowledge of determiners, on individual level there was wide variation, with almost 40% of 
children in the 5-6 year range showing understanding of other’s minds and of False Belief, but 
showing no understanding of ‘the’, and with 30% showing good knoweldge on both, and with 
23% showing better knowledge on ‘the’ than on false belief. The same 5-6 year olds showed 
close to perfect comprehension of anaphoric ‘same’, suggesting that they can tell what is the 
salient referent in the context set. Development of first order theory of mind certainly leads 
development of definite determiners, but children lacking theory of mind can and do show 
knowledge of determiners. Furthermore, if theory of mind, and hence the ability to clearly 
estimate other’s knowledge of context is known by 5 years, why is it that majority of children 
only reach good performance levels on ‘the’ only when they are seven year old? The answer is 
clear – children’s deficits in determiners stem from something other than theory of mind deficits 
– they stem from underdeveloped system of semantics.  
 
 To further support the semantic deficits, we investigated comprehension of maximality 
presupposition in free relative clauses using a match/mismatch version of a truth value judgement 
task. The maximality presupposition is argued to be part of free relative clauses, such that the 
proposition denoted by the free relative clause must refer to a whole context set (with plural or 
singleton members), as specified by the predicate. The homogeneity presupposition (that the 
predicate must be true of every subpart of the maximal entity) is also part of free relative clauses, 
however for the purposes of the present study we make the assumption that this is known to 
children (although this remains to be investigated). Note that it is possible to argue (Heim, p.c.) 
that unlike definite descriptions, free relatives can be interpreted without salience, and hence 
constitute a ‘pure’ test of semantic competence of maximality. If deficits in maximality underly 
children’s deficits in ‘the’, children should show similar deficits in comprehension of maximality 
in free relative clauses. If however children’s knowledge of maximality is intact and their deficits 
in ‘the’ occur for non-semantic reasons (egocentric/pragmtic), children should show adult-like 
comprehension of maximality in free relative clauses, unless certain extra assumptions are made 
by the egocentric/pragmatic view.  
We find that children can evaluate whether or not free relative clauses match context 
descriptions that contain whole context sets. Evaluation of partial set contexts that violate 
maximality presented a difficulty for children, or rather a lack of difficulty – violation of 
maximality presupposition caused adults and older children through puzzlement and extensive 
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pauses in reaction times relative to conditions without maximality violations. Younger children, 
at least through 6 years of age, showed no such puzzlement, indicating that they were happy to 
apply the free relative description to the part of the set described by the predicate. This 
performance in young children violates maximality, but children, being deficient in maximality, 
do not notice this. 6-8 year old children began to show puzzlement, and only 9 year olds showed 
adult-like patterns – indicating that they are aware of the resulting failure of the maximality 
presupposition. The advantage of investigating free relative clauses is that their interpretation 
does not require reliance on anybody’s else’s state of knowledge, not does it require selecting a 
salient context set and salient referent – participants are simply evaluating whether a context 
matches a the set denoted by the free relative sentence. Deficits in comprehension of maximality 
in free relative clauses can only stem from semantic deficits in maximality. 
 In future, we will investigate comprehension of definite descriptions in parallel with free 
relatives (items that involve maximality in their interpretation) and in parallel with items 
involving scalar implicatures, to investigate further the nature of semantic and pragmatic deficits 
in children. 
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 5. Comprehension of Determiners in Autism Spectrum Disorders 
 
In previous chapters we provided extensive evidence that delay in acquisition of the 
definite determiner is likely semantic in nature, and is not due to children’s pragmatic or theory 
of mind deficits. This chapter investigates the acquisition of determiners in people with autism 
spectrum disorders, a range of disorders with the defining characteristic of missing or abnormal 
pragmatic, social, and theory of mind abilities, and as such presenting the potential for ‘minimal 
pair’ comparison to typically developing children and the theories of acquisition of ‘the’. Given 
the prevalence of these disorders (e.g. Yeargin-Allsopp et al 2003), understanding the range of 
their language dis/abilities is important not only for scientific reasons but also for potential 
diagnostic and therapeutic reasons. 
 
5.1. Abstract  
We investigate the comprehension of definite (‘the’ and ‘that’) and indefinite (‘a’ and 
‘another’) articles in Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). Interpretation of these elements, 
denoting salient and unique or simply existing referents, relies on the knowledge of both 
pragmatic and semantic aspects of language. While pragmatics is known to be impaired, little is 
known about the mastery of semantics, i.e. compositional meanings of sentences, in ASD. Thirty 
one children and adolescents clinically diagnosed with ASD (Chronological Age: 5;11-18;6) and 
93 controls (CA: 3;0-17;1), individually matched on non-verbal reasoning (KBIT), vocabulary 
(PPVT), or grammar (TROG), were tested. Those participants with Asperger syndrome and 
PDD-NOS, who had the highest grammar levels, showed adult knowledge levels of articles. 
Another subset of participants with Asperger syndrome and PDD-NOS performed at levels below 
their mental age, but showed patterns found in typically developing younger controls. All 
participants with the diagnosis of autism showed an extremely poor knowledge of articles. Across 
all participants knowledge of articles was most well predicted by scores on the test of reception 
of grammar, as opposed to scores on the test of nonverbal reasoning or the test of vocabulary. 
These results indicate a gradation of knowledge of articles across the spectrum, which may have 
useful implications in the diagnostic process as well as in the elucidation of genetic 
endophenotypes of ASD.  
5.2. Introduction to ASD 
The precise nature of languages impairments in autism spectrum disorders is still not a 
hugely investigated topic, and few of the findings from the rich literature on the typical language 
acquisition have made it over. This is a first study of investigating semantic and pragmatic 
knowledge of articles/determiners in an unselected group of children with autism spectrum 
disorders, with the ultimate goal of increasing the data about the endophenotypes in the 
heterogeneous disorder of autism.  
Deficits in language and communication are known to be one of the defining 
characteristics and diagnostic criteria of autism (APA, 1994). Language abilities in ASD are in 
process of being characterized, but already it looks like different subgroups show distinct patterns 
of language development ranging from nonexistent to delayed to normal. Autism spectrum 
disorders are associated with communicative difficulties (Downs & Smith, 2004), especially 
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 issues with pragmatics – the use of language in conversational situations, given a particular 
context, and a particular state of knowledge of listeners and speakers. Some subtypes of autism 
have also been associated with deficiencies in the computational system of language – sentence 
structure and function words such as auxiliaries and articles. Rapin and Dunn (2003), who looked 
at an unselected sample of children with autism, suggest existence of at least two subgroups in 
ASD, those with language problems in phonology and syntax, and those with language problems 
in semantics and pragmatics, with no overlap. 
A large number of studies has focused on individuals with autism who are high-
functioning, i.e. whose non-verbal IQ is within normal range, and who can pass the first-order 
(involving reasoning about a person’s thoughts) and second-order (involving reasoning about 
what one person thinks about another person’s thoughts) false belief tasks (Bauminger & Kasari, 
1999; Kaland et al 2002). However they still have difficulty recognizing faux pas (Baron-Cohen 
et al, 1999), and they have to reason out other’s behavior in social situations - something that 
non-autistic people understand instinctively (Luckett et al 2002).  
However, difficulties with grammatical morphemes experienced by some children with 
autism in Roberts at al (2004) do not seem to be associated with IQ scores recorded for the 
participants in this study. Despite their normal range IQ, the performance of some of the 
participants on measures of grammar was still poor. Conversely, some of the children with lower 
IQ showed unimpaired performance on the same measures. In the same vein, asynchronies in the 
development of computational aspects of language as opposed to general cognitive abilities (the 
latter reflected in the level of receptive vocabulary) have also been noted in Kjelgaard & Tager-
Flusberg (2001). These authors report that at least two thirds of their subject population of 89 
children with autism, aged 6-16, showed poorer scores on standardized measures of grammar 
than on measures of vocabulary.  
In the following pages, I summarize what is already known about semantic and pragmatic 
knowledge in people with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and characterize what is known 
about theory of mind in these disorders. While some things are known about language in ASD, 
there are not many studies of precise aspects of semantics, and a dearth of studies of articles. 
Given heterogeneous language and cognitive abilities within ASD, it is important to study 
abilities of subgroups in detail, otherwise precise delineations will be impossible, preventing 
further genetic advances.  
5.3. Semantics and Pragmatics in ASD 
Although definite and indefinite articles were not studied in detail in ASD, other semantic 
and pragmatics aspects of language were investigated, and this literature can be used to formulate 
hypotheses regarding knowledge of articles in ASD.  
Note that by semantics here we do not mean vocabulary levels, nor do we mean ability to 
classify words by concepts (colors, etc). There is a profound, but often missed difference, 
between knowing the meaning of e.g. ‘dog’, and of knowing the meaning of ‘not’, ‘the’, ‘every’. 
The latter are both more conceptually abstract and more linguistic – these are functional closed 
class items which typical children often take time to acquire. These referential terms  are used as 
pointers to referents in conversations, and their successful use requires not only pragmatic 
awareness, but also knowledge of their semantic meanings which are part of the computational 
system of language, and are distinct form conceptual meanings of open class words. 
The definition of pragmatics also differs between studies of autism and studies of typical 
development. In case of autism studies – pragmatics is about speech acts, i.e. using language to 
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 request and to question, and about discourse cohesion – sticking to the topic of a conversation, 
and about understanding non-literal language use in ironies and metaphors. In typical 
development, pragmatic studies address, among other things, more subtle aspects of children’s 
knowledge, e.g. children’s comprehension of scalar implicatures (logical entailements) – limiting 
or extending semantic meanings of words such as ‘some’ and ‘every’ based on the contexts. 
Tager-Flusberg (1981) reviewed studies to that date and concluded that semantic and 
pragmatic knowledge is especially deficient in autism. Evidence for pragmatic deficits was 
established – several studies found the now classical deficits in speech acts, speaker-hearer 
relationships, turn-taking, differentiating old and new information. Semantic deficits – there 
defined as knowing conceptual relations between words, e.g. that needle and thread go together – 
were shown to be impaired. Notably, Tager-Flusberg argues that “The evidence for semantic 
abnormalities in autism in only indirect, but the main weakness of the hypothesis is the absence 
of good research” (1981:50).  
Groen, Zwiers, van der Gaag, and Buitelaar (2008) are the most recent to review a wide 
range of studies of language in ASD. Those studies investigating semantics focused on 
vocabulary – either receptive or expressive – which shows high correlation of nonverbal 
reasoning IQ levels. Subtle semantic problems however were shown in conceptualization of 
abstract terms and emotional states. Groen et al conclude that “the exact nature of the semantic 
deficits in autism remains to be established.” (2008:1418).  
5.3.1. Semantics in ASD 
Specifically, several studies investigated spontaneous speech in children with autism for 
presence or absence of function words, such as articles, and for overall discourse cohesion and 
reference which is often mediated through articles.  
Simmons and Baltaxe (1975) in spontaneous speech of 4 of 7 teenagers with autism of 
average IQ found that semantic violations e.g. incongruency in word use, problems with 
pronouns, and inconsistent referential abilities in linking referents across sentences.  
Bartolucci, Pierce & Streiner (1980) studied spontaneous speech in ten year old children 
with autism (mental age of 6 years) who showed 15% omission of articles in obligatory contexts.  
Baltaxe and D’Angiola (1992) investigated discourse cohesion, especially reference (e.g. 
pronominal bridging across sentences (e.g. “John is out. He’ll be back at five”), as well as 
demonstrative and comparative reference), ellipsis (leaving out words or clauses which contain 
old information), and conjunction (using ‘and’, ‘because’). They find that compared to typical 
children (aged 3.5 years), children with specific language impairment (SLI) (aged 7-8 year and 
matched on language levels) were half as successful in discourse cohesion, and that children with 
autism (aged 7-8 years also matched on language levels to typical kids) were only 30% as 
successful as typical kids. Autistic participants were especially impaired in reference and ellipsis 
– using these less than 60% correct – compared to 85% correct in SLI kids and above 95% in TD 
kids. Note that typically developing children as early as 4 years are capable of referential 
bridging (Avrutin and Coopmans  2000). 
Baltaxe and D’Angiola (1996) find that compared to typical children (aged 3.5 years) and 
children with specific language impairment (aged 7-8 years) (matched on language levels), 
children with autism (aged 7-8 years) were less successful in using pronouns and demonstratives 
to tie together discourse. Children with autism produced these at only half the rate of SLI 
children, and only third of rate of TD children. Additionally children with autism made four 
times as many mistakes as TD children, and twice as many mistakes as SLI.  
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 More recently, Colle, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright and van der Lely (2008) investigated 
story-telling discourse in adults with high-functioning autism (HFA) or with Asperger syndrome. 
Referential (anaphoric) use of pronouns and definite and indefinite articles with noun phrases to 
successfully introduce, reintroduce and maintain referents in a story by ASD participants did not 
drastically differ from a control group. However subtle deficits showed that ASD participants 
used less pronouns to maintain reference, and preferred to use full noun phrases. Arnold, 
Bennetto, Diehl (2009) found results similar to Colle et al (2008) but in children and adolescents 
with high-functioning autism ages 9-17. 
 Dahlgren and Sandberg (2008) found correlation between referential ability and theory of 
mind in 7-14 year old children with autism of normal intelligence. The referential ability task 
used involved producing verbal descriptions of a single card among a range of cards so that 
another person could successfully pick it out. This ability correlated with first-order theory of 
mind.  
 In summary, people with autism spectrum disorders who are higher functioning seem to 
show less deficits than those who are low functioning. Precise studies of comprehension of 
articles were not performed.   
5.3.2. Pragmatics in ASD 
Pragmatic impairments in autism (in Rice, Warren & Betz 2005) include a narrow range 
of speech acts (Loveland, Landry, Hughes, Hall & McEvoy, 1988; Wetherby, 1986); deficits in 
narratives and in conversations (Loveland & Tunali, 1993; Tager-Flusberg & Anderson 1991; 
Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan 1995); and a lack of consideration of the listener’s perspective (Paul 
& Cohen, 1984). More studies support earlier findings.  
Sabbagh (1999) discusses that conversation difficulties in people with autism and those 
with right cerebral hemisphere damage stem from inability to understand the importance of 
communicative intentions of their conversation partner. This is supported by a recent study of 
narratives in high functioning autism: children’s narratives were unusual and less coherent than 
those of control subjects, suggesting deficit in awareness of listener’s state of knowledge (Diehl, 
Bennetto & Young 2006). Individuals with Asperger syndrome similarly show problems during 
conversations involving emotional and social topics (Adams et al 2002). Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen 
(1999) investigated comprehension of ‘strange stories’ by adults with HFA and Asperger 
syndrome and found that participants could provide answers to mental state questions but had 
difficulty in providing contextually appropriate mental state answers. For example in a 
“Sarcasm story”, a lady says that it was a lovely day for a picnic when it was raining. A person 
with HFA commented that she was “pretending that everything was OK in order to make Tom 
feel happier” – a clearly incorrect interpretation given the context.  
On the other hand, Kremer-Sadlik (2004) shows that children with high functioning 
autism and Asperger syndrome are able to identify listener’s conversational needs. In 
conversational exchanges at subjects’ homes, subjects produced relevant responses accepted by 
their conversation partners. It may be the case that conversation partners of these subjects may 
themselves have abnormal pragmatic needs given the existence of broad autism phenotype in first 
degree relatives of people with ASD (e.g. Bishop et al 2004).  
Lopez & Leekam (2003) investigated context integration – a key ability for successful 
discourse – in 15 children and adolescents with HFA, who showed good performance in both 
visual and verbal context enhanced identification of objects and homograph disambiguation. 
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 Specific pragmatic deficits of the kind found in typical development were only studied 
recently. 
Dennis, Lazenby, Lockyer (2001) investigated high-functioning children with autism and 
their understanding and use of pragmatic inferences in mental state words, especially 
comprehension of the presupposition and implicature of complements. Participants listened to 
sentences and judged their truth value in metaphor comprehension (matching metaphor with 
situation) and script inferencing (completing stories). For example, <Karen thinks that the door is 
shut> does not entail <the door is shut>; “I have butterflies in my stomach” goes with a > first-
day-at-school picture. Dennis et al found that HFA participants know what mental state words 
mean, and what mental state words imply regarding given or presupposed knowledge (70-80%). 
However, HFA were not able to infer what mental state words implied in context, showing only 
a third level of performance of controls.  
Noveck, Guelminger, Georgieff, Labruyere (2007) studied a famous TD phenomenon 
where children misinterpret the scope of ‘every’ relative to ‘no’ in sentences such as “every horse 
did not jump over the fence” in a context where two of three horses jumped over the fence, and 
judge this sentence to be false, taking it to mean “no horse jumped over”. Participants with 
autism (mean age 16 years, mental age 8 years, just under 70% passing first order false belief 
task) showed close to 50-50 child-like and adult-like interpretations. TD 4-year-old controls 
matched teenagers with autism in their performance. These results indicate difficulties with 
pragmatic scalar implicatures in autism. 
Pijnacker, Hagoort, Buitelaar, Teunisse, Geurts (2009) studied scalar implicatures in 
adults with HFA and Asperger syndrome. These pragmatic inferences included inferring that 
“some” entails “not all”, in underinformative ‘some’, e.g. “some sparrows are birds”. While this 
is logically true, it is pragmatically false because it entails that “not all sparrows are birds”. ASD 
participants were as good as TD controls in judging such sentences. However HFA were almost 
twice as likely to show a logical interpretation for underinformative condition than Asperger 
participants, but there was no significant difference between HFA and typical controls. Pijnacker 
et al also looked at participants’ reaction times: people with HFA took about a second longer to 
make their judgments but those participants that showed logical interpretations were faster by a 
second than those who correctly gave pragmatic interpretations. 
 In summary, the severity of pragmatic deficits (whether speech-acts or scalar 
implicatures) tracks closely with severity of autistic symptoms. 
5.3.3. Theory of mind in ASD 
One proposal is that issues with pragmatics in autism are likely stemming from problems 
with theory of mind (TOM). Hale & Tager-Flusberg (2005) studied natural language samples of 
children with autism, looking for use of topic-related contingent utterances; subjects’ vocabulary 
and TOM was also measured. The researchers conclude that deficits in pragmatic language use 
are linked to deficits in TOM. Joseph & Tager-Flusberg (2004) investigated children with autism 
on several tests of understanding mental states and executive control skill such as working 
memory and planning. Children’s performance on these tests explained the variance in 
deficiencies in communication, but not in social interaction nor in repetitive behaviors. These 
findings suggest a deficit in social-perceptual processes, thus preventing children with autism 
interpreting mental states through information expressed in eye gazes and voices. 
Steele, Joseph, Tager-Flusberg (2003) show that knowledge of Theory of Mind is 
differentially deficient in children autism (57 children, 4-14 years old (mean age 7), verbal 
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 mental age of 5-6 years). Only 25% of children with Autism passed the first order theory of mind 
task and only 12% passed a second-order task. Children with PDD-NOS diagnosis (verbal mental 
age 8 years, chronological age 12 years) pass the first order false-belief more often than those 
with autism, at 36% (Sicotte & Stemberger 1999). Bauminger and Ksari (1999) show that 
children with HFA (8-14 years old, all within normal levels of intelligence) pass second order 
false belief task at 68% (vs 89% in matched TD controls) and that HFA’s performance correlates 
with full and verbal IQ, with those passing the task having higher standard scores by a standard 
deviation. Once study investigated the difference between PDD-NOS and HFA abilities. Begeer, 
Rieffe, Terwogt, Stockmann (2003) had an ingenious task where participants with ASD of 
average intelligence were given a task to perform but an experimenters sabotaged their efforts by 
removing a key object necessary for successful performance. Another experimenter, oblivious to 
the sabotage and thus with a false belief, directed participants to proceed with the task. 90% of 
TD controls informed the experimenter with the false belief of the sabotage, children with PDD-
NOS (aged 7-11 years) also corrected the false belief, but only when they knew they would be 
reward to completing the initial task; children with HFA (aged 7-11 years) tended to not respond. 
Children with Asperger fail only higher-order metaphor and faux-pas tasks (Baron-Cohen et al, 
1999). Thus the three ASD groups provide not only differential levels of language abilities, but 
also of pragmatic and theory of mind abilities, allowing for comparison and contrast. Excluding 
any of ASD group from a study may fail to provide a complete gradation of abilities, and may 
paint a misleading picture.  
 An important question is whether language (grammar/syntax, vocabulary) or nonverbal 
intelligence affects Theory of Mind development (or vise versa), and to what extent can a test of 
TOM measure development of social reasoning independently of other factors. This issues was 
raised in chapters 2 and 4 as well. Harris, de Rosnay, Pons (2005) argue that children with 
advanced language skills (i.e. those who are exposed to lexical and syntactic enrichment through 
maternal conversations) are better at mental state understanding. Studies by de Villiers 
demonstrate that typical children need to have syntactic structure for sentential complements 
prior to successfully performing on false-belief tasks, suggesting that first order theory of mind 
inferencing builds on structural linguistic knowledge (e.g. De Villiers & Pyers 2002). Hale & 
Tager-Flusberg (2003) support this in a training study where typical children trained on TOM 
task improved only on the TOM task, but children trained on a task of sentential complements 
improved both on the syntactic structure comprehension and on a TOM task. A recent study 
however fails to show such exclusive dependence on syntax, instead suggesting a dependence of 
false-belief understanding on general language ability: both syntactic and semantic proficiencies, 
but not working memory (Slade & Ruffman 2005). Perner et al (2003) also show that in German, 
where complement structures are required in sentences not involving mental states, complement 
structure is in place before TOM: children ages 2;6-4;6 could understand ‘want that’ complement 
clauses before ‘say that’, ‘think that’, and false belief.  
For children with autism, one can also observe correlations between linguistic and 
cognitive abilities and TOM. One study comparing children with autism, PDD-NOS and typical 
children on multiple tests found social cognitive ability as measured by first and second order 
TOM tasks are best predicted by verbal memory, performance IQ, age and gender (Buitelaar et al 
1999). Another study, following assessment of children with autism, Asperger syndrome, specific 
language impairment and typical controls, links first order theory of mind to comprehension and 
production of belief terms such as think, know and guess, showing links between development of 
TOM and development of communicative competence (Ziatas & Durkin 1998). Happe (1995) in 
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 reviewing a multitude of studies concludes that TOM is especially impaired in autism, subjects 
needing to be of greater mental age to pass TOM tasks than typically developing children.  
Thus, there is no clear answer as to causation, a nonverbal first-order false belief task 
(Colle, Baron-Cohen & Hill, 2007 and Call & Tomasello, 1999) may remove any potential 
language confounds and provide an estimate of social/pragmatic reasoning independent of 
language. Call & Tomasello tested typical children on the nonverbal and a verbal false-belief 
tasks and found nearly identical performance, confirming the validity of the nonverbal task. Colle 
et al tested autistic and specific-language-impaired children of similar very poor linguistic 
abilities (at typical 2 year-old level) and similar chronological age (8 years), but differing in 
mental age (5 years for autism group, 7 years for SLI group). They replicated the patterns found 
with standard verbal false-belief task: children with SLI, despite having same poor language 
skills as children with autism, perform well on the false-belief tasks, unlike children with autism. 
Thus the nonverbal false-belief task may be used as an estimate of social/pragmatic reasoning 
independent of language.  
5.4. Why study articles in ASD? 
The study of articles in TD acquisition has important implications for the study of the 
organization of the linguistic system in the population with ASD, in the face of reported 
difficulties with semantic and pragmatic aspects of linguistic knowledge.  
The theories around typical acquisition of articles are pertinent to ASD. The 
egocentricity/Pragmatic deficits hypotheses were argued above (in Chapters 2 and 4.1) to be 
analogous to the conclusion in the study of cognitive development that young children have 
difficulties in understanding and using the fundamental concept that other people have minds and 
that these minds access information in particular ways, i.e. difficulties in Theory of Mind (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, Cohen, 1993 & 2000; Astington, Harris, Olson, 1988). In other 
words on this view children have adult-like knowledge of semantic principles, but fail to use 
them correctly. While Egocentricity looks like it is quite analogous to TOM considerations, TD 
children already do well on first-order false belief tasks by age 4-5 (Chapter 4.1 and elsewhere), 
hence the overuse of the definite article in older, 6-7 year-old TD children (Chapter 3) is likely to 
have another explanation. The alternative theory was proposed in which children are 
hypothesized to lack (or have difficulty computing) a crucial semantic property of ‘the’, namely 
the semantic principle of the presupposition of Uniqueness/Maximality (Wexler 2003).  
Thus, while the Egocentrism idea predicts correlation between presence of first order 
TOM in an individual and the individual’s competence in the article system (demonstrated by 
non-overuse of ‘the’), difficulties with Uniqueness predict that there should not be such a 
correlation. While the ideas of egocentrism and uniqueness may seem very similar, they differ in 
a crucial way. Egocentrism and lack of Theory of Mind (as possibly the same developmental 
cognitive stage) are limitations on the child’s pragmatic system, the system of a child’s 
understanding of what other minds know about a given linguistic context, while the lack of 
Uniqueness in a child would be a developmental linguistic stage in the computational system of 
language – the language learning mechanism, one in which the child did not know complete 
semantics of ‘the’, and not a limitation on understanding what other minds know.  
The article ‘that’ is especially interesting because it has particular pragmatic features that 
condition usage, in addition to the property of Uniqueness. Referents of ‘that’, if not pointed to 
physically, must be invoked in memory, in the metalinguistic common knowledge of both 
conversation partners, i.e. in the nondefault context of interpretation.  If TD children have 
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 outgrown Egocentric/Pragmatic difficulties (or first-order false belief difficulties), but have 
difficulties with Uniqueness/Maximality, then they could use these additional pragmatic features 
to figure out the correct referent of ‘that’. That is, pragmatics may save the day even with the 
computational semantic difficulty. If Uniqueness is the correct explanation of overuse of ‘the’, 
we might expect TD children at a certain age to do well on sentences with ‘that’, even though 
they fail when it comes to correctly interpreting ‘the’. On the other hand, if overuse of ‘the’ is a 
pragmatic (Egocentricity/TOM) difficulty, then we do not predict a dissociation between ‘the’, on 
the one hand, and ‘that’ on the other – children should do well on both in comprehension. These 
are differential predictions for TD children (with results from TD children supporting the 
Uniqueness/Maximality deficit hypothesis in Chapters 3 and 4.1), and these predictions hold also 
of children with ASD (if the pragmatic features of familiarity or nondefault context of 
interpretation are known to ASD children).  
Children with ASD however, given their inherent issues with theory of mind and 
pragmatics, may not be able to use additional pragmatic feature in ‘that’. If they are deficient in 
uniqueness, they will perform poorly on both ‘the’ and ‘that’. However if their knowledge of 
uniqueness is intact, they will be able to perform well on ‘the’, and their knowledge of 
uniqueness may be sufficient for successful interpretation of ‘that’ in contexts which do not 
strictly rely on non-default interpretation or familiarity of the referent or other people’s states of 
mind – as can be argued to be the case in the present comprehension task. If however ASD 
children are forced to rely on the pragmatic features in ‘that’, we may expect deficits in ‘that’ 
relative to ‘the’.  
Finally, we have a chance to formulate a good hypothesis and to carry out a structured 
study of specifically semantic and pragmatics aspects of language. Interpretation of referents 
denoted by ‘that’ is guided by semantic principles and by pragmatic considerations, which could 
be problematic for people with ASD if they have to rely on those pragmatic considerations. 
Interpretation of ‘the’, on the other hand, is guided by semantic principles which form part of the 
computational core of the human grammatical ability, and can therefore be predicted to be either 
poor or good depending on the state of the grammar in individuals with ASD. 
5.5. Participants 
The ASD subjects for the present study were recruited in collaboration with Alexandra 
Perovic, through parent support groups and schools for children with disabilities. The clinical 
diagnosis was made by clinicians in the New England area and reported to us by participants’ 
parents. We included all children with a diagnosis of an autism spectrum disorder, ages 6-18, 
who were able to combine two-word utterances and who were able to complete all tasks in our 
study (tasks that included as control items comprehension of simple transitive sentences). 
Participants were individually matched to TD controls on three measures, thus forming 
three control groups per disorder. TD controls were recruited from Boston/Cambridge area 
daycares and afterschool programs. One group of TD controls was matched to probands on raw 
non-verbal cognitive abilities, as measured by Matrices subtest of KBIT-II (usually no more than 
one point off). This group allows us to factor out the influence of general cognition on 
participants' linguistic performance. The second control group was matched on raw scores of a 
standardized measure of receptive vocabulary (PPVT-III, maximum 4 points off), to tease apart 
the influence of general language abilities, i.e. lexical knowledge, on the more abstract aspects of 
linguistic knowledge of language assessed by our experimental task. The third control group was 
matched on raw score of standardized measure of grammar (TROG-2, usually no more than one 
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 point off), to establish whether there are differences in the subtle aspects of linguistic knowledge 
between control and disordered children even if they are matched for the general level of 
grammatical competence. Every effort was made to match the participants on gender and to 
choose only those control participants whose standard scores (SS) on the standardized tests were 
close to the average (usually between 85 and 115). In this way the performance of control 
participants on the study task could not be interpreted as being due to their superior or inferior 
general cognitive or linguistic abilities. As participants with autism are aged between 6-18 years, 
it may not be desirable to match them to TD controls of the same chronological age. TD children 
at age 10 are expected to be at ceiling performance on the experimental probe (Chapter 3). 
5.6. Methods 
Standardized assessment tools are expected to provide a picture of a general level of 
participants’ linguistic functioning that will enable comparison of their abilities with those in 
other studies reported in the literature. Nonverbal reasoning were assessed with of Matrices 
subtest of the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (KBIT) (Kaufman & Kaufman, 1990). Receptive 
vocabulary was assessed with the aid of Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-III (PPVT-III) (Dunn 
& Dunn, 1997). Receptive grammar was evaluated with Test of Reception of Grammar, 2nd 
edition (TROG-2) (Bishop, 2003).  
However, these tools are limited in giving an exact evaluation of participants’ mastery of 
the particular linguistic structures that form the core of human computational knowledge of 
language. To investigate knowledge of semantics and pragmatics of articles novel experimental 
probe was developed, based on studies with typically developing children and work reported in 
the literature on the acquisition of targeted items.  
Comprehension of definite (‘the’, ‘that’) and indefinite (‘a’, ‘another’) articles was 
investigated using an act-out experiment, with 6 tokens of each type of 4 conditions being used, 
allowing for within subject analysis of performance on particular types of stimuli. Performance 
on similar experiments has been investigated by the authors, by Karmiloff-Smith (1979, 
experiment 15) in TD French children, and others e.g. Maratsos (1976). 
The experiment is in a form of a book made of felt cloth, with arrays of 3 or 6 identical 
objects permanently attached to the pages. Objects included apple, watermelon slice, car, carrot, 
Christmas tree, star, flower, icecream cone, baseball, heart, witch’s hat. Every page contains an 
array of target items and an array of distractor objects. Subjects are given two Velcro-backed 
‘actors’, Fishy and Turtle. Thus the characters can be physically stuck to the page by children 
who can see what they were/are doing.  
There were two ways of making sure the subjects are paying attention: whether they are 
affecting the right kind of object, and whether they are doing that with the correct actor (the order 
in which the actors affect the objects is randomized). 
Firstly, subjects are introduced to the two actors and different objects that will be used. A 
few practice trials follow where children come comfortable with using actors to touch either same 
or different objects. Subjects are told that in this ‘game’, they have to decide whether to Fishy 
and Turtle go to same or different objects based on what the experimenter says. Article use is 
avoided during introduction to avoid biasing subjects’ responses.  
Comprehension of items is evaluated when the experimenter gives the child instructions 
on how to manipulate the actors given the context of the current page. The first clause of 
instructions always contains the indefinite article ‘a’ and serves to establish a unique, salient, 
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 visually distinct referent within the context set – the object that has Fishy or Turtle on it. The 
second clause contains one of the four articles – ‘a’, ‘another’, ‘the’, or ‘that’.  
Instructions go like this: “Fishy touches an apple, [pause to allow for action of Fishy 
touching one of the apples] and Turtle touches a/another/the/that apple.” An adult would respond 
like this: pick two different objects upon hearing ‘another’, pick any object upon hearing ‘a’, and 
pick the same (salient) object upon hearing ‘the’ and ‘that’. The number of times the same object 
was subsequently acted upon served as the dependent variable.  
introductory page     test page, example of ‘another’ response 
             
Figure 5.1. Experimental set-up 
Thus the comprehension experiment tests how children interpret ‘the’ versus ‘a’, 
specifically whether they know Uniqueness or whether they take account of the pragmatic 
conditions for establishing context sets – that both the speaker and listener must have means for 
determining the context sets. It also tests whether children use pragmatic properties (old 
information, known to listener) of ‘that’ to decide how to use the correct article. 
5.7. Results 
5.7.1. Some issues on grouping participants 
Kjelgaard and Tager-Flusberg (2001) found receptive vocabulary (as measured by PPVT) 
to be a better indicator of linguistic abilities (articulation, expressive vocabulary) and of IQ than 
children’s performance on CELF (Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals, which 
measures some syntax, working memory for language, morphology). This could be because they 
could only analyze half of their ASD participants on CELF, primarily those with near-normal IQ 
levels, as the rest did not pass CELF. Or this could be because CELF is an extensive test 
measuring much more than syntactic competence. In this regard, TROG (used here) focuses 
primarily on syntax comprehension and is much shorter than CELF.  
Using the criteria that Kjelgaard and Tager–Flusberg (2001) adopted for defining 
language subgroups in autism, Roberts, Rice and Tager-Flusberg (2004) in their study of 
finiteness in autism spectrum disorders, divided their sample of children with ASD according to 
PPVT standard scores – 85 and above (normal), 70-84 (borderline), below 70 (impaired), and 
found overall that finiteness levels correlate with vocabulary levels. 
Alternative binning may be problematic. For example binning by diagnosis (autism vs 
PDD-NOS vs Asperger) may be subject to parental or clinical biases – in some states, children 
may be more likely to receive services through schools with a diagnosis of autism, rather than a 
diagnosis PDD-NOS. Binning by non-verbal IQ is problematic due to potential inaccuracies of 
IQ testing, since people with ASD show different nonverbal reasoning skills based on the 
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 particular tests (Dawson, Soulieres, Gernsbacher, Mottron 2007). 
However dividing children by vocabulary makes a key assumption that vocabulary is 
indicative of syntactic/semantic/linguistic ability. While vocabulary and cognitive scores may be 
causative to syntactic language abilities in people with mental retardation (e.g. Facon, Facon-
Bollengier, Grubar 2002), the dissociation between verbal and nonverbal abilities is known in 
autism, and thus a priori it may incorrect to make this assumption. In typically developing 
children, syntactic/grammatical abilities were shown to be independent of vocabulary levels 
(Rice, Wexler, Hershberger 1998). 
We must keep in mind that one of the ultimate goals is endophenotyping – finding 
subgroups characterized in a clear-cut ways, for enhancing gene finding. (e.g. Bradford et al 
(2001) show that incorporating language phenotypes strengthens evidence of linkage to autism). 
Another goal is to enhance diagnosis (e.g. Botting, Conti-Ramsden (2003)). 
Thus we will explore the optimal binning/grouping strategy, and to that end our sample 
will be divided five times: by diagnosis, by standard score on nonverbal reasoning (KBIT), by 
standard score on vocabulary (PPVT), by standard score on grammar (TROG), and by 
performance patterns on the test of determiners.  
Recall that the task involves interpreting ‘a’, ‘another’, ‘the’ or ‘that’ as pointers to an 
already-established referent or to a new referent. Thus “number same responses” refers to the 
number of times subjects decide that an already-talked-about entity is referred to, and attach the 
two toy actors to a single object out of an array of several. This seems better than percentage 
correct, because, as discussed above, for the ‘a’ condition, the correct response depends on the 
interpretation. The target adult responses would be closer to 0-10% same actions for ‘a’ and 
‘another’, and close to 100% same actions for ‘the’ and ‘that’. 
5.7.2 Results for All ASD participants 
Participants 
    Age KBIT SS PPVT SS TROG SS 
ASD mean 11.17 87.39 84.65 73.32 
  SE 0.66 7.35 4.98 3.42 
  range 6 19 40 151 40 133 55 111 
  number 31 31 31 31 
KBIT controls mean 7.72 106.26 107.90 103.03 
  SE 0.54 6.64 2.14 2.31 
  range 3 15 85 128 88 140 74 130 
  number 31 31 31 31 
PPVT controls mean 8.64 104.80 100.87 102.68 
  SE 0.70 7.38 1.89 2.68 
  range 3 17 80 147 86 126 74 134 
  number 31 30 31 31 
TROG controls mean 6.48 103.35 104.06 98.23 
  SE 0.58 6.64 2.28 1.23 
  range 3 17 73 138 77 138 87 113 
  number 31 31 31 31 
Table 5.2. Details on all the ASD and all the TD controls 
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 Results 
 
Figure 5.3. Number ‘same’ responses (out of 6) as a measure of knowledge of determiners 
in all ASD and their TD controls (error bars represent +- 1 SE) 
 
We find that knowledge of indefinite articles ‘a’ and ‘another’ does not differ among 
participant groups, however knowledge of ‘the’ and ‘that’ does so. 
MANOVA (between subjects factor = group (ASD vs three TD controls), dependent 
variables  = performance on ‘a’, ‘another’, ‘the’, ‘that’) showed significant effect of group for 
‘the’ (F(3,120=3.6, p=.015) and ‘that’ (F(3,120)=3.4, p=.019), but not  for ‘a’ and ‘another’. 
Tukey Post Hoc analysis of group showed significant differences on ‘the’ between ASD group 
and KBIT controls (p=.012), and on ‘that’ between ASD and KBIT controls (p=.022) and 
between ASD and PPVT controls (p=.05). However R2 for the model was less than .1 for all 
dependent variables.  
Adding chronological age as a covariate increased R2 for the model to .33 (adjusted R2 .3) 
for ‘the’ and .24 (adjusted R2 .21) for ‘that’, and showed significant effect of age of participants 
for ‘another’ (F(1,119)=3.9, p=.048), ‘the’ (F(1,119)=42.5, p<.001) and ‘that’ (F(1,119)=24.8, 
p<.001). The effect of group was significant for ‘the’ (F(3,119)=11.5, p<.001) and ‘that’ 
(F(3,119)=8.9, p<.001).  
We further investigated the effect of participants’ standard scores on article performance, 
by adding KBIT SS, PPVT SS and TROG SS scores as covariants. The effect of group was now 
lost, the effect of age preserved at same significance levels for ‘the’ and ‘that’. KBIT SS scores 
showed effect on ‘the’ (F(1,115)=5.4, p=.022). PPVT SS scores showed no effect. TROG SS 
scores showed effect on ‘that’ only (F(1,115)=11.7, p=.001). R2 for the model increased to .49 
(adjusted R2 .43) for ‘the’ and .49 (adjusted R2 .46) for ‘that’.  
 
 We now turn the focus specifically on the definite determiners, since this is where 
variation lies. Participants were subdivided by their pattern of performance between ‘the’ and 
‘that’, with “A” pattern denoting good performance on both ‘the’ and ‘that’, “B” pattern denoting 
bad performance on ‘the’ with a relatively better performance on ‘that’, “C” pattern denoting a 
bad performance on ‘that’ with a relatively better performance on ‘the’, and finally “D” pattern 
denoting a bad performance in both ‘the’ and ‘that’. ‘Good’ performance was considered if 
children got 4/6 or greater ‘same’ actions on the same object. ‘Bad’ performance was 3/6 or less 
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 items. For ‘B’ and ‘C’ patterns children had to get a difference of 2 ‘same’ actions between ‘the’ 
and ‘that’ for the difference to count. Thus difference between 3 and 4 does not count, but a 
difference between 3 and 5 does. This is was done to figure out whether children are showing 
adult-like knowledge (A pattern), showing deficits especially in semantics (but not pragmatics) 
(B pattern, found in TD children), showing deficits especially in pragmatics (but not in 
semantics) (C pattern, not found in TD children), or showing deficits across the board (D 
pattern). 
The proportion of participants showing these patterns is graphed. It becomes immediately 
clear that participants are not showing a random performance. As a group, close to 60% of 
children with ASD show no knowledge of articles (pattern “D”), with only 25% showing good 
knowledge (“A” pattern), and the remaining 15% showing the “B” pattern where they do better 
on ‘that’ than on ‘the’. No control group has similar distribution of participants showing that 
many poor responses. The TROG control group (which is the youngest) is showing over 40% 
“A” pattern. In the KBIT and PPVT control groups almost 60% of participants are showing good 
proficiency with ‘the’ and ‘that’. Observe that only one participant in the TROG control group is 
showing the “C’” pattern.  
This analysis illustrates one of the main points of the data. Children with ASD are more 
deficient in their knowledge of articles than expected given their nonverbal reasoning abilities, 
more deficient than expected given their vocabulary levels, and more deficient than expected 
given their grammatical levels. As a group ASD children are older than their controls, but their 
world experience does not help them determine salient referents in context sets.  
 
 
Figure and Table 5.4. Proportion of all ASD participants showing adult like (A), semantic 
deficit (B), pragmatic deficit (C) or null knowledge (D) patterns. 
  ASD KBIT-control PPVT-control TROG-control 
D 0.58 0.29 0.29 0.29 
C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
B 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.26 
A 0.26 0.58 0.58 0.42 
 
ANOVA (between group factor: ASD vs 3 TD groups, dependent variable = proportion 
participants showing a particular pattern) showed significant effect of group (F(3,120)=5.7, 
p=.025), with Tukey post hoc tests showing ASD group to be different from KBIT group and 
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 PPVT group (p=.041 for both), with R2 for the model less than .1. Adding age as covariant 
increased R2 to .3 (adjusted R2 .28). Both effects were significant: age (F(1,119)=51.8, p<.001), 
group (F(3,119)=14.8, p<.001). We further investigated the effect of participants’ standard scores 
on article knowledge patterns, by adding KBIT SS, PPVT SS and TROG SS scores as covariants. 
There were still significant effects of age (F(1,115)=46.3, p<.001), but not group. KBIT SS and 
PPVT SS scores here showed no effect. TROG SS scores showed effect (F(1,115)=5.9, p=.017). 
R2 for the model increased to .45 (adjusted R2 .42).  
This analysis shows that whether we are measuring knowledge of individual articles, or 
patterns of definite article knowledge, the effects are similar. From here onward, we will analyze 
patterns of performance on the definite articles in different groupings of participants. 
5.7.3. Grouping By diagnosis 
The goal in this section is to make sense of the factors that drive participants knowledge 
of articles. First of, we are dividing all ASD participants into their clinical diagnoses groups.  
Participants 
  Age 
Nonverbal 
Reasoning AE/ SS 
Vocabulary 
AE/SS 
Grammar 
AE/SS 
Autism (13) 
11.29 
(6.47-17.23) 
6.14 / 66.85 
(40-103) 
5.28 / 59.85 
(40-87) 
4.01 / 56.15 
(55-62) 
PDD-NOS (10) 
9.38 
(5.99-12.21) 
9.05 / 97.5 
(69-126) 
8.75 / 94.8 
(71-120) 
6.38 / 78.8 
(55-99) 
Asperger (8) 
13.21 
(6.12-18.56) 
14.42 / 108.13 
(73-151) 
15.8 / 112.25 
(91-133) 
10.16 / 94.38 
(74-111) 
Table 5.5. ASD participants divided by their clinical diagnosis 
 
 ages kbit controls ppvt controls trog controls 
Autism (aut) controls 5.73 (3-7.69) 5.64 (3-7.95) 4.28 (3.62-5.35) 
Pdd-nos (pdd) controls 7.95 (4-14.59) 8.51 (5.91-12.24) 6.98 (3-11.91) 
Asperger (asp) controls 10.66 (7.72-15.21) 13.69 (9.14-17.11) 9.44 (5.2-17.08) 
Table 5.6. TD controls corresponding to subdivisions by ASD clinical diagnosis 
 
The participants included thirteen children clinically diagnosed with autism, ten children 
clinically diagnosed with Pervasive Developmental Disorder – Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-
NOS), and eight children clinically diagnosed with Asperger syndrome (AS). Their performance 
on a battery of standardized tests showed varying degrees of abilities: children with autism 
showed significant impairments in comprehension of grammar, vocabulary, and non-verbal 
reasoning; children with PDD-NOS showed age-level vocabulary and non-verbal reasoning, but 
were delayed in grammar. Children with Asperger syndrome showed above average vocabulary, 
and average non-verbal reasoning abilities and grammar skills. Thus in all categories of ASD, 
grammar skills lag behind nonverbal IQ and vocabulary skills. Nine groups of younger typically 
developing controls were included, individually matched to probands on raw scores on TROG, 
PPVT, and KBIT: three groups of controls for each of the three proband groups, allowing us to 
compare probands’ performance on articles to that of typically developing children of similar 
cognitive profiles.  
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 If there are no differences in performance on articles between younger controls and 
probands, then development of articles proceeds in typical, albeit delayed (relative chronological 
age) fashion. However, if probands are performing differently or considerably worse than 
controls than article development, than it is specifically impaired in ASD. 
Results  
 
Figure 5.7. Number ‘same’ responses in 
autism and their TD controls 
 
Figure 5.8. Number ‘same’ responses in 
PDD-NOS and their TD controls
 
 
Figure 5.9. Number ‘same’ responses in Aspergers and their TD controls 
 
Multivariate ANOVA (the four articles as dependent variables, the 12 subject groups as 
between subject variables) showed significant effect of group on ‘the’ (F(11,112)=8.6, p<.001) 
and ‘that’, (F(11,112)=8.2, p<.001) with R2 of .45 (.4 adjusted). Tukey’s post hoc tests showed 
significant differences for ‘the’ between the Asperger and the autism groups (p<.001), autism and 
its KBIT control group (p=.046), and autism and all pdd-nos and asperger control groups (p=.012 
- p<.001), and for ‘that’ between the Asperger and the autism groups (p<.001), autism and PDD-
NOS (p=.021), autism and its KBIT controls (p=.004), autism and its PPVT controls (p=.016), 
and autism and all PDD-NOS and Asperger groups (all ps<.001). No groups differ in their 
performance on either ‘a’ or ‘another’. Addition of standardized test scores as covariates, showed 
that only TROG SS has significant effect only ‘that’ (F(11,108)=10.6, p=.001).  
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 MANOVA of just the ASD participants binned by diagnosis revealed significant effect of 
such binning on ‘the’ (F(2,28)=16.3, p<.001) and ‘that’ (F(2,28)=26.5, p<.001), and overall 
model had R2 of .54 (adjusted .5) for ‘the’ and .65 (adjusted .63) for ‘that’. 
Binning participants by diagnosis brings out very clear patterns. Children with autism are 
showing a profound absence of knowledge of articles. They are more impaired at articles than all 
of their control groups, more impaired than their nonverbal, verbal and grammar mental ages 
would predict. This is suggestive of a severe semantic and pragmatic deficit in these children.  
Children with PDD-NOS as a group show better performance than children with autism, 
although the difference is not significant due to extensive within group variation in PDD-NOS. 
however like children with autism, the PDD-NOS are performing worse than their controls, 
worse than predicted by their mental ages. Note, PDD-NOS are performing slightly better on 
‘that’ than on ‘the’ – a pattern found in typical development.  
Children with Asperger syndrome in start contrast show knowledge of articles similar to 
their controls – at almost adult-like levels. Although the differences between groups are not 
significant, the Asperger group performs most like their grammar (TROG) controls. Observe that 
these results are surprising. We predicted children with Asperger syndrome to perform more 
poorly on ‘that’ than on ‘the’, given their pragmatic deficits. If anything, children with Asperger 
seem to be doing a bit worse on ‘the’ than on ‘that’ – a pattern found in typical development.  
Endophenotypes within clinically defined groups 
Patterns of performance within ASD groups were also analyzed. We are calling these 
endophenotypes, which (1) Are internal phenotypes & measurable components unseen by 
unaided eye but discoverable by examination; (2) Are simpler clues to the genetics underpinning 
psychiatric disease than the disease syndrome itself; (3) Are latent genetically influenced traits, 
which may be related only indirectly to disease symptoms. (from Glannon 2004, Skuse 2001, 
Gottesman & Gould 2003). We explore the idea that a constrained test of semantics and 
pragmatics (of articles) may contribute to accurately defining the autism spectrum disorders 
endophenotypes allowing for a more precise genotypic characterization. 
Participants with autism did not show any differences in performance within their clinical 
subgroup. Participants with Asperger syndrome and with PDD-NOS however did. 
 
Further characterization 
of performance  Age 
Nonverbal 
Reasoning AE/ 
SS 
Vocabulary 
AE/SS 
Grammar 
AE/SS 
PDD-NOS: autism-like 
performance (5) 
9.47 
(5.99-12.21) 
9.4/100 
(86-126) 
9.73/102.2 
(73-120) 
5.9/75.8 
(55-99) 
PDD-NOS: child-like 
performance (2) 
9.2 
(7.06-11.34) 
6.96/86 
(69-103) 
7.5/83.5 
(82-85) 
6.0/77.5 
(76-79) 
PDD-NOS: adult-like 
performance (3) 
9.36 
(6.08-11.19) 
9.86/101 
(93-111) 
7.95/90 
(71-102) 
7.42/84.67 
(74-97) 
Asperger: child-like 
performance (3) 
10.62 
(6.12-16.19) 
15.19/126.67 
(104-151) 
13.28/118.33 
(91-133) 
8.14/91 
(74-109) 
Asperger: adult-like 
performance (5) 
14.76 
(10.82-18.56) 
13.95/97 
(73-109) 
17.32/108.6 
(100-121) 
11.37/96.4 
(76-111) 
Table 5.10. Endophenotypes within clinically defined groups 
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Figure and Table 5.11. Article endophenotypes within clinical diagnosis subgroups and 
their TD controls 
 
ASPER-
GER 
asp  
kbit 
asp  
ppvt 
asp 
trog AUTISM 
aut 
kbit 
aut 
ppvt 
aut 
trog 
PDD-
NOS 
pdd 
kbit 
pdd 
ppvt 
pdd 
trog 
D 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.54 0.62 0.50 0.30 0.20 0.10 
C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 
B 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.15 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.40 
A 0.63 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.00 0.38 0.23 0.15 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.40 
 
ANCOVA (12 participant groups by Pattern by KBIT, PPVT and TROG SS scores as 
covariates) showed significant effect of group (F(11,108)=4.4, p<.001), and a significant effect of 
TROG SS (F(1,108)=5.3, p=.023). R2 for the model is .47 (adjusted .41). Tukey’s post hoc tests 
showed significant difference between the autism and the Asperger groups (p<.001), autism and 
its KBIT controls (p=.031), autism and all pdd-nos and Asperger control groups (ps<=.001). 
Participants with Asperger syndrome showed two distinct patterns of performance. 63% 
of AS were completely adult-like - showing perfect knowledge, and 37% showed the pattern of 
performance found in typical development, namely poor performance on ‘the’, and good 
performance on ‘that’ (B pattern), but with a more pronounced difference than found typically. 
Such a pattern goes against our predictions: if anything children with AS should do worse on 
‘that’ (more pragmatics involved) than on ‘the’. While good performance on ‘that’ continues to 
await explanation, poor performance on ‘the’ seems to go with lower grammar scores: the poorly 
performing AS subgroup has on average a lower TROG score than the adult-like AS subgroup. 
Thus, given good nonverbal intelligence and good vocabulary skills, overall grammatical 
development is predictive of knowledge of the article ‘the’ in participants with Asperger 
syndrome. 
Children with PDD-NOS showed three patterns of performance. These patterns were the 
two found in the Asperger groups, child-like (B pattern, 20% of PDD-NOS subjects) and adult-
like (A pattern, 30% of PDD-NOS subjects), and the pattern found in the group with autism (C 
pattern, 50% of PDD-NOS subjects), with participants’ scores on a standard measure of grammar 
correlating with their performance on ‘the’ and ‘that’. Thus, as with the Asperger subgroups, 
overall grammatical development is the driving force for article development in people with 
PDD-NOS. 
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 5.7.4. Grouping By articles/determiners  
Herein, we are subdividing ASD participants (along with their KBIT, PPVT, and TROG 
controls) by their patterns of performance on articles, and investigating the resulting patterns of 
their nonverbal reasoning, vocabulary, and grammar abilities.  
Participants 
  Age 
Nonverbal 
Reasoning AE/ SS 
Vocabulary 
AE/SS 
Grammar 
AE/SS 
Null (no) 
performance (18) 
10.79 
(5.99-17.23) 
7.04/76.06 
(40-126) 
6.51/71.61 
(40-120) 
4.54/61.61 
(55-99) 
Child-like (diff) 
performance (5) 
10.05 
(6.12-16.19) 
11.9/110.4 
(69-151) 
10.97/104.4 
(82-133) 
7.28/85.6  
(74-109) 
Adult-like (same) 
performance (8) 
12.74 
(6.08-18.56) 
12.42/98.5 
(73-111) 
13.8/101.63 
(71-121) 
9.89/92  
(74-111) 
Table 5.12. ASD participants divided by their performance on articles 
 
ages kbit controls ppvt controls trog controls 
no controls 6.26 (3-9.01) 6.61 (3-12.24) 4.79 (3-10) 
dif controls 9.91 (6.58-15.21) 10.12 (5.91-16.76) 8.27 (5.2-17.08) 
same controls 9.63 (4-14.59) 12.3 (7.28-17.11) 9.18 (4.89-12.19) 
Table 5.13. TD controls corresponding to subdivisions by ASD performance on 
articles 
Results 
ANOVA (12 participant groups by KBIT, PPVT, and TROG SS scores as dependent 
variables) shows significant effect of such grouping on all variables: KBIT SS (F(11,111)=4.5, 
p<.001), R2=.31 (adjusted .24)), PPVT SS (F(11,111)=6.8, p<.001, R2 =.4 (adjusted .34)), TROG 
SS (F(11,111)=16.6, p<.001, R2=.6 (adjusted .58)). Tukey’s post hoc test showed the following 
contrasts. The null ASD group was significant different from the child-like ASD group on KBIT 
(p=.005), PPVT (p=.003), and TROG (p=.007). The null ASD group was also different form the 
adult-like ASD group on PPVT (p=.001), and TROG (p<.001). 
Dividing ASD participants by their performance on articles indicates that those who show 
no knowledge of articles (null group) have lower nonverbal reasoning, vocabulary and grammar 
abilities, than those who show at least some knowledge of articles (child-like (diff) and adult-like 
(same)). The difference between the child-like group (who shows partial knowledge) and the 
adult-like group lies in their grammar skills what are in the average range for adult-like group and 
below-average for the child-like group. 
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Figure and Table 5.14. Article endophenotypes within subgroups defined by article 
knowledge and their TD controls 
  DIFF 
dif  
kbit 
dif  
ppvt 
dif 
trog NO 
no 
kbit 
no 
ppvt 
no 
trog SAME 
same 
kbit 
same 
ppvt 
same 
trog 
D 0 0.2 0.2 0 1 0.44 0.44 0.50 0 0 0 0 
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.06 0 0 0 0 
B 1 0 0 0.6 0 0.22 0.22 0.28 0 0 0 0 
A 0 0.8 0.8 0.4 0 0.33 0.33 0.17 1 1 1 1 
 
ANCOVA (12 participant groups by Pattern as dependent variable by KBIT, PPVT and 
TROG SS scores as covariates) showed significant effect of group (F(11,108)=7.0, p<.001) ), and 
the effect of TROG SS approached significance (F(1,108)=2.9, p=.088). R2 for the model is .55 
(adjusted .5). Tukey post hoc tests showed significant differences between the null and child-like 
groups (p=.005), the null and the adult-like groups (p<.001), the null and its KBIT (p=.001) and 
PPVT (p=.001) and TROG (p=.039) controls. 
MANOVA of just the ASD participants binned by performance revealed significant effect 
of such binning on ‘the’ (F(2,28)=156.2, p<.001) and ‘that’ (F(2,28)=170.7, p<.001), and overall 
model had R2 of .92 for both ‘the’ and ‘that’. 
 
5.7.5. Grouping by IQ 
The goal in this section is to further make sense of the factors that drive participants 
knowledge of articles. Here, we are dividing ASD participants (along with their KBIT, PPVT, 
and TROG controls) according to their IQ levels, to investigate whether this works  for reducing 
the variation across ASD.  
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 Participants 
  Age 
Nonverbal 
Reasoning AE/ 
SS 
Vocabulary 
AE/SS 
Grammar 
AE/SS 
Baseline IQ (5) 
12.28 
(6.91-15.69) 
4.47/43.6 
(40-54) 
5.02/55.6 
(40-71) 
3.8/55.6 
(55-58) 
Low IQ (6) 
13.13 
(8.04-17.23) 
7.29/69.5 
(66-73) 
7.65/64.5 
(40-104) 
4.89/62 
(55-76) 
Normal IQ (20) 
10.31 
(5.99-18.56) 
10.98/103.7 
(84-151) 
10.58/97.95 
(50-133) 
7.44/81.15 
(55-111) 
Table 5.15. ASD participants divided by their Nonverbal Reasoning Standard Score 
 
 ages kbit controls ppvt controls trog controls 
base controls 4.17 (3-5.61) 5.99 (4.81-7.95) 3.94 (3.62-4.85) 
low controls 6.9 (4.59-8.1) 7.37 (3-12.1) 5.32 (3.74-7.06) 
norm controls 8.85 (4-15.21) 9.69 (3.62-17.11) 7.46 (3-17.08) 
Table 5.16. TD controls corresponding to subdivisions by ASD IQ 
Results 
 
Figure and Table 5.17. Article endophenotypes within subgroups definied by IQ and their 
TD controls 
  BASE 
base 
kbit 
base 
ppvt 
base 
 trog LOW 
low 
kbit 
low 
ppvt 
low 
trog NORM 
norm 
kbit 
norm 
ppvt 
norm 
trog 
D 1 0.8 0.6 1 0.67 0.17 0.33 0.33 0.45 0.2 0.2 0.1 
C 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.05 
B 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.50 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.25 
A 0 0 0.2 0 0.17 0.67 0.50 0.17 0.35 0.7 0.7 0.6 
 
ANCOVA (12 participant groups by Pattern by KBIT, PPVT and TROG SS scores as 
covariates) showed significant effect of group (F(11,108)=2.8, p=.003), and effect of TROG SS 
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 (F(1,108)=8.8, p=.004). R2 for the model is .41 (adjusted .33). Tukey post hoc tests showed no 
significant differences between ASD participant groups. Only baseline ASD group was 
significantly different from Normal group’s controls (KBIT p=.009, PPVT p=.009, TROG  
p=.007). 
MANOVA of just the ASD participants binned by IQ revealed moderate significant effect 
of such binning on ‘the’ (F(2,28)=3.4, p=.05) and ‘that’ (F(2,28)=4.2, p=.025), and overall model 
had R2 of .19 (adjusted .14) for ‘the’, and .23 (adjusted .18) for ‘that’. 
Dividing ASD participants by their nonverbal reasoning abilities blurs distinctions 
between groups. While those with baseline IQ show no knowledge of articles, those with low and 
average IQ show mixed pattern of knowledge. Thus nonverbal reasoning levels are not the 
driving force behind comprehension of articles. 
 
5.7.6. Grouping by Vocabulary 
The goal in this section is to further make sense of the factors that drive participants 
knowledge of articles. Here, we are dividing ASD participants (along with their KBIT, PPVT, 
and TROG controls) according to their vocabulary levels – something that Kjelgaard and Tager-
Flusberg (2001) argued works well for reducing the variation across ASD.  
Participants 
  Age 
Nonverbal 
Reasoning AE/ SS 
Vocabulary 
AE/SS 
Grammar 
AE/SS 
Baseline Vocab (8) 
13.65 
(10.48-17.23) 
6.26/56.75 
(40-84) 
4.98/47.25 
(40-58) 
3.87/55 
(55-55) 
Low Vocab (7) 
9.23 
(6.91-11.34) 
6.88/80.86 
(54-99) 
6.59/77 
(71-82) 
5.1/64.14 
(55-83) 
Normal Vocab (16) 
10.78 
(5.99-18.56) 
11.71/105.56 
(73-151) 
12.28/106.69 
(85-133) 
8.16/86.5 
(55-111) 
Table 5.18. ASD participants divided by their Vocabulary Standard Score 
 
 ages kbit controls ppvt controls trog controls 
base controls 5.68 (3-7.69) 5.55 (3-7.95) 4.17 (3.62-4.85) 
low controls 6.49 (3.9-9.06) 6.93 (4.81-9.1) 5.86 (3.81-10.14) 
norm controls 9.27 (4-15.21) 10.94 (4.57-17.11) 7.91 (3-17.08) 
Table 5.19. TD controls corresponding to subdivisions by ASD Vocabulary  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 Results 
 
Figure and Table 5.20. Article endophenotypes within subgroups defined by Vocabulary 
and their TD controls 
  BASE 
base 
kbit 
base 
ppvt 
base 
 trog LOW 
low 
kbit 
low 
ppvt 
low 
trog NORM 
norm 
kbit 
norm 
ppvt 
norm 
trog 
D 1.00 0.38 0.63 0.75 0.71 0.57 0.14 0.14 0.31 0.13 0.19 0.13 
C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 
B 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.13 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.57 0.25 0.13 0.06 0.19 
A 0.00 0.38 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.43 0.71 0.29 0.44 0.75 0.75 0.63 
 
ANCOVA (12 participant groups binned by vocabulary, by Pattern, by KBIT, PPVT and 
TROG SS scores as covariates) showed significant effect of group (F(11,108)=1.9, p=.042), and 
effect of TROG SS (F(1,108)=6.2, p=.014). R2 for the model is .36 (adjusted .28). Tukey post hoc 
tests showed significant differences between the baseline and the normal ASD groups (p=.026), 
baseline and normal controls (p<=.001). 
MANOVA of just the ASD participants binned by vocabulary revealed significant effect 
of such binning on ‘the’ (F(2,28)=8.4, p=.001) and ‘that’ (F(2,28)=12, p<.001), and overall 
model had R2 of .37 (adjusted .33) for ‘the’ and .47 (adjusted .43) for ‘that’. 
Dividing ASD participants by vocabulary levels seems a bit better than dividing children 
by nonverbal reasoning, but still not great. There is not much difference between the baseline and 
the low vocabulary groups. 
 
5.7.7. Grouping By Grammar 
The goal in this section is to further make sense of the factors that drive participants 
knowledge of articles. Here, we are dividing ASD participants (along with their KBIT, PPVT, 
and TROG controls) according to their grammar levels – something that Kjelgaard and Tager-
Flusberg (2001) showed does not works well for reducing the variation across ASD.  
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 Participants 
  Age 
Nonverbal 
Reasoning AE/ 
SS 
Vocabulary 
AE/SS 
Grammar 
AE/SS 
Baseline Grammar (16) 
11.21 
(6.47-17.23) 
6.61/71.19 
(40-103) 
6.18/66.63 
(40-115) 
4.27/57.56 
(55-69) 
Low Grammar (6) 
9.43 
(6.08-15.15) 
8.04/93.67 
(69-125) 
8.96/95.83 
(71-131) 
5.81/77 
(74-83) 
Normal Grammar (9) 
12.27 
(5.99-18.56) 
14.62/112 
(99-151) 
14.43/109.22 
(91-133) 
10.45/98.89 
(89-111) 
Table 5.21. ASD participants divided by their Grammar Standard Score 
 
 ages kbit controls ppvt controls trog controls 
base controls 6.1 (3-9.01) 6.44 (3-12.24) 4.57 (3.62-6.21) 
low controls 7.09 (4-9.06) 8.51 (5.91-12.1) 6.56 (4.89-10.14) 
norm controls 11.01 (6.42-15.21) 12.65 (6.2-17.11) 9.82 (3-17.08) 
Table 5.22. TD controls corresponding to subdivisions by ASD Grammar 
Results 
 
Figure and Table 5.23. Article endophenotypes within subgroups defined by Grammar and 
their TD controls 
  BASE 
base 
kbit 
base 
ppvt 
base 
 trog LOW 
low 
kbit 
low 
ppvt 
low 
trog NORM 
norm 
kbit 
norm 
ppvt 
norm 
trog 
D 1.00 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.11 
C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
B 0.00 0.19 0.25 0.31 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.22 0.11 0.00 0.00 
A 0.00 0.38 0.31 0.13 0.50 0.83 0.83 0.50 0.56 0.78 0.89 0.89 
 
ANCOVA (12 participant groups binned by vocabulary, by Pattern, by KBIT, PPVT and 
TROG SS scores as covariates) showed significant effect of group (F(11,108)=3.8, p<.001), and 
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 effect of TROG SS (F(1,108)=6.3, p=.014). R2 for the model is .45 (adjusted .38). Tukey post hoc 
tests showed significant differences between the baseline and the low ASD groups (p<.001), the 
baseline and the  normal ASD groups (p=.001). Baseline ASD group differed from its KBIT 
control (p=.009), its PPVT control (p=.016), and from all low and normal control groups 
(p<.001).  
MANOVA of just the ASD participants binned by grammar revealed significant effect of 
such binning on ‘the’ (F(2,28)=24.1, p<.001) and ‘that’ (F(2,28)=79.9, p<.001), and overall 
model had R2 of .63 (adjusted .61) for ‘the’ and .85 (adjusted .84) for ‘that’. 
Dividing ASD participants by their grammatical abilities makes the differences in 
performance on articles very evident between groups – more so than when dividing participants 
by their IQ or vocabulary levels. Now there is a clear difference between the baseline group and 
the low and the normal ASD groups. The difference in performances are there in the data, and 
binning participants by their grammatical abilities brings out these differences.  
5.8. Discussion 
In summary, children with autism show no knowledge of definite articles, children with 
PDD-NOS show a delay in definite article development, and lastly those with Asperger syndrome 
show near-perfect adult knowledge of definite articles. Observe that all populations except autism 
differentiate indefinite (a, another) and definite (the, that) articles. That the autism group only 
gives 6% same responses on ‘the’ or ‘that’ is striking – only three year old typically developing 
children with much lower cognitive and language skills show this kind of performance. If this 
result holds up with a larger group, it will be a very important result in the study of language 
disability in autism. 
 Investigation of differential subject groupings revealed that while no binning is perfect, 
binning by vocabulary or by nonverbal IQ does not do a good job of distinguishing the really 
poor performing participants (null (D) pattern) from the mildly impaired (child-like (B) pattern) 
from the nonimpaired (adult-like (A) performance). On the other hand, binning by clinical 
diagnosis clearly distinguished the poorest performing children from the highest performing 
participants. Binning by overall grammatical skills distinguished the poorest performing from 
mildly delayed, and the poorest performing from the highest performing. Such distinctions are 
key for determining which group of participants would require the most language assistance.  
 The binning-by-different-groups analysis also shows that the driving force in knowledge 
of definite articles in ASD is not one’s vocabulary levels, and it is not one’s nonverbal IQ – it is 
only one’s grammar levels, here as measured by TROG.  Regardless of how the ASD participants 
were grouped, TROG SS always came out as a significant covariate. It is worth it to restate this 
clearly: knowledge of articles in ASD is best predicted by their standard scores on a standardized 
test of comprehension of grammatical structures such as transitive and passive voice sentences, 
relative clauses, sentences with negation, prepositions, personal pronouns – all aspects of 
language that have to do with syntactic ability. TROG does not measure definite articles in any 
way. The fact that overall grammatical development is a significant predictor of article 
knowledge merits further investigation and suggests that knowledge of articles is mediated by the 
computational language faculty, just as syntactic ability is. 
In terms of theoretical significance for semantic and pragmatic theories, our results on the 
patterns of article knowledge within ASD support the idea that acquisition of definite determiner 
‘the’ is mediated by maturation of knowledge of semantic properties and not solely pragmatics. 
We do not find children who do worse on ‘that’ than on ‘the’ within ASD (C pattern). But we 
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 find some ASD children who perform like typically developing children - better on ‘that’ than on 
‘the’ (B pattern) – indicating a deficit in uniqueness/Maximality, with a relative strength in 
knowledge of pragmatic features of ‘that’ (of familiarity or interpretation relative to unusual 
context). This is surprising given known ‘pragmatic’ deficits in ASD. It seems that despite their 
social difficulties, some of the ASD participants know the pragmatic feature “information known 
to both speaker and hearer” or ‘interpretation relative to nondefault context’, which is what helps 
them interpret ‘that’ correctly, while they are interpreting ‘the’ incorrectly due to lack of 
uniqueness/Maximality presupposition. Good performance on both ‘the’ and ‘that’  (A pattern) in 
some children is evidence of intact knowledge of uniqueness, but does not tell us whether the 
knowledge of pragmatic features in ‘that’ is intact, since in our task, uniqueness may be enough 
for comprehension of ‘that’. Knowledge of the indefinite article ‘a’ and of anaphor ‘another’ 
seems intact, as we are not seeing random performance which can result in 25% ‘same’ 
performance. 
 Perhaps some comments from two of our Asperger participants can elucidate what is 
going on. Following the task, we asked how they made their decisions. One male participant (18 
years of age) said:  “you said ‘the apple’, ‘the’ can refer to a previously described object, 
therefore Turtle goes to same location as Fish”… This sort of explicit reasoning occurred with 
every single one of the items in the task. This participant, when questioned about ‘the’ vs ‘that’ 
said: “’the’ can involve a set of objects; ‘that’ can involve only one.” It is possible to interpret 
this statement to mean that ‘the’ can refer to a singular or a plural item. Another male participant 
(16 years of age) said:  “‘the’ can mean any and specific… ‘that’ is single specific thing”. 
Observe that the definition of ‘the’ of the latter is exactly what one would get if ‘the’ was missing 
uniqueness – as what we think is going on in TD children (Wexler 2003) – ‘the’ can refer to a 
unique specific thing, or it can refer to one of the things in the context set. 
 In further studies, our aim is to replicate the present findings in a larger set of participants 
with ASD. It is also important to study acquisition of anaphor ‘same’ – just like we did in 
Chapter 3.4 with Typically Developing participants – since correct performance of ‘same’ does 
not require uniqueness/maximality, but does require awareness of the salient entity in the context 
set. Additionally, investigating comprehension of free relative clauses in ASD, something that we 
argued in Chapter 4.2 requires only maximality and not salience, may be very informative. In the 
present sample, we cannot firmly answer the question of whether participants with autism have 
this awareness of the salient entity in the discourse set.  
The observed performances reveal varying degrees of impaired, delayed, and normal 
semantic and pragmatic knowledge in our sample of children with ASD. No participants showed 
any atypical patterns of article comprehension, in fact patterns found in typical development were 
exaggerated in some children with PDD-NOS and with Asperger syndrome. Such distinct 
patterns of performance could strongly contribute to the phenotypic characterization of ASD. 
Indeed, perhaps knowledge of articles can act as an endophenotype, a simpler clue to the genetics 
underlying ASD, rather than, or in addition to, the three hallmark components of autism. A 
constrained test of semantics and pragmatics (of articles) may contribute to accurately defining 
the autism spectrum disorders endophenotypes allowing for a more precise genotypic 
characterization and diagnostics. 
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6. Williams Syndrome 
 
In chapter 5, we showed that acquisition of determiners in children with autism spectrum 
disorders does not proceed a deviant pattern from typical acquisition – it is simply severely 
delayed, over and beyond what would be expected given the cognitive functioning levels of those 
children. In the first part of this chapter, we investigate acquisition of determiners in what 
sometimes has been called the mirror opposite of autism – Williams syndrome – whose sufferers 
are known for their hypersociability and linguistic fluency. Un/Fortunately first impressions are 
misleading, and often those with Williams syndrome perform only slightly better, but not too 
differently, than those with autism. In the second part of this chapter, we take advantage of the 
fact that the genetics underlying Williams syndrome are known, and investigate, using mouse 
models, whether two of those genes contribute to the abnormal brain development in Williams 
syndrome, which in turn could contribute to the language impairments experienced by those with 
Williams syndrome. 
 
6.1 Comprehension of Determiners in Williams Syndrome 
 
6.1.1 Abstract 
 
We investigate the comprehension of definite (‘the’ and ‘that’) and indefinite (‘a’), 
articles, as well as anaphor ‘another’, in children and adolescents with Williams syndrome (WS). 
Interpretation of these elements, denoting salient and unique or simply existing referents, relies 
on the knowledge of both pragmatic and semantic aspects of language. There is a debate whether 
pragmatics is impaired in WS, and there is little known about the mastery of semantics, i.e. 
compositional meanings of sentences, in WS. We tested 6 children and adolescents with WS 
(Chronological Age: 6;5-20;7) and 18 typically developing controls (CA: 4;7-16;0), individually 
matched on non-verbal reasoning (KBIT), vocabulary (PPVT), or grammar (TROG). We find 
that participants with WS show a variety of knowledge patterns – with 50% of participants 
showing very poor knowledge on ‘the’ and ‘that’. One WS participant showed perfect knowledge 
of ‘the’ and ‘that’, and the remaining participants showed a pattern found in typical acquisition 
where ‘that’ is understood better than ‘that’. WS group performed most like its typically 
developing grammar controls of mean age 6 years. In comparison, children and adolescents with 
autism spectrum disorders (group matched to WS on age, IQ, vocabulary and grammar) all 
showed no knowledge of articles. These preliminary results suggest that Williams syndrome 
impacts the semantic and pragmatic language systems, but not as much as autism does.  
6.1.2 Background on Williams Syndrome 
Williams syndrome is caused by a deletion of 25 genes on chromosome 7q11.23. The 
incidence is 1 in 7,500 births (on the basis of FISH test). Physical characteristics include unusual 
facies -‘elfin faces’; hypercalcemia, heart and kidney abnormalities, hypersensitivity to sound, 
auditory and visual problems, growth retardation. Neuropsychologically, people with WS are 
hypersociable and easily approach strangers (Doyle, Bellugi, Korenberg, Graham 2004), yet they 
have Theory of Mind deficits and pragmatic deficits similar to those found in autism (Porter, 
Coltheart, Langdon 2007; Laws Bishop 2004; Philofsky, Fidler, Hepburn 2007). WS also have 
severe to mild cognitive impairment (mean IQ 55, range 40-90); deficits in visuospatial 
124
  
perception, spatial memory and processing, but preserved face recognition, all unlike people with 
autism. Language abilities in WS were believed to be delayed but intact, or at least preserved 
reative to their cognitive deficits, however some recent studies (in Rice, Warren & Betz 2005, 
and others) show that WS have problems with complex aspects of grammar involving dislocation 
of sentential elements, e.g. passive sentences with psychological verbs and raising sentences with 
‘seem’ that involve similar syntax (Perovic & Wexler 2006, 2007). From a syntactic point of 
view, even adult individuals with WS linguistically resemble typically developing 5-6 year old 
children. Other skills in adults with WS remain at 6-8 year age equivalent (Howlin, Davies, 
Udwin, 1998). 
Given the unique profile of deficits and abilities in WS, it is important to study their 
knowledge of definite and indefinite articles. These small words are a very specific aspect of 
language that bridges semantics, pragmatics and maybe even theory of mind. Knowledge of 
semantics and pragmatics and TOM has been studied in WS, but never that of articles. Studying 
knowledge of articles in WS is important not only for the sake understanding WS further, but 
also for the sake of making sense of theoretical explanations of articles in typical development 
(TD).  
6.1.3. Semantics and Pragmatics in Williams syndrome 
Although definite and indefinite articles were not studied in detail in WS, other semantic 
and pragmatics aspects of language were investigated, and this literature can be used to formulate 
hypotheses regarding knowledge of articles in WS.  
Note that by semantics here we do not mean vocabulary/lexicon levels, nor do we mean 
ability to classify words by concepts (colors, etc). There is profound, but often missed difference, 
between knowing the meaning of e.g. ‘dog’, and of knowing the meaning of ‘not’, ‘the’, ‘every’. 
The latter are both more conceptually abstract and more linguistic – these are functional closed 
class items which typical children often take time to acquire. These referential terms are used as 
pointers to referents in conversations, and their successful use requires not only pragmatic 
awareness, but also knowledge of their semantic meanings which are part of the computational 
system of language, and are distinct form conceptual meanings of open class words. 
The definition of pragmatics also differs between studies of WS and studies of typical 
development. In case of WS studies – pragmatics is often about speech acts, i.e. using language 
to request and to question, and about discourse cohesion – sticking to the topic of a conversation, 
and about understanding non-literal language use in ironies and metaphors. In typical 
development, pragmatic studies address, among other things, more subtle aspects of children’s 
knowledge, e.g. children’s comprehension of scalar implicatures (logical entailments) – limiting 
or extending semantic meanings of words such as ‘some’ and ‘every’ based on the contexts. 
6.1.3.1. Semantics in Williams Syndrome 
Inevitably, we review lexical knowledge studies. WS experience a late lexical onset, 
attributed to a deficit in early phonological processing (Nazzi, Paterson & Karmiloff-Smith 
2003). Production of words on a naming task in WS has been shown to be similar to that of TD 
children matched on mental age, but WS produced more gestures indicating word finding 
difficulties (Bello, Capirci, Volterra (2004)). People with WS were initially argued to have 
‘bizarre’ semantics producing e.g. unusual animal names, however semantic priming – which 
indicates organization of mental dictionary and semantic memory – was shown to be normal in 
an online task in WS (Tyler, Karmiloff-Smith, Voice, Stevens, Grant, Udwin, Davies, Howlin 
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1997). They however suggest that integration of semantic information may still be abnormal in 
sentence comprehension. Reading in WS is argued to impaired due to their weaker semantic 
knowledge (Laing, Hulme, Grant, Karmiloff-Smith, 2001). Few studies address specific semantic 
terms. Comprehension of spatial terms - prepositions ‘in’, ‘on’, ‘above’, and ‘below’ but not 
nonspatial terms (including negation ‘neither’…’nor’) was impaired in participants with WS, thus 
suggesting that their visuospatial difficulties also concern linguistic spatial terms (Phillips, 
Jarrold, Baddeley, Grant and Karmiloff-Smith (2004)). Laing and Jarrold (2007) find in two 
picture matching tasks that WS can perform on conditions that require a basis of existing 
semantic knowledge better than on conditions that require a mental representation of spatial 
relations. Pictures of animals were used, but names of animals were not – the animals were 
colored in different colors and were referred to based on their color. In the former condition 
animals on pictures were drawn the same size, e.g. penguins and giraffes, therefore WS had to 
rely on lexical/conceptual knowledge to answer which animal; in the latter condition animals 
were drawn either the in correct size relation or in the opposite (e.g. penguin bigger than giraffe), 
so participants had to suppress lexical knowledge and pay attention to spatial relation in pictures. 
Technically, WS and TD performed no better than chance at semantic conditions. WS performed 
better at spatial than semantic (slightly), but TD were way better at spatial. So the authors seem 
to be overinterpreting their results. WS were at chance on both conditions.  
To our knowledge, only one study addressed knowledge of articles in WS. Elicited 
production of articles and nouns in French WS participants showed that they produce more errors 
than do TD children, with more errors of omission of articles (20%) and also more lack of gender 
concord between the article and the noun (50%) (as required in French) (Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, 
Berthoud, Davies, Howlin, Udwin 1997). This deficit in syntactic gender marking was attributed 
to WS’s morphosyntactic difficulties, and not due to a lack of knowledge of gender or articles 
independently. Finally, Mervis & John (2008) caution against generalizations by showing that 
depending how participants with WS are matched, the relative difficulties with spatial vocabulary 
disappeared. In summary, those with Williams syndrome may have semantic deficits, especially 
where semantics/lexical abilities intersect with morphosyntax, as in e.g. gender marking. 
6.1.3.2. Pragmatics in Williams Syndrome 
Those with Williams syndrome were thought to not have issues with social 
communication given their friendly personality (Bellugi, Lichtenberger et al 1999; Bellugi, 
Adolphs et al 1999). Rice et al in their 2005 review of language disorders say that pragmatics has 
not been studied extensively in WS. Since then Stojanovik (2006) showed that people with WS 
have a hard time interpreting information requests from their conversation partners and providing 
enough information of them. Thus people with WS do have difficulties with social conversational 
interaction. Laws and Bishop (2004) used Children’s Communication Checklist (a questionnaire 
that parents fill out) to show that participants with WS show some degree of pragmatic language 
impairment as well as more difficulties with social relationships and restricted interests, 
suggesting a parallel between WS and ASD. WS scored lower on inappropriate initiation of 
conversations, stereotyped conversations and use of contexts than participants with Down 
syndrome and language impairments; on discourse coherence (e.g. maintaining referents with 
in/definite articles) WS scored higher than language impaired groups but lower than TD controls. 
But in direct comparison, WS outscore ASD participants. Philofsky, Fidler, Hepburn (2007) used 
the same test and found that while both groups showed significant deficits relative to TD 
controls, WS performed better than ASD on pragmatic language, especially on discourse 
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coherence, stereotyped language (although not by a lot); nonverbal communication and social 
relations subscales showed ASD to have twice as many deficits as WS.  
Comprehension of personal pronouns (which in TD is delayed due to children’s inability 
to set pragmatic constraints on the context of interpretation or due to children’s inability to 
consider multiple referential representations due to their limited working memory) in 50% of 
people with Williams syndrome is adult-like, and in 30% of WS is TD child-like suggesting a 
“delay in the acquisition of constraints regulating coreferential interpretation of pronouns.” 
(Perovic, Modyanova, Wexler, reanalysis; quote from Perovic, Wexler 2007).  
Verbal working memory was argued to be a relative strength in WS, but unlike in TD, it 
correlates with grammatical abilities, suggesting that children with WS rely on working memory 
to learn grammar (Robinson, Mervis, Robinson 2003).  
In summary, participants with WS may have pragmatic difficulties in maintaining 
referents using articles due to their issues with discourse cohesion.  
6.1.3.3. Theory of Mind in Williams Syndrome 
It has been shown that Theory of Mind is a not a strong area in individuals with Williams 
syndrome. While 94% of WS pass first order false belief tasks, only 31% pass a harder 2nd order 
false belief task (usually passed by TD 7 year olds), but 88% pass an easier 2nd order task (that us 
usually passed by TD 5 years – with clearer and easier-to-remember stories); 50% of WS knew 
metaphor and sarcasm well (unlike ASD people who interpret these literally), and the rest found 
sarcastic statements easier than metaphors (i.e. socially constrained is easier than cognitively 
constrained) (Karmiloff-Smith, Klima, Bellugi, Grant, Baron-Cohen 1995). In contrast, other 
studies show deficits in first-order and second order theory of mind abilities in people with WS 
that are similar to those in ASD: only 24% of WS pass first order TOM, and only 45% pass 
second order TOM (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan 2000; Sullivan & Tager-Flusberg 1999). 
Additionally, people with WS were unable to identify ironic jokes, instead judging them to be 
lies, just as younger typically developing children do (Sullivan, Winner & Tager-Flusberg 2003). 
A recent study (Skwerer, Verbalis, Schofield, Faja, Tager-Flusberg 2006) used a version of Eyes 
Test developed by Baron-Cohen for diagnosing of theory of mind deficits in those with Asperger 
syndrome and high-functioning autism (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb 2001) 
where participants have to correctly pick an adjective describing a gaze depicted in a picture of a 
person’s eyes. WS individuals are known to be good at face processing, however they showed 
worse performance than age matched normal controls (and similar performance to age-, IQ-, and 
language- matched people with learning and intellectual disabilities). These results clearly 
support WS’s deficits in interpretation of social communication. Santos and Deruelle  (2009) 
suggest that WS’s TOM deficits (measure by attribution of intentions) are modality specific – 
with WS doing much better at verbal story tasks, and much worse at visual tasks (comic strips 
depicting scenarios).  
6.1.3.4. Autism spectrum disorders vs (in) Williams syndrome 
While on the surface ASD and WS seem mirror opposites, especially in visuospatial 
domain and social domain, more accurate studies suggest common social/theory of 
mind/pragmatic deficits. Klein-Tasman, Mervis, Lord and Phillips (2007) find that up to 50%-
70% of participants with WS when tested on ADOS module 1 (autism diagnostic observation 
schedule for those with no or beginning language skills) score as being autistic or on the autism 
spectrum. WS are impaired in eye contact, joint attention, interacting normally with other people 
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– it seemed that other human beings were their favorite toy, not another sentient human being 
with independent wishes and thoughts.  
Thus, we are seeing similar pragmatic difficulties in people with ASD and WS. Despite 
their different communication styles, both groups experience difficulties with social 
communication. It is essential then to characterize the precise nature of this deficit. Previous 
studies often use communication checklists and general tests of language to access people’s 
difficulties with semantics and pragmatics (e.g. Farmer and Oliver 2005). The results are often 
telling, but specific study of certain aspects of language will provide a clearer picture. 
6.1.4. Predictions  
It could be argued people with WS and people with autism and PDD-NOS have similar, 
poor, profiles when it comes to their linguistic, pragmatic and theory of mind abilities, although 
WS fair slightly better than ASD. Thus it is possible, then, that knowledge of semantics and 
pragmatics, as measured by a test of definite determiners, will be similar in ASD and WS, if they 
are matched on their overall cognitive and linguistic functioning. Please see section 5.4 for 
discussion of predictions for determiners in ASD which is also relevant here, since similar 
predictions can be made for WS participants. 
Relative to typically developing children, it is expected that WS participants could 
perform below TD children that would be matched on to WS on cognitive levels and grammatical 
levels, especially given Laws and Bishop (2004) findings on WS’s problems on discourse 
cohesion.  
 WS participants also present a wonderful comparison group for elucidating the theoretical 
accounts for definite articles. On one hand, WS are gregarious and hypersocial, so if it weren’t 
for studies explicitly showing social, pragmatic and theory of mind deficits in WS, it would be 
easy to suggest that WS would have no problems with articles for pragmatic reasons. It is also 
possible that WS have semantic deficits, but based on existing lexical studies, it is hard to argue 
for them. Since we are assuming that semantic knowledge of uniqueness/maximality is part of the 
computational language faculty, then we expect some correlation between grammatical/syntactic 
development and semantic development. WS participants are known to show a deficit in syntactic 
movement (passive and raising comprehension, acquired by 7-8 year in TD (Perovic, Wexler, 
2006, 2007), but no deficit in syntactic antecedents (reflexive pronouns comprehension, acquired 
by 4-5 years in TD (Perovic, Wexler, 2007), suggesting that WS are (even when they are adults) 
at a linguistic level of a typically developing 5-6 year old child. Based on the typical 
development study, some 5-6 year olds would know definite and indefinite articles perfectly, and 
some would show no knowledge, and yet others may lack semantic knowledge in ‘the’ but 
overcome this lack in ‘that’ using its the extra saliency and requirements on context of 
interpretation. 
 Given this reasoning, it is possible to make the following prediction. If deficient 
pragmatics is what causes difficulties in comprehension of determiners in all populations, 
children with WS should perform just like ASD children matched on age and cognitive abilities. 
If deficient semantics is what causes difficulties in comprehension of determiners, participants 
with WS should perform just like TD 5-6 year olds.  
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6.1.5. Participants 
 The WS subjects, with confirmed genetic diagnosis of WS, were recruited by Alexandra 
Perovic in 2005 with help of Williams Syndrome Association (WSA) in the USA. Two 
participants were tested in 2006, and four participants were recontacted in 2009 to ask for their 
participation in the present study.  
 
    Age KBIT SS PPVT SS TROG SS 
WS mean 13.87 85.17 79.00 67.83 
  SE 2.27 15.01 2.13 4.40 
  range 6.4 20.6 75 101 73 86 55 81 
  number 6 6 6 6 
Autism/PDD-NOS (ASD) mean 11.49 88.00 77.83 65.83 
  SE 1.76 15.56 13.19 7.02 
  range 6.5 17.2 40 126 40 120 55 99 
  number 6 6 6 6 
KBIT controls mean 9.48 100.17 102.67 98.33 
  SE 1.43 11.08 3.19 5.73 
  range 5.6 15.2 94 109 97 117 79 113 
  number 6 6 6 6 
PPVT controls mean 9.65 109.67 98.33 101.33 
  SE 1.71 15.01 1.45 4.50 
  range 4.6 16.0 101 115 93 102 88 118 
  number 6 6 6 6 
TROG controls mean 6.02 97.67 99.67 97.83 
  SE 0.44 3.87 3.93 3.09 
 range 4.6 7.1 88 112 89 117 90 109 
  number 6 6 6 6 
Table 6.1.1. Details of WS participants and their TD and ASD controls 
 
The ASD subjects for the present study were recruited in collaboration with Alexandra 
Perovic, through parent support groups and schools for children with disabilities. The clinical 
diagnosis was made by clinicians in the New England area and reported to us by parents. For the 
present comparison with Williams syndrome, only those with autism or PDD-NOS diagnosis 
were included, since those with Asperger are expected to significantly differ from WS 
participants on nonverbal reasoning and grammatical abilities, which may invalidate 
comparisons. 
WS participants were individually matched to TD controls on three measures, thus 
forming three control groups. TD controls were recruited from Boston/Cambridge area daycares 
and afterschool programs. One group of TD controls was matched to probands on raw non-verbal 
cognitive abilities, as measured by Matrices subtest of KBIT-II (usually no more than one point 
off). This group allows us to factor out the influence of general cognition on participants' 
linguistic performance. The second control group was matched on raw scores of a standardized 
measure of receptive vocabulary (PPVT-III, maximum 4 points off), to tease apart the influence 
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of general language abilities, i.e. lexical knowledge, on the more abstract aspects of linguistic 
knowledge of language assessed by our experimental task. The third control group was matched 
on raw score of standardized measure of grammar (TROG-2, usually no more than one point off), 
to establish whether there are differences in the subtle aspects of linguistic knowledge between 
control and disordered participants even if they are matched for the general level of grammatical 
competence. Every effort was made to match the participants on gender and to choose only those 
control participants whose scores on the standardized tests were close to the average (between 85 
and 115). In this way the performance of control participants on the study task could not be 
interpreted as being due to their superior or inferior general cognitive or linguistic abilities. 
WS participants were also group matched to a subset ASD participants from Chapter 5 
(especially those with autism or with PDD-NOS) on age, raw and standard scores of the three 
standardized tests. Herein, this subgroup will be referred to ASD. 
 
The testing procedure was the same as for ASD participants in Chapter 5.6. 
6.1.6. Results 
 
 
Figure and Table 6.1.2. Number of actions on the ‘same’ object (max 6)  
(error bars represent +-1 SE) 
GROUP A ANO THE THAT 
WS 0.5 0 2.83 4 
ASD 0.5 0.33 0.67 1 
KBIT controls 0.33 0 4.5 5.17 
PPVT controls 0.33 0 4.67 4.67 
TROG controls 0.67 0.5 2.33 3.5 
 
We find that knowledge of indefinite articles ‘a’ and ‘another’ does not differ among 
participant groups, however knowledge of ‘the’ and ‘that’ does so. 
MANOVA (number ‘same’ responses on ‘a’, ‘another’, ‘the’, and ‘that’ as dependent 
variables, 5 groups (WS, ASD, and three WS control groups) as between subject factors) showed 
significant effect of group for ‘the’ (F(4, 25)=3.72, p=.017) and ‘that’ (F(4, 25)=3.95, p=.013), 
but not for ‘a’ and ‘another’. Fisher’s LSD posthoc tests (selected to bring out the subtle effects 
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in the small number of subjects) showed differences on ‘the’ approaching significance between 
ASD and WS group (p=.086), and significant differences on ‘the’ between ASD group and WS 
KBIT and PPVT control groups (p=.004 and p=.003 respectively), but WS group did not differ 
significantly from its controls; significant differences on ‘that’ were observed between WS and 
ASD groups (p=.015), and between ASD and all WS controls (p=.001 for KBIT controls, p=.004 
for PPVT controls, p=.04 for TROG controls). R2 for the model is .373 (adjusted .27) for ‘the’ 
and .387 (adjusted .289) for ‘that’. 
 We now turn the focus specifically on the definite determiners, since this is where 
variation lies. Participants were subdivided by their pattern of performance between ‘the’ and 
‘that’, with “A” pattern denoting good performance on both ‘the’ and ‘that’, “B” pattern denoting 
bad performance on ‘the’ with a relatively better performance on ‘that’, “C” pattern denoting a 
bad performance on ‘that’ with a relatively better performance on ‘the’, and finally “D” pattern 
denoting a bad performance in both ‘the’ and ‘that’. ‘Good’ performance was considered if 
participants got 4/6 or greater ‘same’ actions on the same object. ‘Bad’ performance was 3/6 or 
less items. For ‘B’ and ‘C’ patterns participants had to get a difference of 2 ‘same’ actions 
between ‘the’ and ‘that’ for the difference to count. Thus difference between 3 and 4 does not 
count, but a difference between 3 and 5 does. This is was done to figure out whether participants 
are showing adult-like knowledge (A pattern), showing deficits especially in semantics (but not 
pragmatics) (B pattern, found in TD children), showing deficits especially in pragmatics (but not 
in semantics) (C pattern, not found in TD children), or showing deficits across the board (D 
pattern).  
 
Figure and Table 6.1.3. Proportion of participants showing patterns of performance 
  WS ASD KBIT control PPVT control TROG control 
D 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.17 0.50 
B 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.17 
A 0.17 0.00 0.67 0.83 0.33 
 
The proportion of participants showing these patterns is illustrated. It becomes 
immediately clear that WS participants are not showing a random performance – their 3/6 
average responses for ‘the’ are not equally distributed across participants. As a group, 50% of 
participants with WS show no knowledge of articles (pattern “D”), with only 15% (one subject) 
showing good knowledge (“A” pattern), and the remaining 35% (two subjects) showing the “B” 
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pattern where they do better on ‘that’ than on ‘the’. Only the TROG control group has similar 
distribution of participants showing that many poor responses. The TROG control group (which 
is the youngest) is showing 35% “A” pattern. In the KBIT and PPVT control groups 70-80% of 
participants are showing good proficiency with ‘the’ and ‘that’. Observe that not a single 
participant shows the “C’” pattern. The pattern that ASD group shows contrasts with WS and all 
controls – not a single participant with ASD, when matched on age, nonverbal reasoning, 
vocabulary and grammar to WS participants, shows knowledge of articles. 
ANOVA (between group factor: WS vs ASD vs three control groups, dependent variable 
= proportion participants showing a particular pattern) showed significant effect of group 
(F(4,25)=6.1, p=.001), with Fisher’s LSD post hoc tests showing WS approaching significant 
difference from the ASD group (p=.072), and WS differing from KBIT group and PPVT group 
(p=.024 and .042 respectively), with R2 for the model .495 (adjusted .415). 
This analysis illustrates two of the main points of the data. Participants with WS are more 
deficient in their knowledge of articles than expected given their nonverbal reasoning abilities, 
and more deficient than expected given their vocabulary levels. However, participants with WS 
are performing at the levels expected by their grammar levels – levels shown by typically 
developing five year olds. Participants with WS outperform only one comparison group – those 
with autism spectrum disorders. Even though WS and ASD participants are at similar ages and 
have similar nonverbal reasoning, vocabulary and grammar levels, half of WS show no 
knowledge whereas ALL of ASD so no knowledge.  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
AGE 6.42 10.2 10.92 16.08 19 20.59 
‘A’ 0 2 1 0 0 0 
‘ANOTHER’ 0 0 0 0 0 0 
‘THE’ 0 3 2 5 3 4 
‘THAT’ 0 4 2 6 6 6 
PATTERN D D D A B B 
‘SHARE’   4 4   4 4 
‘SAME’   4 0   4 4 
KBIT RAW 15 20 19 26 30 36 
KBIT SS 90 82 75 77 86 101 
PPVT RAW 59 92 95 129 148 153 
PPVT SS 78 74 73 79 84 86 
PPVT AE 4.58 6.92 7.20 10.08 12.67 13.67 
TROG RAW 4 7 5 12 13 14 
TROG SS 69 55 55 71 76 81 
TROG AE 4 4.92 4.42 6.5 7 7.92 
Table 6.1.4. Details of performance and functioning of individual WS participants 
 
Since only six WS participants are presently included, it is worth to have a closer look at 
their individual performances. Values for ‘a’, ‘another’, ‘the’, and ‘that’ show actions on the 
‘same’ objects out of 6. Values for ‘same’ and ‘share’ show the same out of 4, and only four WS 
participants were tested on these. Three WS participants (2,5,6) showed perfect knowledge of 
‘same’ and ‘share’, while at the same time showing ‘B’ and ‘D’ patterns in determiner 
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knowledge, and one participant (3) understood ‘share’ but not at all ‘same’ and showed ‘D’ 
pattern. So far it seems that knowledge of WS grows with age – those younger than 11 years 
showing poor knowledge, and those 16 and older are at least showing partial knowledge. It is an 
interesting question whether knowledge of articles matures in WS, and whether the majority of 
WS attain knowledge of articles by adulthood. Of course, we observe a delay in article 
knowledge relative to chronological age, but relative to grammatical age equivalents, WS 
participants are exactly where they should be.  
6.1.7. Discussion 
In summary, we find that children and adolescents with Williams syndrome show 
multiple levels of knowledge of definite and indefinite articles, with the youngest WS 
participants showing no knowledge (D pattern), and the oldest WS participants showing either 
adult-like (A pattern) or child-like knowledge (B pattern), where ‘that’ is known better than ‘the’.  
Relative to their TD controls, WS perform worse than expected given their nonverbal-
reasoning and vocabulary levels, but WS perform similarly to their grammar controls who are on 
average 6 years old. This finding suggests that knowledge of articles in WS tracks more closely 
with their overall grammatical development which is known to be delayed (Perovic, Wexler, 
2006, 2007), and does not track with their vocabulary levels which are known to be a relative 
strength in WS. 
Relative to participants with ASD matched on age, nonverbal, verbal and grammatical 
levels, WS perform much much better. Where all ASD participants show poor knowledge of 
articles, only 50% of WS participants do so.  
So far, the results are consistent with articles being mediated by the computational 
semantic system of language and not solely pragmatics. This is because WS and ASD 
participants show widely different performances, and if their deficits were in pragmatics, and not 
in semantics, it could be expected they would show similar performance. This is also because 
some WS show better performance on ‘that’ than on ‘the’ (a child-like pattern of performance), 
suggesting they are sensitive to the saliency of referent with ‘that’ which involves additional 
pragmatic features (of familiarity or interpretation relative to nondefault context situation), but 
their knowledge of ‘the’ is deficient – suggesting a deficit in the semantic property of 
uniqueness/Maximality. It is notable that 50% of WS show intact performance on article ‘that’ 
despite their known difficulties in pragmatic communication. Knowledge of the indefinite article 
‘a’, and anaphor ‘another’ seems intact, as we are not seeing random performance which can 
result in at least 30% performance. 
The observed performances reveal varying degrees of impaired, delayed, and normal 
semantic and pragmatic knowledge in our sample of children with WS. No participants showed 
any atypical patterns of article comprehension, in fact patterns found in typical development were 
exaggerated in some children with WS. In further investigations our goal is to increase the 
present sample size. It would also be amazing to investigate whether knowledge of articles in WS 
tracks with any atypical deletions, in a similar way that visuospatial and social behaviors do. 
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 6.2. Initial characterization of GTF2I family of gene homologues in 
mouse neocortical development 
 
6.2.1. Abstract 
 
People with Williams syndrome have a profound disorganization of grey and white 
matter, with region specific thickening and thickening of the cortex which correlates with their 
cognitive strengths and weaknesses. This indicates that some genes in Williams syndrome region 
contribute to abnormalities in brain development and hence can contribute to abnormalities in 
laminar patterning, which can be directly investigated in mouse models using the method of in 
utero electroporation. We investigated effects of overexpression of mouse homologues of 
Williams syndrome region genes GTF2I and GTF2IRD1, which are known to contribute to the 
visuospatial, social and perhaps even linguistic deficits in the disorder, in mouse embryonic 
neocortical development using in utero electroporation. We find that individually Gtf2i and 
Gtf2ird1 do not significantly affect laminar patterning, but when overexpressed together, they act 
synergistically to cause a severe depletion of cells in the cortical plate phenotype. Primary neurite 
length at the end of embryogenesis was found increased relative to Gfp control in both Gtf2i and 
Gtf2ird1, but was decreased relative to Gfp in double overexpression. The abnormalities in 
orientations of primary neurites were increased in Gtf2i and Gtf2ird1, and in the double 
overexpression. These results indicate that GTF2I and GTI2IRD1 act synergistically to contribute 
to cortical abnormalities in Williams syndrome and Williams syndrome duplication phenotypes, 
which may underlie their cognitive and behavioral deficits. 
6.2.2. Background on the Williams syndrome region genotypes and neurological 
phenotypes 
Williams syndrome results from a microdeletion on chromosome 7q11.23 (referred to 
herein as WS region) resulting in haploinsufficiency in about 25 genes (Ewart et al 1993).  
The incidence is 1 in 7,500 births (on the basis of FISH test). Physical characteristics 
include unusual facies -‘elfin faces’; hypercalcemia, heart and kidney abnormalities, 
hypersensitivity to sound, auditory and visual problems, growth retardation. 
Neuropsychologically, people with WS are hypersociable and easily approach strangers (Doyle, 
Bellugi, Korenberg, Graham 2004), yet they have Theory of Mind deficits and pragmatic deficits 
similar to those found in autism (e.g. Laws Bishop 2004). WS also have severe to mild cognitive 
impairment (mean IQ 55, range 40-90); deficits in visuospatial perception, spatial memory and 
processing, but preserved face recognition, all unlike people with autism. Language abilities in 
WS were believed to be delayed but intact, or at least preserved relative to their cognitive 
deficits, however recent studies show that WS have problems with complex aspects of grammar 
involving dislocation of sentential elements, e.g. passive sentences with psychological verbs and 
raising sentences with ‘seem’ that involve similar syntax (Perovic & Wexler, in press, 2007). 
From a syntactic point of view, even adult individuals with WS linguistically resemble typically 
developing 5-6 year old children. Other skills in adults with WS also remain at 6-8 year age 
equivalent (Howlin, Davies, Udwin, 1998). 
Several human (and mouse) imaging studies suggest profound disorganization of grey and 
white matter in WS as contributing to the WS phenotype. In addition to global reductions in 
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 white matter (up to 18%) and in grey matter (6%) (e.g. Thompson et al 2005), there is region 
specific thickening and thickening of the cortex and corresponding abnormalities in the gyral 
patterns. There are increased numbers of thinner gyri (Thompson et al 2005, Gaser et al 2006) 
and reduced (Kippenhan et al 2005) and abnormal (van Essen et al 2006) sulcal depths in both 
hemispheres, with reductions in grey matter correlating with reductions in sulcal depth. Imaging 
studies have shown alterations in brains of WS that are consistent with their relative strengths and 
weaknesses. Reiss et al (2004) find overall WS brains are smaller than controls, but “after 
adjusting for overall brain volume, find that participants with WS showed reduced thalamic and 
occipital lobe gray matter volumes and reduced gray matter density in subcortical and cortical 
regions comprising the human visual-spatial system compared with controls [also found by 
Boddaert et al 2006 in children with WS; Campbell et al 2009; by Chiang et al 2007 correlating 
positively with performance IQ]. The WS group also showed disproportionate increases in 
volume and gray matter density in several areas known to participate in emotion and face 
processing, including the amygdala, orbital and medial prefrontal cortices, anterior cingulate, 
insular cortex, and superior temporal gyrus” (also found by Campbell et al 2009). One 
postmortem study (Galaburda et al 2002) found increased cell density in left layer four, and 
increased numbers of small neurons in layers four, five and six in the visual cortex, supporting 
the neuroimaging findings. Another postmortem study found abnormalities in the auditory cortex: 
WS had more larger neurons bilaterally, and showed a lack of asymmetry in cell packing density 
found in controls (higher on the left than on the right) (Holinger et al 2005). Notably, planum 
temporale (surrounding Sylvian fissure and involved in language) showed reversed asymmetry in 
WS, with larger planum temporale on right hemisphere, which itself was due to abnormal 
horizontal Sylvian fissure which did not ascend into the parietal lobe – a pattern usually found in 
the left hemisphere of typical people (Eckert et al 2006). The same area additionally shows 
significant grey matter thickening (by 5-10%) (Thompson et al 2005). Of the studies focusing on 
white matter abnormalities in WS, Marenco et al (2007) used “diffusion tensor imaging to 
demonstrate alteration in white matter fiber directionality, deviation in posterior fiber tract 
course, and reduced lateralization of fiber coherence in WS” and suggest that “abnormalities are 
consistent with an alteration of the late stages of neuronal migration”. In many cases, WS had not 
only thicker white matter tracts, but also multiple ‘streams’ of such projections. 
The WS neural networks are disorganized at a fundamental level as shown by a study of 
auditory perception in WS via fMRI (Levitin et al 2003) where auditory regions (temporal lobe) 
had reduced activation (relative typical controls) and greater amygdalar activation. Additionally, 
the activation was more widely distributed across cortical and subcortical structures during music 
processing. Thus the fact that people with WS have relatively preserved music abilities and 
hypersensitivity to sound does not mean that brain areas underlying these abilities are spared – in 
fact the reverse is true. A similar picture emerges in other domains. During a global processing 
task, WS showed reduced parietal and visual cortical activation, normal activation in ventral 
occipitotemporal cortex, but elevated activation of the thalamic nuclei (Mobbs et al  2007a). In a 
response inhibition task, while behaviorally similar to controls, WS showed reduced activation of 
critical cortical and subcortical structures involved in behavioral inhibition (such striatum, 
dorsolateral prefrontal and dorsal anterior cingulated cortices) (Mobbs et al 2007b). Hoeft et al 
(2007) used diffusion tensor imaging to show that fractional anisotropy was higher in the right 
superior longitudinal fasciculus – associating between deficits in visuospatial construction and 
higher FA in WS. Similarly, Meyer-Lindenberg et al (2004) using fMRI showed isolated 
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 hypoactivation in WS in the parietal portion of the dorsal stream which correlated with gray 
matter volume reductions.  
Despite these brain abnormalities in WS, of the genes involved in WS none have been 
investigated for their direct effects on embrionic brain development. 
Discoveries of atypical deletions of the WS locus contributed to understanding of some 
genes via genotype-phenotype correlations. Notably, atypical deletions involving (or missing) the 
GTF2I family of genes (GTF2IRD1 & GTF2I) suggested that those are the genes strongly 
contributing to the hypersocial, the visuospatial and even maybe the linguistic deficits in WS. 
These atypical deletions spare just the GTF2I family of genes, while deleting all other WS genes. 
Although the details vary across several studies involving from all over the world subjects, all 
these patients have improved visuospatial abilities, milder facial abnormalities, milder to no 
mental retardation, and close to normal social skills (without overfriendliness or anxiety) relative 
to ‘typical’ WS. Language was addressed in only four of the studies, and in two of them normal 
language skills were found, while other two showed mild delay in language acquisition (both 
vocabulary levels and syntactic comprehension), similar to typical WS. (van Hagen et al 2007, 
Howald et al 2006, Morris et al 2003, Hirota et al 2003, Doyle et al 2004, Tassabehji et al 2005, 
Gagliardi et al 2003, Blyth et al 2008, Ferrero et al 2009). Dai et al (2009) find a unique 
individual with atypical WS deletion that includes GTF2IRD1, but not GTF2I, who has physical 
and visuospatial WS features but does not have language delay and has no overt abnormal social 
behavior phenotype. These data are consistent with the possibility that GTF2IRD1 is associated 
with WS facial dismorphology and visuospatial deficits, and that GTF2I is associated with the 
hypersociability and linguistic deficits.  
Another study of an atypical deletion (Edelmann et al 2007), this one involving only the 
GTF2I genes and those more distal (but excluding majority of WS genes), found autism and 
Williams syndrome profile (including impaired visuospatial ability, an overly friendly 
personality, excessive non-social anxiety and language delay) in the patient, suggesting that 
GTF2I genes can, essentially by themselves, cause most features of WS. That is not the first 
study of people having both autism features and Williams syndrome (Reiss, Feinstein et al 1985; 
Herguner, Mukaddes 2006). Notably, Schubert & Laccone (2006) find a patient with a deletion 
spanning entire WS region and extending by a few genes on each side, who had severe WS 
phenotype, with motor and equilibrium disturbances as well as lack of speech/language abilities 
and autistic behavior. These studies suggest that genes bordering the WS region likely contribute 
to ASD.  
The recently discovered duplication of the WS region shows a different phenotype than 
WS deletion. There are no visuospatial deficits, no phobias, no heart abnormalities, but there is a 
severe speech and language delay, affecting both production and comprehension of language, and 
gait and motor problems – both uncharacteristic of WS deletion. Unfortunately, detailed 
linguistic description of WS duplication is unavailable, but language difficulties experienced by 
these individuals are orders of magnitude worse than language impairments found on WS 
deletion (Mervis, p.c.). Social (autistic) deficits and some mental retardation appear in some, but 
not all cases of WS duplication. (Sommerville et al 2005, Depienne et al 2007, Torniero et al 
2007, 2008, Berg et al 2007). GTF2I was among the genes whose expression is increased in the 
duplication (Sommerville et al 2005).  
Brain imaging of one case of WS duplication (in Torniero et al 2008) showed increased 
cortical thickness and simplified gyral pattern in parietal lobes, increased cortical thickness in 
insular cortex, and some ectopic gray matter formations in subcortical white matter extending 
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 from ventricles to beneath left parietal lobe, which the authors suggest represent columns of 
radial migration abnormality. Another case (Torniero et al 2007) showed cortical thickening and 
simplified gyri in left sylvian and temporal cortex (as in typical WS, consistent with the severe 
language phenotype); ectopic formations were not observed. 
In summary, we conclude that language development (although likely not in same 
quality) is something that is consistently affected in both WS duplications and WS deletions (as 
do Osborne, Mervis 2007), suggesting that, perhaps, GTF2I is one of the dosage-sensitive gene 
contributing to the cortical abnormalities underlying linguistic deficits. Torniero et al (2007) 
reach a similar conclusion but implicate other genes: “Two such genes, linked to microtubule- 
associated proteins, are present in the duplicated region: LIMK1, encoding a protein kinase which 
regulates actin filament dynamics, and CYLN2, encoding a protein presumably linking 
microtubules to dendritic lamellar body.” 
6.2.3. GTF2I family of genes: GTF2I and GTF2IRD1 
In mouse embryonic development, both GTF2I and GTF2IRD1 are widely expressed. In 
adult mice (and humans), GTF2I is present exclusively in neurons showing especially high levels 
in the hippocampus, Purkinje cells, and dentate gyrus, but GTF2IRD1 is expressed throughout the 
body in adults, in brain in olfactory bulb, purkinje cells and neurons in piriform cortex. (Danoff 
et al 2004, Bayarsaihan et al 2003, Enkhmandakh et al 2004).  
Animal models of Gtf2i and Gtf2ird1 were found to have particular phenotypes, 
replicating some features of Williams syndrome. 
Animal models of Gtf2ird1 knockout in mice, in one case showed growth retardation and 
craniofacial abnormalities similar to those in WS (Tassabehji et al 2005). In another case (Young 
et al 2008), which did not replicate the craniofacial dismorphology, Gtf2ird1-targeted mice 
showed reduced fear, anxiety and aggression (like in WS), but with spared spatial memory, 
slightly impaired auditory-cued fear memory, and normal synaptic activity in the hippocampus. 
Additionally there was an altered serotonin metabolism, with alteration of postsynaptic serotonin 
turnover without increase in overall serotonin production – serotonin metabolite 5-HIAA (5-
hydroxyindole acetic acid) was found to be elevated in amygdala, frontal cortex and parietal 
cortex. Van Hagen et al (2007) find that Gtf2ird1 heterozygote mice have significantly enlarged 
ventricles, mildly enlarged corpus callosum, freeze more than WT in fear contexts, and spend 
almost twice as much time on accelerating rotorod than WT. Staining brains with 
“hematoxylin/eosin did not reveal any gross abnormalities in the distributions of neurons, 
neuropil, glia or white matter. In addition, the cyto-architectonic layers in both the hippocampus 
and cerebellum appeared unaffected.” 
Animal model of Gtf2i is so far only grossly characterized: microarray data from Gtf2ird1 
and Gtf2i homozygotes, who showed embryonic lethality, brain hemorrhage, and vasculogeneic, 
craniofacial, and neural tube defects, suggested impairment of genes involved in the 
TGFbetaRII/Alk1/Smad5 signal transduction pathway, although the effect on these genes by 
Gtf2i knockout was less pronounced; heterozygotes of each genotype selectively showed 
microcephaly as well as craniofacial and skeletal abnormalities, and retarded growth – all 
features found in WS (Enkhmandakh et al 2008). 
What are the molecular mechanisms that can underlie these phenotypes? Many findings, 
mostly from the cancer literature, suggest involvement of GTF2I in regulation of cell cycle. 
GTF2I family of genes, including GTF2I and GTF2IRD1, have been under scrutiny not 
only for their involvement in Williams syndrome, but also in cancer, in cell cycle regulation and 
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 in transcriptional regulation of growth-promoting genes and signal transduction. Upon 
modulation by extracellular signals, GTF2I protein (TFII-I) regulates activation of the c-fos 
promoter (Kim, Cochran, 2000), which is part of the early-immediate response gene cascade 
involved in, among other things, learning of bird song (e.g. Kimpo et al 1997). TFII-I is a unique 
transcription factor because it provides a link between the basal transcriptional machinery and 
specific transcription factors (Roy, 2001) (quote from Stasyk et al 2005). Involvement of TFII-I 
in cell cycle makes it a great candidate for investigation in neuronal migration. Desgranges et al 
(2005) show that usually TFII-I activates transcription of cyclin D1 by binding to its promoter. 
Upon cell cycle arrest (from genotoxic stress and p53 activation), TFII-I is ubiquitinated and 
degraded, however overexpression TFII-I increases cyclin D1 levels, and causes accelerated entry 
to and exit from S phase, and overcomes p53-mediated cell cycle arrest. 
The GTF2I family of genes shows mutually antagonizing effect – usually both are found 
in the nucleus, but their mutual overexpression results in all GTF2IRD1 locating to the nucleus 
and in all TFII-I locating outside of the nucleus, preventing the latter’s transcriptional activation 
of c-fos promoter (Tussie-Luna et al 2001). The GTF2I family of genes also modulates regulation 
of the transforming growth factor beta (TGF-beta)/activin target gene goosecoid (Gsc) - 
suggesting they are involved in TGF-beta signaling (Ku et al 2005). Downregulating TFII-I 
abolished TGF-beta mediated induction of Goosecoid, as does overexpressing GTF2IRD1. Ku et 
al suggest GTF2IRD1 protein (also known as BEN) plays a repressor or a baseline regulator role 
(it is constitutively recruited to distal promotors of Goosecoid), whereas TFII-I in complex with 
SMAD2 plays an upregulating role – upon effect of TGF-beta signaling, TFII-I displaces BEN 
and activates transcription. (SMAD2 has the ability to interact with gene promoters via DNA-
binding proteins; SMAD3 (which in Ku et al did not bind with TFII-I) can bind to DNA directly 
(reviewed by Stasyk et al 2005). Stasyk et al (2005) however find that when TGF-beta1-
dependent phosphorylation of TFII-I is cancelled, SMAD3 cooperates with TFII-I to increase 
expression of cyclin D2 and D3.  
 
Figure 6.2.1. Reproduced from Ku et al (2005) 
“Proposed model for TGF-beta signal-dependent transcriptional regulation of Gsc at a steady 
state. DE is occupied by BEN, which suppresses the transcription of Gsc possibly by recruitment 
of HDAC3. Upon TGF-beta/activin stimulation, Smad2 translocates to the nucleus, interacts with 
TFII-I, displaces BEN, and activates Gsc transcription” 
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 Upstream regulators and Downstream targets of the GTF2I family of genes 
It is notable that through their downstream and upstream targets, the GTF2I family of 
genes connects on a molecular level with other neurodevelopmental disorders. 
Upstream regulators of GTF2I family of genes include TGF-beta signaling, which plays a 
role in proliferation and differentiation and inflammation, and which has been implicated in 
autism. Serum levels in patients with autism had significantly decreased levels of TGF-beta1 
(Okada, Hashimoto et al 2007), but brain levels of TGF-beta1 were elevated (Cohly, Panja 2005). 
MADH9, a member of the SMAD family of proteins that mediate the TGF-beta signaling 
pathway which is expressed in the brain, was implicated in a patient with autism and auditory 
processing deficits (Smith, Woodroffe, Smith, Holguin et al 2002). The genetic link between 
autism and Williams syndrome is not limited to the TGF-beta signaling pathway. Other genes 
within Williams syndrome region overlap with gene pathways involved in autism. For example, 
FZD9, a gene deleted in WS, may act as receptor for WNT signaling proteins involved in tissue 
polarity and development (in Tassabehji 2003). WNT2, involved in development of central 
nervous system, was implicated in two families with parent-child autism and severe language 
abnormalities (Wassink et al 2001).  
The downstream targets of the GTF2I family of genes have been investigated via 
molecular and bioinformatics analyses, which showed their involvement in immunity response, 
cell cycle, catalytic activity, signaling pathways and transcriptional regulation (Chimge et al 
2007a, Chimge et al 2007b, Chimge et al 2008). Notably, Chimge et al (2008) identify, among 
others, Tgfb2 as a potential downstream target of Gtf2ird1. Most recently, TFII-I, in complex 
with PARP1 and SFPQ proteins1, was found to regulate the DYX1C1 gene (Tapia-Páez et al 
2008), which is a candidate gene for dyslexia (e.g. Taipale et al 2003), a neurodevelopmental 
disorder where children are unable to learn to read despite having good linguistic skills; the 
problem seems to be due to abnormal phonological processing implicating auditory brain areas. 
DYX1C1 has been implicated in abnormal laminar patterning (neuronal migration) in rat 
neocortex (Wang et al 2006) and in auditory processing and spatial learning in rats (e.g. 
Threlkeld et al 2007). Additionally, downregulation of DYX1C1 causes heterotopias (pockets of 
unmigrated neurons along lateral ventricles – interfering with white matter) in the cortex and the 
hippocampus (Threlkeld et al 2007, Rosen et al 2007). These neocortical heterotopias (or 
ectopias) have been found in brains of people with dyslexia (Humphreys, Kaufmann, Galaburda, 
1990), Williams syndrome (Ferland et al 2006), duplication of Williams syndrome region 
(Torniero et al 2008), autism (Bauman & Kemper, 2005:130-131), language impairment (Preis et 
al 1998) and fragile X syndrome (Parrini et al 2006). Notably, neocortical ectopias/heterotopias 
are associated with attenuated neurophysiological responses to rapidly changing auditory stimuli 
in mice - a key phenotype in dyslexia (Frenkel et al 2000). This molecular connection between 
WS and dyslexia in quite intriguing. People with WS are known to be susceptible to dyslexia, and 
have auditory processing difficulties (e.g. Temple 2003, Levitin et al 2003). That DYX1C1 is a 
downstream target of TFII-I suggests a common molecular mechanism across disorders. Another 
interesting downstream target of Gtf2ird1 (as noted by Tassabehji et al 2005) is Goosecoid,                                                         1 PARP1 is intracellular protease with a role in development of neuronal cell death, apoptosis, 
necrosis; Activated in traumatic brain injury, Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s; involved in learning and 
long-term memory in rats (dyslexics have working memory problems!). SFPQ is involved in 
neuronal differentiation and maturation, lies in a region on chromosome 1p34-p36 linked to 
dyslexia and SLI. 
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 which in humans is on 22q11 - DiGeorge/Velocardiofacial syndrome region which is associated 
with autism and visuospatial construction deficit. 
6.2.4. Aim 
No studies address the effect of the GTF2I genes on neocortical development, and the 
goal here is to characterize the consequences of modulation of these genes on laminar patterning, 
growth and cell morphogenesis. Laminar patterning can be modulated by altering cell cycle (in 
which TFII-I is clearly involved), e.g. cell output at the ventricular zone, or by altering neuronal 
migration directly (which is not known but possible for TFII-I, e.g. in a manner similar to Reelin 
(another autism candidate gene) (Persico et al 2001). Another goal is to further evaluate the 
significance of the interaction of TFII-I with TGF-beta pathway. Given findings that TFII-I is 
phosphrylated upon TGF-beta activation to activate transcription, we investigated the effects of 
inhibiting its activation by TGF-beta with SMAD7. SMAD7 is a potent inhibitor of TGF-beta 
activity that acts by binding to TGF-beta receptors and preventing phosphorylation of SMAD3 
and SMAD2 (which themselves interact with TFII-I) and is a mediator of its proinflamatory 
signalling (Yan, Liu, Chen 2009; Fraser, 2007). 
6.2.5. Methods 
We investigated the effects of overexpression of Gtf2i, Gtf2ird1, as well as co-
overexpression of Gtf2i and Gtf2ird1. We also investigated the effects of co-overexpression these 
genes with Smad7. 
Using the in utero electroporation technique which allows specific targeting of DNA 
misexpression and maintaining of the normal course of development, and which targets 
specifically migrating neuroblasts of pyramidal cells (Tabata, Nakajima, 2001; Saito, Nakatsuji, 
2001), these target genes (along with green fluorescent protein gene to clearly visualize the 
resulting changes) were misexpressed in the developing mouse neocortex at E14.5.  
The genes were individually cloned into pEF6 plasmid. Plasmid DNA was purified with a 
mixed protocol (designed by Damon Page) combining QIAGEN EndoFree plasmid kit and 
QIAGEN HiSpeed Plasmid kit (to attain maximal possible yields while making sure to remove 
all endotoxins), dissolved in 10% TE buffer in at concentration of 2 µg/µl. For injection, total 
plasmid concentration was 1µg/µl with 1% Fast Green solution for visualization of injections. 
Time-pregnant mice were anesthetized with Isoflurane, the abdomen was opened and the uterine 
horns were exposed. Approximately 1-1.5 µl of plasmid solution was injected via picospritzer 
into the lateral ventricle with glass micropipette. The embryo in the uterus was placed between 
the tweezers-type electrodes, which has disc electrodes of 5-7 mm in diameter at the tip. Five 
electronic pulses (25-55V, 50ms) were delivered with an electroporater. The wall and the skin of 
the abdominal cavity were sutured, and the embryos were allowed to develop normally. 
The embryos were extracted at E18.5 (birth), immersion fixed in 4% paraformaldehyde 
overnight, subsequently extracted, postfixed for 4-6 hours, cryoprotected in 20% sucrose 
overnight, embedded in OCT compound, and sectioned into 50 µm slices in cryostat, and 
mounted on slides, and after removing the OCT with phosphate-buffered saline (PBS), were 
coversliped for viewing under Zeiss confocal microscope (Laser Scanning Microscope LSM 5 
Pascal). Images were taken with a 10x objective, at 1024-1024 resolution, with no digital zoom. 
The resulting images were normalized in Photoshop and analyzed in ImageJ to measure the 
distribution of transfected GFP signal across the migratory paths from the ventricular zone to the 
top levels of the cortex. The GFP signal was divided into 10 bins for initial analysis. Bins 1-3 
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 (corresponding to the signal from the ventricular zone (VZ)), bins 4-6 (corresponding to the 
signal from the intermediate zone (IZ)), and bins 7-10 (corresponding to the signal from the 
cortical plate (CP)) were later summed for final statistical analysis (in SPSS). 
 A total of 81 pregnant Black Swiss mice underwent IUEP procedure, with surgeries on 26 
mice (about 223 embryos) resulting in no surviving embryos (due to issues with electrodes, 
inconsistencies in plasmid preparation, and other experimental issues), and with surgeries on 55 
mice (521 embryos) resulting in 246 surviving embryos (47% survival rate), of which 131 ended 
up being transfected (53% transfection rate). Analyzable transfections (clear lateral migrations 
showing cortical plate through ventricular zone) formed a minor subset of the total, with many 
transfections labeling thalamic cells, midline cells, or weakly labeling lateral cells. 
 Laminar migration data presented herein are based on the following (images = adjacent 
sections; technical replicates = nonoverlapping regions of interest defined by a box of 150 pixels 
in width across cortex by between 600-800 pixels and covering the area from the ventricular zone 
to the pial surface): GFP (2 brains, 4-5 images per brain, 1-2 technical replicates per image, 
Gtf2ird1 (2 brains, 1-5 images, 2-4 technical replicates per image), Gtf2i (3 brains, 3-4 images 
each, 1-2 technical replicates per image), Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1 (1 brain, 4 images, 1-3 technical 
replicates per image), Smad7 (2 brains from Damon Page, 7 images total, 2-4 technical replicates 
per image), Smad7+Gtf2ird1 (1 brain, 10 images, 2-5 technical replicates per image), 
Smad7+Gtf2i (1 brain, 9 images, 1-5 technical replicates per image). 
 Neurite morphology at the end of embryogenesis data presented herein are based on the 
following lateral transfections: GFP (3 brains, 5 images, 30 cells), Gtf2i (6 brains, 6 images, 32 
cells), Gtf2ird1 (3 brains, 4 images, 30 cells), Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1 (2 brains, 4 images, 30 cells), 
Smad7 (2 brains, 3 images, 28 cells), Smad7+Gtf2ird1 (1 brain, 2 images, 29 cells), Smad7+Gtf2i 
(2 brains, 2 images, 30 cells). Analysis was not done in blind fashion, but every care was taken to 
evaluate all cells with clearly discernible neurites in each image. Gfp, Gtf2i, Gtf2ird1 cell analysis 
was done on different brains from the laminar migration data analysis. The angle of the apical 
neurite, as compared with a vertical line to the pial surface (measure of neurite orientation), and 
the length of primary neurite, as measured from the junction of the primary neurite to the cell 
body, were approximated using line measure in ImageJ. For analysis, angles outside of 15 
degrees from the vertical (-15 to 15 degrees) were considered abnormal (as in Meikle et al 2008), 
yielding percent abnormal neurite orientations. Raw length (in pixels), given the uniform sizes of 
images, yielded the percent change relative to Gfp controls in length of primary neurite. These 
primary neurites are likely primary dendrites, however MAP2 antibody for dendrites and TAU-1 
for axons needs to be done.  
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 6.2.6. Results 
Gtf2i and Gtf2ird1 act synergistically to modulate laminar patterning of pyramidal neurons 
 
Figure 6.2.2. Laminar patterning in Gtf2i, Gtf2ird1 and Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1 overexpression 
 
Distribution of GFP-only cells was similar to that reported elsewhere (e.g. Hand et al 2005).  
MANOVA (plasmid type as independent factor (Gfp, Gtf2ird1, Gtf2i, Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1), 
three bins (1-3 (VZ), 4-6 (IZ), 7-10 (CP)) as dependent variables) showed significant effect of 
plasmid for bins 1-3 (F(3,54)=4.8, p=.005) and bins 7-10 (F(3,54)=5.8, p=.002). Fisher’s LSD 
posthoc comparisons showed significant differences in bins 1-3 (ventricular zone) between the 
double plasmid (Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1) and Gfp (p=.001), and Gtf2ird1 (p=.003), and Gtf2i (p=.011). In 
bins 4-6 (intermediate zone) no differences between plasmids were observed. In bins 7-10 
(cortical plate), double plasmid Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1significantly differed from Gfp (p<.001), and from 
Gtf2i (p=.001), and from Gtf2ird1 (p=.003). 
Comparative analysis of modulation of laminar patterning by overexpression of Gtf2i or 
Gtf2ird1 by themselves vs GFP controls shows no statistically significant differences on laminar 
patterning. There are subtile effects in overexpression of Gtf2ird1 with slightly less cells making 
it up to the cortical plate and more cells remaining in the intermediate zone, espeically relative to 
Gtf2i overexpression. There is a subtile effect in overexpression Gtf2i with slighly more cells 
remaning in ventricular zone. Thus both Gtf2ird1 and Gtf2i show minor laminar patterning 
effects, but those are different in quality. 
144
 Simultanous overexpression of both Gtf2ird1 and Gtf2i however has a drastic effect on 
laminar patterning, causing many cells to remain behind in the ventricular plate, and shrinking 
the cortical plate. 
Smad7, a Potential Upstream Regulator, worsens laminar patterning effects of Gtf2ird1 and 
Gtf2i  
 
Figure 6.2.3. Laminar patterning in Smad7, Smad7+Gtf2i, and Smad7+Gtf2ird1 
overexpression 
 
MANOVA (plasmid type as independent factor (Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1, Smad7, Smad7+Gtf2i, 
Smad7+Gtf2ird1), three bins (1-3, 4-6, 7-10) as dependent variables) showed significant effect of 
plasmid for bins 1-3( F(3,93)=3.5, p=.018) and bins 7-10 (F(3,93)=2.98, p=.035); the differences 
in bins 4-6 approached significant trends (F(3,93)=2.5, p=.066). Fisher’s LSD posthoc 
comparisons showed significant differences in bins 1-3 (ventricular zone) between 
Smad7+Gtf2ird1 and Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1 (p=.01), and Smad7 alone (p=.016). In bins 4-6 
(intermediate zone) there were no significant differences between plasmids. In bins 7-10 (cortical 
plate), Smad7+Gtf2ird1 differed from Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1 (p=.031), and from Smad7+Gtf2i 
(p=.013). 
Smad7 by itself causes a severe depletion of cells in the cortical plate phenotype, more 
severe than caused by synergistic overexpression of Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1. There is a trend that does 
not reach significance where Smad7 overexpression with either Gtf2ird1 or Gtf2i causes even 
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 more cells to remain at the bottom of the ventricular zone. Thus either Smad7 acts in dominant 
fashion, or the effects of these genes run in parallel.  
 
Figure 6.2.4. Summary of Laminar Patterning in overexpression experiments 
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 Neurite morphology at the end of embryogenesis is abnormal with overexpression of Gtf2i, 
Gtf2ird1, and Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1  
 
 
Figure 6.2.5. Neurite Morphology at E18.5 
 
MANOVA showed significant effect of plasmid on both length (F(6,202)=8.6, p<.001) 
and abnormal angle of orientation(F(6,202)=3.9, p=.001).  
Fisher’s LSD post hoc comparisons showed significant differences in length between 
Smad7+Gtf2i and Gtf2i (p<.001), and Gtf2ird1 (p=.008), and Smad7+Gtf2ird1 (p=.004), and 
Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1 (p=.04); Gfp and Gtf2i (p<.001), Gtf2ird1 (p=.007), and Smad7+Gtf2ird1 
(p=.003); Gtf2i and Smad7 (p=.03); Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1 and Gtf2i (p<.001), and Gtf2ird1 (p<.001), 
and Smad7+Gtf2ird1 (p<.001), and Smad7 (p<.001), and Gfp (p=.046).  
Differences in abnormal angles of orientation showed significance between: Smad7+Gtf2i 
and Gtf2i (p=.008), and the difference with Smad7 approached significance (p=.06); 
Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1 was different from Smad7+Gtf2i (p=.015), Smad7+Gtf2ird1 (p=.009), and Gfp 
(p=.001), and almost different from Gtf2ird1 (p=.058); Gtf2i differed from Gfp (p=.001), 
Gtf2ird1 (p=.033) and Smad7+Gtf2ird1 (p=.005); Smad7 differed from Gfp (p=.008) and from  
Smad7+Gtf2ird1 (p=.04). 
Neurite length at the end of embryogenesis was found increased relative to Gfp control in 
both Gtf2i and Gtf2ird1. There is a trend that does no reach significance in the decrease of neurite 
length in double overexpression relative to Gfp, but a significant difference in neurite length 
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 between Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1 and Gtf2i and Gtf2ird1. The orientation of primary neurites was not 
significantly different from Gfp with Gtf2ird1, but was significantly different with Gtf2i and with 
double Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1 transfection.  
Overexpression of Smad7 and Smad7+Gtf2ird1 resulted in longer neurites relative to Gfp 
control and to double Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1 transfection, but similar length as in Gtf2i and Gtf2ird1. 
Length of neurites in overexpression of Smad7+Gtf2i was no different from Gfp control. The 
orientations of primary neurites tell a different story: overexpression of Smad7 had similar 
abnormal neurite angles to Gtf2i+Gtf2ird1 and to Gtf2i overexpression, however overexpression 
of Smad7+Gtf2ird1 and Smad7+Gtf2i seemed to bring this abnormality towards levels observed 
in Gfp controls and in Gtf2ird1 overexpression.  
6.2.7. Discussion 
Williams syndrome region, given opposing phenotypes in deletion and duplication 
syndromes, has dosage-sensitive genes that are contributing to the cortical abnormalities 
underlying behavioral deficits. Based on the data on atypical WS deletions available in the 
literature, it is possible to suggest that GTF2I contributes to hypersociability and linguistic 
deficits, and that GTF2IRD1 contributes to the facial dismorphology and visuospatial deficits. 
However prior to this study, the direct effect of these genes on brain development was not 
investigated (or published).  
We find that overexpression of each of these genes individually in mouse neocortex does 
not significantly affect laminar patterning, but does increase the length of neurites and increases 
the abnormal neurite orientations at the end of embryogenesis. Cooverexpression of both genes 
causes drastic depletion of cells in the cortical plate, shorter neurite lengths, and deviant primary 
neurite orientations. These results are consistent with previous findings – mouse Gtf2ird1 
heterozygotes show normal brain histology (Van Hagen et al (2007), but WS duplication (which 
involves overexpression of both GTF2I and GTF2IRD1) in humans results in thickened cortex 
and pockets of ectopic neurons around the ventricles (Torniero et al 2008). We find that when 
both are simultaneously overexpressed, Gtf2ird1 and Gtf2i act synergistically to cause abnormal 
laminar patterning. 
 We further investigated effects of modulating TGF-beta signaling, which is known to 
interact with GTF2I and GTF2IRD1. Overexpression of Smad7, a potent inhibitor of TGF-beta 
signaling, caused severe depletion of cells in the cortical plate, similar to co-overexpression of 
Gtf2ird1 and Gtf2i, and similar abnormal orientation of neurites, but slightly longer than normal 
neurite lengths. Co-overexpression of Smad7 with either Gtf2ird1 or Gtf2i did not rescue 
migration effects, and in fact seemed to slightly worsen them, however such co-overexpression 
seemed to bring the abnormalities in neurite orientation towards levels observed in Gfp controls; 
Smad7+Gtf2ird1 overexpression however increased neurite length more than in Smad7 alone, but 
Smad7+Gtf2i overexpression brought neurite length in line with Gfp controls. 
In further experiments, we plan on increasing the number of animals in each of the 
present analyses, and investigating synergistic effects of DYX1C1 downstream candidate gene 
and TGF-beta regulator candidate gene. 
While the present results do not tell us the specific role of Gtf2ird1 and Gtf2i in brain 
development, and they are based on data from a small number of animals, these results do 
indicate that Gtf2ird1 and Gtf2i certainly each contribute to neurite morphology (length and 
orientation) at the end of embryogenesis, and in synergism they contribute to abnormal laminar 
patterning. As such, these results suggest that abnormalities underlying brain development in 
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 Williams syndrome are similar to some of those abnormalities underlying brain development in 
dyslexia and in autism. In dyslexia and WS, it is laminar patterning that seems to be affected (e.g. 
Wang et al 2006; the present findings), and it is likely that abnormal laminar patterning 
contributes to abnormal connectivity and macrocephaly in autism (e.g. via PTEN (e.g. Bill & 
Geschwind 2009). In autism and WS, it is dendrite morphology, which is key for efficient 
synaptic function, that seems to be affected (e.g. Ramocki & Zoghbi 2008; Bourgeron 2009; the 
present findings). These abnormalities can well underlie abnormal brain development which can 
contribute to deficient language abilities. Successful acquisition and processing of language 
likely requires extensive integration and fine-grained processing of information from across 
multiple brain areas, and this process can well be disrupted by abnormalities in functional 
connectivity due to abnormal neuronal morphology and placement. 
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 7. Global Discussion & Conclusion 
 
This work set out to understand the reasons for children’s overuse of the definite 
determiner ‘the’. At stake are not only linguistic theories, but also the understanding of how 
children’s semantic and pragmatic language develops. One of the theoretical camps argues the 
problem is in the correct use of the ‘the’, i.e. children have adult semantic knowledge, however 
children do not yet have correct pragmatic interpretations, which primarily have to do with 
distinguishing between speaker/listener knowledge. The other camp argues it is a problem in 
children’s knowledge of the semantic principles that guide the correct use of ‘the’, specifically 
that of Maximality/Uniqueness (Wexler 2003), i.e. it is just another stage that maturation of 
linguistic principles goes through. 
 The main investigation focused on comprehension of definite determiner ‘the’ in parallel 
with indefinite determiner ‘a’, anaphors ‘another’ and ‘same’, and demonstrative ‘that’ within a 
context of a constrained act-out task where typically developing (TD) participants had to rely on 
their knowledge of determiners to correctly interpret anaphoric reference (referring to a salient or 
a nonsalient linguistic antecedent (established by e.g. an indefinite description)). In follow-up 
studies, we investigated whether there is indeed individual correlation between knowledge of 
theory of mind (as would be expected by pragmatic theories) and knowledge of the definite 
determiner, and we also investigated whether children show similar deficits as they do with ‘the’ 
in free relative clauses which require knowledge of semantic Maximality.  
We find that children are aware of the salient entity in the context set as early as three 
years (as manifested by knowledge of ‘another’ and ‘same’), and children are aware of other’s 
minds by 5 years, however children begin to show adult-like interpretation of ‘the’ and free 
relative clauses only by the age of 6.5 years, with majority of children showing full knowledge by 
8 years. Such pattern is at odds with pragmatic deficit theories, but is in line with specifically 
semantic deficit theory.  
Turning now to language development in individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders, 
we find no weird and no atypical patterns of acquisition. Language development in autism 
spectrum disorders and Williams syndrome is known to be variable, with significant delays in 
syntactic and pragmatic abilities. However these disorders present an ultimate test of the 
competing theories: in both ASD and WS, especially in ASD, the recurrent deficit is in 
pragmatics – in awareness of other minds, in formulating coherent discourses, although the 
severities of such deficits seem to correlate with overall verbal and cognitive functioning. 
Whether these disorders are impaired in semantic knowledge, prior to work done in this thesis, 
was unknown beyond studies of omission of functional morphemes (such as ‘the’) in ASD. 
We find that participants with autism spectrum disorders and those with Williams 
syndrome actually look like TD 3-6 year olds in their performance on determiners (Figure 7.1). 
Over 50% of participants show no knowledge of definite determiners, with less than 30% 
showing good knowledge, and with remaining children comprehending the saliency of the unique 
referent better when referred to with ‘that’ than with ‘the’ – a pattern found in TD children, 
peaking at age 5. If the deficits seen in TD 3-6 year olds are mirrored by the deficits observed in 
neurodevelopmental disorders, and if we are arguing that deficits in typical acquisition are 
semantic in nature, it follows that deficits seen in neurodevelopmental disorders are also semantic 
in nature. 
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 It must be noted that averaging performance across autism spectrum disorders muddles 
the linguistic endophenotypes within ASD – children with autism showed no knowledge of 
determiners, while children with Asperger syndrome showed adult-like or partial (child-like) 
knowledge of determiners – understanding ‘that’ better than ‘the’. Children with PDD-NOS 
diagnosis formed a mixed group in knowledge of determiners, but a coherent group in that they 
all had milder autistic features and milder cognitive deficits than those with autism, but were 
worse off on such measures than those with Asperger syndrome. Actually, children with PDD-
NOS as a group look like children with Williams syndrome on measures of determiners, even 
though they have better (near-normal) nonverbal reasoning and vocabulary abilities, whereas 
children with WS have below-normal abilities. Another way to interpret the results is to observe 
that the effect of Williams syndrome disorder on one’s knowledge of definite determiners is 
much less severe than the effect of autism, which erases all traces of knowledge. Milder form of 
autism (PDD-NOS) and WS show similar distributions of patterns. Asperger syndrome stands in 
its own right – outperforming all other developmental disorders.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Patterns of Performance on ‘the’ and ‘that’ in all Participants: 
Typically Developing Children (TD) of 3-6 years of age, 6.5-9 years of age, and teenagers 
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD), and Williams Syndrome (WS) 
 
“A” pattern denotes good performance on both ‘the’ and ‘that’. 
“B” pattern denotes a bad performance on ‘the’ with a relatively better performance on ‘that’. 
“C” pattern denotes a bad performance on ‘that’ with a relatively better performance on ‘the’. 
“D” pattern denotes a bad performance on both ‘the’ and ‘that’. 
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 Another point worth noting, is that in ASD and WS disorders, it is the typically 
developing, youngest, grammar (TROG) controls who come closest to matching the performance 
of participants with developmental problems. In other words, deficits in determiners manifested 
by participants with ASD and WS are worse than expected given their nonverbal reasoning and 
their verbal ability (vocabulary knowledge) levels. In case of Williams syndrome, there is a very 
close match between WS and their TROG controls in terms of their semantic/pragmatic 
knowledge; in case of autism spectrum disorders, TROG controls outperform ASD participants.  
 
 In addition to human behavioral investigations, this work set out to investigate the effects 
of genes involved in Williams syndrome and in Williams syndrome duplication on brain 
development using mouse models, in an attempt to understand how genetic abnormality 
contributes to abnormal brain development that underlies abnormal language in Williams 
syndrome and in the duplication disorder. We find that Gtf2i and Gtf2ird1, two transcription 
factors that are causal to many of WS phenotypes, act synergistically to cause abnormalities in 
laminar patterning and in neurite morphology at the end of embyogenesis, both of which are key 
for establishing appropriate cortical layering which in turn is key for efficient information 
processing. 
 
A few questions remain to be answered in the study of semantic and pragmatic language 
development.  
 
There is a sizeable group of younger typically developing children who show good 
knowledge of ‘the’ before age 7 - are they precocious in their linguistic development, are they 
receiving any kind of super special input, what is driving their knowledge ahead of other children 
of the same age? Similarly, there are some children who show deficits in ‘the’ when they are 7 or 
8 years old – are they disadvantaged in any way in their language development? To answer this 
question, we are investigating children’s nonverbal reasoning, vocabulary levels, overall 
grammatical comprehension levels, as well as children’s syntactic knowledge of actional and 
psychological passives, and children’s syntactic and pragmatic interpretation of personal and 
reflexive pronouns (Modyanova, Perovic, Hirsch, Wexler, in preparation). The answer to this 
question can also be provided by a behavioral genetic twin study of comprehension of 
determiners – do monozygotic twins who share 100% of their genes show more similar trends in 
development of determiners than do dizygotic twins who only share 50% of their genes? To what 
extent do shared environmental factors contribute to development of determiners? 
Are children really that bad at interpreting Maximality in free relative clauses, and is there 
true individual correlation between knowledge of Maximality in free relative clauses and 
knowledge of Maximality in the definite determiner? To answer this question, we are 
investigating comprehension of definite descriptions in parallel with free relatives (items that 
involve maximality in their interpretation) and in parallel with items involving scalar 
implicatures, within the context of a picture-matching task that skirts around the issues with 
presupposition failures.  
Are there subgroups of knowledge within WS, and if yes, what determines those 
subgroups best? In case of children with ASD, it is their overall grammatical development that 
predicts their knowledge of determiners, and similar delineation in participants with WS was 
presently impossible due to small number of subjects. 
157
 What about comprehension of determiners in other disorders? Children with Specific 
Language Impairment (SLI) present a perfect contrast to children with autism – both populations 
have severe language difficulties, but children with SLI have no theory of mind problems! (e.g. 
Colle, Baron-Cohen & Hill 2006). Children with Down syndrome have atrocious language skills, 
but have relatively better social awareness capacities than do children with Williams syndrome 
and autism. Crucially, what about children with the duplication of the Williams syndrome locus? 
 Are there brain regions that are uniquely involved in interpretation of determiners, and 
how does maturation of these brain areas progress? For example, adult’s Broca’s area lights up 
upon encountering syntactic violations of inflection and auxiliary omission of the type that 
children produce when they are 2-3 years old, but adult’s parietal area lights up when 
encountering syntactic violations in subject-verb agreement of the kind that children never make 
(Kovelman et al 2009). Notably, children with SLI show reversed perisylvian activity asymmetry 
when auditorily processing ‘the’ in stories, depressing left hemisphere temporal activity and 
enhancing processing in right temporal area – this a direct link between deviant neurophysiology 
and processing of definite determiner is established (Shafer et al 2001). What kind of brain 
responses do omissions or mistakes in determiners, or failures of maximality presupposition, 
elicit in normal and impaired adults and in children? 
Are there any polymorphisms in any genes that can be uniquely associated with faster or 
slower acquisition of determiners (or for that matter, any aspect of the maturing language 
faculty)? We already know that development of syntactic constructions, such as passives and 
verbal inflections, has substantial heritability but little shared environment effects, with higher 
correlations between abilities of monozygotic twins than dizygotic twins (Ganger et al 2005, 
Ganger 1998). SLI Consortium (2002, 2004; Falcaro et al 2008) identified two quantitative trait 
loci in families with language impairment: SLI1 locus on 16q (10.5 Mb region: 16q23.1-16q24.2) 
associating with phonological short-term memory impairments (via non-word repetition test 
(NWR)), and SLI2 locus on 19q (23.5 Mb region: 19q12-19q13.42) associating with syntactic 
impairments (via test of verbal inflections by Wexler and Rice). Bishop et al (2005) found via 
DeFries-Fulker analysis (predicting one twin’s abilities based on the other twin’s abilities) that 
verbal inflection does not associate with NWR, but verbal inflection does associate with the 
sentence structure subtest of a standardized grammar test, suggesting 19q may be responsible not 
only for verbal inflections, but for all sentential syntax. Alarcon et al (2002, 2008) linked delay in 
producing a first word in males with autism to CNTNAP2 (7q35) – a gene in the neurexin family 
involved in synaptic function. Vernes et al (2008) show that CNTNAP2 is a downstream target of 
FOXP2, a transcription factor involved in a human familial speech and language disorder, and 
that a specific haplotype of CNTNAP2 is associated with the phonological working memory 
deficit endophenotype in specific language impairment. Thus, a shared genetic mechanism can be 
the cause of a language impairment/delay endophenotype across neurodevelopmental disorders. 
Dyslexia studies found several candidate regions (although none overlapping with SLI), and four 
candidate genes – three involved in neuronal migration (DYX1C1, DCDC2, KIAA0319) and one 
involved in activity dependent synaptic plasticity and connectivity (ROBO1) (Galaburda et al 
2006). Notably, DYX1C1 is a downstream target of GTF2I (a WS gene) (Tapia-Paez et al 2008) – 
suggesting a genetic link between dyslexia and Williams syndrome. Observe, that the more 
precise the phenotypic biomarker – e.g. verbal inflections, or ability to read – the easier 
(relatively) it is to track down the genetic correlates of the behavioral biomarkers.  
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  How do such ‘linguistic’ genes actually contribute to language development on a cellular 
and molecular basis? FOXP2 is known to modulate plasticity – the flexibility of connections 
between neurons which is key for learning (e.g. Haesler et al 2007), and CNTNAP2 and ROBO1 
are both involved in synaptic function – also key for plasticity. Key genes for dyslexia, and as 
this dissertation has found, mouse homologues of key genes in Williams syndrome – GTF2I and 
GTF2IRD1 – affect laminar patterning – the maturing of neurons and the formation of 
appropriate cortical layering which is key for efficient information processing. In a unique study, 
Dediu and Ladd (2007) find an association between newly evolved alleles in genes contributing 
to human brain growth and languages that use tone mark semantic distinctions, also implicating 
brain growth as a key modulator of linguistic abilities. Notably, none of these genes are ‘new’ in 
evolutionary terms, i.e. they have key roles in development of other species of the animal 
kingdom, e.g. FOX genes have transcriptional functions conserved from yeast to humans. 
However, modulations in expressions or in alleles of these genes are present and are the likely 
contributor to human language abilities. For example, “345 genes were identified as differentially 
expressed between superior temporal gyrus and the remaining cerebral cortex”, of which 
CNTNAP2 showed an unusual pattern of expression not found in other species (Abrahams et al 
2007). 
 
Instead of providing a final word on the maturation of definite determiner ‘the’ in 
children, this dissertation opens many possible avenues for future investigations. 
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